Hatred in Hesiod

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Abstract:

This thesis examines the conception and role of hatred in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* of Hesiod. Chapter One focuses on Styx as the central figure of hatred, and examines how she can be understood as hate in relation to her function as oath and river. Based on this, I analyse what is revealed about the role of hatred in Hesiod's cosmogony and the newly ordered universe established by Zeus. Chapter Two introduces the children of Styx and examines them as a group before focusing on the first two children, Zelos and Nike, to investigate them closely in order to understand how the qualities they represent interact with and inform our understanding of hate. Chapter Three examines the other two children, Kratos and Bie, for the same purposes. In Chapter Four I take what has been discovered in the previous chapters and present a model and understanding of hatred that can then be used to examine instances in the texts where hate is mentioned. It will also be used to cautiously suggest and analyse instances in the poems where, even though hatred is not explicitly mentioned, elements of hatred appear to be at work.

This analysis aims to contribute to our understanding of emotions in the ancient world and the history of emotions, as well as deepening our understanding of Hesiod's own personal conception of the universe.

Sam

Always something there to remind me.

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Finally, to Dominik, for everything.

Author’s Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: ..... DATE:.....

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Preface

I have written this thesis with a goal to make it as accessible as possible. Numerous fruitful conversations with academics from other fields of study has only strengthened my firm belief in the value of interdisciplinary collaborations. As such, I have adopted several conventions that an experienced Classicist might consider overly explanatory. My hope is that these decisions will make my work more accessible to the public at large, academics from other disciplines, and students of Classics less familiar with the material at hand. To this end I have endeavoured to give the dates for all ancient authors whose works I discuss, or of the dates of the work if the authorship is uncertain. I have also given explanations for points of Greek grammar and translation that a scholar more familiar with ancient Greek will already understand. These explanations and comments are generally confined to footnotes. For the same reason I have, whenever I have adapted a translation, given an explanation for the changes I have made. Again, these explanations are to be found in the footnotes.

Introduction

In the last few decades research into the nature and function of emotions has burgeoned. It now encompasses a wide array of approaches, including neurological, ethical, cognitive, psychoanalytical, sociological, and evolutionary perspectives. The history of emotions and their representations in cultures has also become an area of great interest to scholars, and classicists are no exception. Recent publications have addressed the topic of emotions in the ancient world more broadly,[1] while other works have focused on specific emotions.[2] But there has been very little work surrounding hatred.[3] Indeed, this is the case for all disciplines that examine emotions. Compared to the wealth of research accorded to emotions such as love and anger, the amount of scholarship dedicated to hatred is minor.

The purposes of this work are twofold: first, to broaden our understanding of Hesiod, his conception of cosmogony and universal governing principles, and the role hatred plays in his thoughts; secondly, to contribute to our understanding of the history of emotions. The contemporary relevance is obvious: anything that provides us with a potential model for how to understand a society's beliefs about the roles, functions and morality of emotions invites us to compare and reassess our own understanding of emotions. For what has always been evident is that emotions both structure and disrupt the interactions of people. What is equally evident from a mere glance at the current state of the world is that the way the majority of the West handles its emotions, and hatred in particular, is deeply destructive.

Why Hesiod?

My intention when I first began my research was to investigate hatred in archaic literature more broadly, including both philosophical (Empedocles) and tragic (Aeschylus) texts, as well as both Hesiod and Homer. It became apparent, however, that I had not the space to do justice to them all. Given the choice between presenting

[1] E.g. Konstan (2006a); Chaniotis (2013); Chaniotis & Ducrey (2014); Cairns & Fulkerson (2015);
[2] E.g. Harris (2001); Braund & Most (2003); Konstan & Rutter (2003); Kalimtzis (2012); Fulkerson (2013); Sanders (2014); Caston & Kaster (2016); Lateiner & Spatharas (2016).
[3] Konstan is a rare exception. See (2006b).

a brief overview of four sources, or an in-depth choice of one source, I opted for the latter. Of the four candidates, I chose to focus on Hesiod. He alone presents Hate as a personified figure, in the character of Styx. Styx's appearance in Hesiod is in the *Theogony*, but there is much that is relevant to an investigation of hatred in the *Works and Days* as well. These two poems will be my focus. It is now accepted that the ending of the *Theogony* as we have it has been altered and added to; the disagreement is only over where the 'genuine' Hesiod ends. But even those scholars most generous in their retention of Hesiodic material think that the original poem ended at verse 964. I shall therefore include nothing past that point. For the same reason I have excluded the *Shield of Herakles*. The current consensus is that it is spurious, and indeed, it has been considered of dubious authenticity since antiquity.

The contents of the *Theogony* and of the *Works and Days* differ vastly. The former is a cosmogony, giving Hesiod's account of the construction and ordering of the universe, while the latter is a combination of practical and moral advice, along with a healthy dose of reproach towards Hesiod's brother Perses. Examining both poems therefore gives us insight into how Hesiod perceived emotions to function for both gods and men.

What are Emotions?

In order to study the function of a specific emotion we must first have some notion of what an emotion *is*. The abundance of literature on the topic attests to the complexity of defining and understanding emotions. Glancing at the history of the study of emotions it is immediately clear that there are few things that are universally agreed upon. Nico Frijda and Klaus Scherer summarise four 'relatively uncontroversial' features of emotions. Firstly, they are occasioned by an event that the subject considers important in that it is 'directly linked to its sensitivities, needs, goals, values, and general well-being'. Secondly, emotions provide a 'strong motivational force' for a response to the triggering event, producing what they term 'a state of action readiness', in which the subject is ready to respond to the event in a way it has determined will help achieve a desired aim (e.g. fleeing, appeasing, intimidating). Thirdly, emotions engage the entire person. Finally, emotions bestow 'control precedence', i.e. they claim 'priority in the control of behaviour and experience'

(though they do not always get it – sometimes emotions override concerns for consequences, sometimes concerns for consequences override the expression of emotion).[4]

Note that this list also attempts to define emotions as distinct from other 'affective states' such as moods, attitudes, and preferences. Hatred is often classified as a mood rather than an emotion. However, the distinctions between emotions and moods are not hard and fast, and hate is just as often classified as an emotion. In a series of studies conducted by Beverley Fehr and James Russell, participants showed a tendency to categorise hatred as an emotion. When asked to list examples of emotions, hatred was the sixth most common example, given by 44.5% of participants. In a second study that asked participants to assign general 'categories' to specific words, hatred was again the sixth most common word to be categorised as an emotion (again 44.5% of the time). In another study 'hate' was highly rated as an 'extremely good example' of an emotion (second only to love in one study, and to anger and love in another). In a final study not a single participant disagreed with the statement that hate was an example of an emotion.[5]

When it comes to Hesiod, there is no evidence of a distinction between emotions and moods – indeed, though things we might call emotions or moods are present in Hesiod, no words are used that we might take to mean either 'emotion' *or* 'mood'. Given the absence of a distinction, I shall use the term 'emotion' when discussing hatred in Hesiod.

The discussion of the differences between moods and emotions, and which emotional states belong in which category is but one of the battlegrounds in the field of emotion research which is relevant to us. We must also address another: the issue of whether emotions are universal or culturally specific.

[4] Frijda & Scherer (2009).
[5] Fehr & Russell (1984). These results were replicated by Shaver et al. (1987).

Universal Versus Culturally Specific Emotions

With the exception of a few individuals, the experiencing of emotions is universal to humans. This much can be agreed upon. Which emotions, if any, are universally experienced is where the disagreements begin. At first glance we might consider it obvious that some emotions are universal – could there really be a culture or people that lacked anger, or love? But as Keith Oatley notes, even within a culture, what we consider an emotion such as love to be has changed: 'If you were to hear now of a father forbidding his 39-year-old daughter to marry… you would regard the father's possessive emotions as inappropriate… In other words, our idea of love and even its experience in relation to parents and to partners has changed'.[6] Of course, we could say that whilst the cultural norms surrounding the appropriate expression and targets of an emotion have changed, there is some core element that remains unchanged and universal – surely the neurological processes involved in love have not changed in the past century?

Throughout the history of the study of emotions, multiple lists of basic emotions have been proposed. The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, a Sanskrit treatise on dramaturgy, attributed to Bharata, and compiled some time between 300 BCE and 200 CE, contains a chapter that discusses eight *sthāyi-bhāva*. As Richard Shweder, Jonathan Haidt, Randall Horton, and Craig Joseph note, translating this into English immediately poses a problem – there is no single satisfactory English equivalent, and suggested translations include 'emotions', 'mental states' and feelings'.[7] We shall discuss the issue of translation in more detail shortly; for now, I shall present the vocabulary adopted by Shweder et al., who list them as: sexual passion, amusement, sorrow, anger, fear, perseverance, disgust, and wonder.[8]

Compare this list to attempts by contemporary Western scholars to produce a list of basic emotions. Carroll Izard and Sandra Buechler proposed a list of ten: interest, joy, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame/shyness, and guilt.[9] Immediately we see that there is some overlap (anger, fear, sorrow/sadness), but also some differences: contempt, shame, and interest are missing from the *Nāṭyaśāstra*;

[6] Oatley (2004: 9).
[7] Shweder et al. (2008: 410).
[8] Shweder et al. (2008: 411).
[9] Izard & Buechler (1980: 168).

sexual passion and perseverance are missing from Izard and Buechler's list; and the overlap between amusement/joy, sorrow/sadness, and wonder/surprise is highly debateable.[10] What of disgust? Despite being translated using the English word 'disgust', Shweder et al. suggest that the word in question, *jugupsā*, is 'more like a domain of the loathsome'.[11]

The most famous list compiled by a contemporary Western scholar is that of Paul Ekman, produced using data from studies of the recognition of emotions through facial expressions. Along with E. Richard Sorenson and Wallace Friesen, Ekman identified six universal basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear.[12] Ekman and Friesen conducted further research and, in a study comparing the ability of American college students and New Guineans to recognise emotive facial expressions, found that the New Guineans struggled to distinguish fear from surprise.[13] Based on this research, Ekman and Harriet Oster adjusted the list to just five emotions, combining fear and surprise as one,[14] and later Ekman and Friesen separated out disgust and contempt.[15]

Jonathan Haidt and Dacher Keltner conducted similar studies using a group of 40 American participants and 40 Indian participants, and noted that even among the basic emotions, some were easier for participants to identify than others: anger was the most well-recognised of Ekman's list, and contempt the least. They also found that embarrassment was more frequently identified than Ekman's contempt or fear, and that American participants were notably better at recognising Ekman's basic emotions than Indian participants.[16] Based on their results, they suggested that a gradient model of recognition was far more appropriate than attempts to classify an emotion as either culturally specific or universal.[17]

Even with those emotions that had the highest recognition rates, the effects of culture

[10] Schechner (1988) tried to make such comparison with Ekman's list of basic emotions but, as Shweder et al. note, the facial expressions do not correspond (2008: 411-12).
[11] Shweder et al. (2008: 412).
[12] Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen (1969).
[13] Ekman & Friesen (1971:128).
[14] Ekman & Oster (1979: 531).
[15] Ekman & Friesen (1986). See also Ekman & Heider (1988).
[16] Haidt & Keltner (1998: 257; 261).
[17] Haidt & Keltner (1998: 263).

still loom large: the circumstances under which an emotion might be felt, and if felt, might be considered moral or immoral, productive or destructive, appropriate or inappropriate, as well as how it might be publicly demonstrated, are all governed by societal and cultural norms. This is not something proponents of universal emotions dispute. Ekman et al. are only too happy to attribute any difference in facial expressions of basic emotions to the influence of culture.[18]

If we approach the issue of universal emotions from the perspective of a translator, an obvious flaw with much of the research that has been done comparing the display of emotions between cultures emerges. There is a notable absence of consideration and discussion of the translations used and precise meanings of the words chosen - sometimes this important aspect of the methodology it is not documented at all. Pointing to the fact that English speaking scholars have assumed that English words are appropriate for naming universals, Anna Wierzbicka rightly asks, 'how is it that these emotions are so neatly identified by means of English words?'[19] This criticism is, of course, equally applicable to the study cited above regarding the classification of hate as an emotion – we cannot assume that all contemporary cultures would answer in the same ways.

But translation is possible because the vast majority of the time we can find words in each language with enough semantic overlap so as to allow meaningful communication. However, the fact that there is never perfect correlation means that, even if universal emotions do indeed exist, our access to them is always filtered through our culture and language. No theory of emotional universals can be accurate unless it first takes account of the meaning of all different emotion words in all cultures. Though my aim is to study 'hatred' in Hesiod, the results will also be just a tiny part of the work necessary to understand 'hatred' in more universal terms.[20]

[18] Ekman (1992c).
[19] Wierzbicka (1986: 584).
[20] Despite arguing against the methodology of Ekman and Friesen, Wierzbicka, along with Goddard, does think that some sort of universal concept of some emotions can be reached by using a 'metalanguage' containing around 60 'semantic primes' that can be 'can be expressed equally well and equally precisely in other languages' (2004: 155-6). But their own examples of their metalanguage in action include definitions that fail to properly distinguish different emotions from each other, and certainly lack the cultural nuance that we are interested in at present.

However, whilst my own approach is based on the premise that there is something different about Hesiod's concept of hatred compared to the contemporary Western concept, we must also understand whether Hesiod himself understood emotions as either culturally specific or universal. Clearly, this is not a question that Hesiod explicitly addressed, but the answer is nevertheless obvious. Hesiod's focus is cosmogony – an explanation of how the universe began, and why it is the way it is. Through the actions of successive generations of gods, Titans, and other divine beings, the world is shaped into the form that Hesiod saw before him, and those deities include many emotions personified as physical, external forces (e.g. Eros, Styx, Philotes, Aidos). As personified forces they are out there in the world, visiting whom they will. It is the same physical manifestation of an emotion that visits and interacts with all humans, and even other gods. Hesiod's emotions are universal – not in a contemporary psychological or evolutionary sense, but in the sense that they pervade the universe and represent some of its governing forces.

Translation and Emotional Language

Quite apart from this issue of whether emotions are culturally specific or universal, language is an important component of understanding and studying emotions, especially for our current investigation, given the textual nature of the evidence. There are several issues of language that we must address.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of language in understanding and communicating about emotions, Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore, and Alan Collins also point out that 'the enterprise of mapping emotion words onto emotion structures' is not the same as establishing the nature of the emotions themselves.[21] Whilst this is certainly the case, language is still, of necessity, the way we understand the nature of the emotions, and understanding the connotations of emotion words and the contexts in which they are used will clearly aid any endeavour to establish the nature of the emotion being studied. Though I take as a starting point a group of words (which we will discuss in more detail later) already identified as being translatable to 'hate', the ultimate goal is to understand the emotional structures Hesiod has applied those

[21] Ortony, Clore & Collins (1988: 2).

words to. Thus, the reader must bear in mind that when I discuss Hesiod's 'hatred' I mean 'the emotion represented by the cluster of Greek words discussed, which have been identified as meaningfully translatable by the English word hatred.'

Of course, a specific emotion need not be explicitly mentioned in a text in order for it to be understood that a certain character is feeling that certain emotion. Once the nature of the emotion represented by a certain word has been examined using the instances in which that word appears, we will have an understanding of the types of relationships and situations that the emotion appears in, how it operates, what types of actions it provokes, what, if any, moral sentiments are attached to it, and how it is physically portrayed – the elements of emotional experience that others have referred to as 'scripts'. Using this information we can then tentatively look elsewhere in the text to see if there are other instances in which the script associated with the emotion word is present, even when the emotion word itself is not. This line of enquiry can only be pursued cautiously because, without a direct statement of what the emotion in question is, there is always room for error. Hesiod rarely gives descriptions of facial expressions or postures (information which would be highly useful in identifying a script) and focuses instead on actions and genealogy, and the same action can be prompted by many different emotions – or none at all. Nevertheless, examining the genealogy will allow us to investigate related concepts, which will help provide tentative insight into what action scripts are relevant to understanding his conception of hatred.

But even the above considerations do not represent the full complexity of the linguistic issues we must consider even before we turn to ancient Greek: English itself has a notable amount of words that are taken, by different people, at different times, to be synonymous, or very closely associated, with 'hate.' When we combine this fact with the reluctance of emotion theorists to define what they mean by specific emotion words a highly frustrating situation emerges.

One clear example of the problem is evident in Robert Solomon's attempts to differentiate between 'contempt', 'resentment', and 'hatred.' Solomon defines 'contempt' as an emotion felt by one who considers themselves 'superior' towards

those that they consider 'inferior'.[22] But the linguistic examples of metaphors given as examples of how we talk about those we hold in contempt – "a rat", "a worm", "scum", etc. are highly identifiable elements of what we now call 'hate speech' due to their use by genocidal regimes to dehumanise their victims and justify violence against them. Solomon then says that the people towards whom we direct such language are those we 'loathe', parenthetically commenting that this is a 'variety of contempt', without defining it any further.

As for hatred, Solomon simply says that it 'is an emotion of equality' and that it 'seeks out equals'.[23] But this explains nothing. Whilst it makes sense that inequality between two parties can cause negative emotions between them, it cannot be the case that it is the relationship of equality that causes hatred. What is it that an equal does which causes us to hate them? Solomon does not say. It is hatred between ethnic groups and nationalities that Solomon later claims cause war and violence,[24] but such hostilities are driven by the fact that at least one group thinks that the other is inferior. By Solomon's own definition, the feeling involved in ethnic conflict should be contempt, not hatred. The alternative is to commit to the idea that hatred, and thus war, only happens between groups that consider themselves equals. I do not believe that this is the position that Solomon intended to assume, but rather a slippage in terminological uses that undermines the attempt to distinguish them.

Resentment, on the other hand, Solomon (clearly influenced heavily by Nietzsche) defines as 'the feeling of the weak towards the strong… in history, slaves resented their masters. Resentment is always on the defensive and it is always looking up at those considered oppressive.'[25] But it is not at all clear that this power dynamic is understood by lay people as essential to resentment. When we turn to the Oxford English Dictionary we find the first definition is a 'sense of grievance; an indignant sense of injury or insult received or perceived; (a feeling of) ill will, bitterness, or anger against a person or thing; the manifestation of such feeling'. There is no mention here of a power dynamic; further, both anger and indignation closely associated with resentment in this definition are emotions that Solomon has elsewhere

[22] Solomon (2006: 211).
[23] Solomon (2006: 211-12).
[24] Solomon (2006: 180).
[25] Solomon (2006: 211).

defined as quite distinct from resentment.[26]

All of this shows us two things. First, that even when the very nature of certain emotions is under discussion, our own language use frequently frustrates the distinctions we are trying to impose. Solomon uses contempt and hatred interchangeably, even whilst defining them as separate things. Secondly, it demonstrates (some of) the large range of emotions (or words) that, in English, we associate with hatred.

The problem can be seen even more starkly with the below map (Fig. 1). For each word, arrows have been drawn to other words that are mentioned in the Oxford English Dictionary definition for that word. If we examine the interrelations following the direction of the arrows, we see that: seven have one degree of separation from hatred, six have two degrees of separation, two have three degrees of separation, two have four degrees of separation, one has five, and another one has six (surprisingly, it is contempt). Ignoring the direction of the arrows we have: ten words with one degree of separation, six with two degrees of separation, three with three degrees of separation, and two with four degrees of separation. 'Intense dislike' is missing from these lists, for the obvious reason of not having its own dictionary entry.

Hatred is given in the meanings of: enemy, animosity, enmity, detestation, abhorrence, and malice. And hatred's meanings are: malevolence, loathing, hostility, animosity, intense dislike, and aversion. Hatred *is* given as an obsolete meaning for loathing, though I am at a loss to explain why they think it obsolete. Note that the only overlap between those words that mention hatred in their definition, and those words included as part of the definition of hatred is aversion (and loathing).

[26] Solomon (2006: 20): Anger and (moral) indignation are distinct from each other; but 'righteous' anger is the same as (moral) indignation (175); both lack Solomon's specification that we consider the target to be someone we consider oppressive. Indignation is always prefaced as 'moral'.



Fig 1.

And this is not even a complete list: repulsion, offensiveness, distaste, antipathy, horror, and evil are all given as part of the meanings for at least one word represented in the map.[27] What this demonstrates is that the exact meaning of hatred is highly complex (and perhaps even unsolvable) even when working in one language, let alone when we involve the extra hurdle of translation.

What does all of this mean for an inquiry into hatred in Hesiod? One simple answer is that it means that we must recognise that, just as there is a constellation of closely

[27] Marcus (2002: 119) laments the plethora of words English has for the 'phenomenon' of hatred, listing: 'malice, animus, malevolence, ill will, animosity, bitterness, hate, hostility, disgust, aversion, antipathy, abhorrence, distaste, repugnance, enmity, displeasure, umbrage, petulance, resentment, repulsion, annoyance, disapprobation, disapproval, and antagonism' as 'only a few of them' (yet in the next sentence Marcus also calls all of them 'variants of revulsion and loathing').

related words in English, so too, there will be in Ancient Greek. Whatever words we start our investigation with, we must be open to the possibility of other, closely related words revealing themselves.

We turn now to investigate how contemporary theorists define hatred. There are a plethora of different approaches to emotions which we could turn to for attempts to define hatred. Some, such as evolutionary and neurological approaches are of no use to us; they are simply not relevant to Hesiod. Others, such as the phenomenological perspective will provide some limited insight, but Hesiod's texts lack the type of data that would be required to make this a highly fruitful avenue to pursue. A useful starting point for understanding hatred will be to examine prototype analyses of the emotion. Having gained a basic insight into qualities associated with hatred, we will be better placed to examine hatred from two more perspectives: psychological, and sociological. These are the dominant, and complementary, modes that I will utilise in examining hatred in Hesiod. Due to a dearth of research that specifically looks at hatred as a moral or immoral emotion, I have not included a separate section on such an approach. The morality of hatred, however, is inextricably interwoven throughout both the sociological and psychological approaches.

The discussion of these different modes of analysis and the definitions they produce will illuminate the complex nature of hatred, and reveal various elements of the emotion which we must take note of in Hesiod's works if we are to truly understand the nature and function of hatred in his poems.

What is Hatred?: Prototype Analysis

Before we can discuss the best way to analyse hatred, we must have some understanding of what hatred *is*. As we have already seen, this is a question that has confused theorists. One approach that might shed some light on at least the lay understanding of hatred is that of prototype analysis. We have already seen this type of analysis used to demonstrate that the lay concept of hatred strongly identifies it as an emotion, rather than a mood. The theory behind such analyses eschews the notion that a certain quality can be said to simply belong or not belong to a category, and instead investigates the *degree* to which a quality or idea can be said to be typical of a

specific concept or category. The idea has seen notable use in the study of emotions – unsurprising, given the difficulty in defining specific emotions, and the conceptual overlap we have already seen demonstrated. A prototype analysis of a specific emotion is an investigation into which qualities or ideas are associated with an emotion, and to what degree. Those qualities that receive high recognition rates can be grouped as 'core' ideas relating to the central concept, whilst those still associated with the concept, but less strongly, can be classed as 'peripheral'.

In 1969 Joel Davitz conducted a study investigating the ideas associated with 50 different emotions. The study had 50 participants, who used a pre-generated checklist of over 500 statements to describe different emotions, including hate, contempt, disgust, resentment, dislike, and anger.[28] There was notable overlap between all five emotions, but particularly hate, contempt, anger, and resentment. All four had core physical component of the whole body feeling tense, and a psychological component of feeling easily irritated. They also all shared a feeling of a tense face/mouth, though this was reported by just under half of participants in the case of hate (48%).[29]

The strongest overlap was between hate and anger, which also shared core characteristics of an impulse to 'hurt, to hit, or to kick someone else', or 'to strike out, to pound, or smash, or kick, or bite; to do something that will hurt', a sense of being 'caught up and overwhelmed by the feeling' and of being 'gripped by the situation'.[30] To a lesser extent (i.e. the quality was core for one emotion but peripheral to the other, or peripheral to both) they also shared physical characteristics of clenched teeth (38% for hate, 52% for anger), clenched fists (46% for hate, 52% for anger), 'muscular rigidity' (42% for hate, 40% for anger), increased blood pressure (46% for hate, 72% for anger), a quickened heartbeat (38% for hate, 52% for anger), as well as the sensation of 'a tight knotted feeling' in the stomach (46% for hate, 38% for anger). The also shared characteristics of a sensation of a 'narrowing of the senses', where 'attention becomes riveted on one thing' (40% for hate, 52% for anger), of feeling about to explode or burst, (46% for hate, 48% for anger), wanting to 'strike out' or 'explode' but holding back (50% for hatred, 46% for anger), and feeling

[28] 'Dislike' was an odd case in that there were no results at all that were given by a majority of participants.
[29] Davitz (1969: 35-36, 42-43, 64-65, 79).
[30] Davitz (1969: 35-36, 64-65).

'excitement' or 'over stimulated' (34% for hate, 64% for anger) as well as desires to 'say something nasty' (62% for hate, 42% for anger), and to get revenge (54% for hate, 40% for anger).[31]

A peripheral component of hate that differentiated it from anger was a feeling of being 'trapped, closed up, boxed, fenced in, tied down, inhibited' (40%). This sense of feeling trapped can be grouped with other peripheral components of hate, such as feeling 'under a heavy burden' (34%), being unable to laugh or smile (42%), and a sense that it 'seems bottled up inside' (42%). None of these ideas were present in anger, and give a sense of hatred as something which feels restricting, confining, or limiting.

Certainly Davitz's study was not without flaws – many of the different characteristics either overlap or are very similar (e.g. the 'to strike out, to pound, or smash, or kick, or bite; to do something that will hurt' and the impulse to 'hurt, to hit, or to kick someone else'). Further, the study looked only at what it feels like to experience an emotion, and did not look at what caused the emotion in the first place. It is illuminating nonetheless.

In 1993 Julie Fitness and Garth Fletcher conducted a study designed to produce both a cognitive appraisal analysis and a prototype analysis for love, hate, anger, and jealousy in personal relationships. Later, in 2000, Fitness conducted a study of anger between colleagues in the workplace that also collected data on hate. Given that anger and hate were the only emotions common to all three studies, and that anger was the emotion that had the strongest overlap with hate in Davitz's study, I shall continue to comment on both emotions. Of these two, the most useful to us is Fitness and Fletcher's study, since, unlike Fitness's workplace study, it focused exclusively on hatred.

The results of Fitness and Fletcher's study showed that the most – and only – common cause of hatred between couples was in situations where 'their spouses had neglected, badly treated, or humiliated' them – an answer given by 65% of

[31] Davitz (1969: 35-36, 64-65).

participants. This scenario was also the second most common cause of anger (33%), which was most frequently caused by feeling that their partner had been unfair to them (48%).[32] This matched the findings of Fletcher's workplace study, where anger did not vary between humiliating and non-humiliating events, but hatred was elicited more in events the participants found humiliating.[33] Fletcher's workplace study also investigated the difference between hatred based on the relative status of the hater compared to the target of their hate, and found that 'respondents interacting with superiors and co-workers reported significantly more intense hate for the offender than respondents interacting with subordinates.' i.e. hatred was more common when the subject felt they had less power in the situation.[34] This result is similar to that obtained by Fitness and Fletcher, where hate was characterised as 'effortful, and involving a high level of obstacles', and with the fact that subjects 'felt less in control of the situation.'[35]

Another study conducted by Katherine Aumer-Ryan and Elaine Hatfield focused specifically on hatred, investigating how people conceived of hatred, who the targets of hatred were and how they try to handle their hatred. They found that the most common reasons given by participants as to why they hated someone were 'defects of personality' and 'betrayal', with betrayal being the most common reason given in instances where the target of hatred was a significant other.[36] They also discovered in their study that 'when attempting to define "hate," most participants referred to other similar attitudes or emotions such as "extreme dislike," "extreme disgust," and "extreme anger."'[37] This matches the notable overlap between anger, dislike, and hatred seen by Davitz, though the correlation with disgust was less notable in Davitz's results.

Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield's study also asked participants about what people and groups of people they had hated, rather than examining hatred within a specified relationship. But friends (28%), acquaintances (23%), family, (11%) and exes (11%) made up the majority of the subjects identified as being hated. 'Groups' of people

[32] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 947).
[33] Fletcher (2000: 156).
[34] Fitness (2000: 157).
[35] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948).
[36] Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield (2007: 154).
[37] Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield (2007: 151).

such as telemarketers or pick-pockets were only given as targets of hate 5% of the time – though Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield deliberately steered away from 'taboo' hatreds such as misogyny and racism, which might well have impacted that result. Co-workers were also mentioned only 5% of the time.

Fitness and Fletcher's study was the only one that asked participants about the duration of the emotions being investigated. The responses indicated that hatred could last only seconds or minutes (37%), hours (40%), or days and weeks (22%). In contrast to this, anger was experienced predominantly as of very brief duration, with 63% reporting it as lasting only seconds or minutes. Anger was also said to have lasted hours by 30% of participants and only 5% reported anger as lasting days to weeks. Thus, hatred frequently lasts a lot longer than anger, but is also capable of disappearing very quickly, and still, as with anger, usually lasts no longer than hours. Of course, a caveat to this is that Fitness and Fletcher's study only allowed participants to give an answer of 'days and weeks' for the maximum duration of their hatred. Further, given that the study was confined to couples who were still together, one might suspect that if the hatred was not overcome – and lasted months or years, then the marriage was likely to have ended. Certainly, the fact that 11% of participants in Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield's study gave their ex-partners as examples of someone they hated, suggests that the hatred can endure beyond the end of the marriage.

In Fitness and Fletcher's study, participants reported a 'negative cognition' about their partner in the case of anger and hatred 100% of the time, but those experiencing hatred also reported having negative feelings about themselves 73% of the time compared to only 32% for anger (thoughts such as 'believing they deserved such bad treatment or blaming themselves for putting up with the situation').[38] Hatred was most the common emotion associated with a negative perception of the relationship between the couple (35%). Hatred, then, appears to have a far broader negative impact on the perception of the relationships and those in it.

In terms of how emotions were expressed and acted upon, the most common

[38] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948).

expression for hatred was to say nothing at all, act coldly, and leave the situation, contrary to Davitz's results in which there were strong desires to say something nasty, get revenge, and to strike out. But hate could also commonly be expressed verbally, in a hostile manner, with an accompanying behaviour of shouting and throwing things. A response of 'behaving as usual' was very slightly more common (27%) than the behaviour of yelling and throwing things (25%). But these more hostile and aggressive urges were all expressed more commonly in anger, and formed the predominant responses for anger. Despite anger being more likely to involve actively hostile words and actions, it was also more likely than hatred to be expressed through calm discussion (30% compared to 17%). Hatred and anger were equally unlikely to result in an urge to resolve the situation (6%), but only 2% of participants reported the urge to take revenge in the case of anger, compared to 15% in the case of hatred – though this is still significantly less that the 54% reported in Davitz's study.[39]

In terms of physiological symptoms, tense muscles were the most commonly reported symptom for both anger and hatred, and a tight stomach was the second most frequent symptom for both – again matching Davitz's results. However, hatred could also manifest as a sick stomach (17%), which was a symptom absent in anger (though present only in the case of disgust in Davitz's study). No one reported feelings of warmth or heat as a symptom of hate (compared to 20% for love and 22% for anger).

Attempts to control hate and anger were both reported at around 74%. This is a notably higher rate of attempting to control the emotions than was reported by Davitz, but matches Davitz in there being similar reports of 'wanting to explode but holding back' between hatred (50%) and anger (46%). The most common reason given for attempting to control both of them was because they were felt to be destructive emotions (45%). 20% reported trying to control their hatred because they felt it was inappropriate, comparable to anger at 24%, but interestingly no one reported controlling their hatred because they feared their partner's reaction, compared to 18% in the case of anger. The most common reason given for *not* controlling hatred and anger was because the participant wanted their partner to know how they felt (40% for hatred, 54% for anger).

[39] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 946).

When asked to recall events eliciting each emotion, 68% of participants recalled an anger event that had taken place in the last 1-4 weeks, 23% 1-12 months ago, and only 8% recalled an event over a year ago. On the other hand, hate events were recalled 30% of the time at 1-4 weeks, 40% of the time at 1-12 months, and 30% of the time for over a year. Even when the event is over and the emotion has faded, it seems that the memory of hatred lingers whilst anger fades.

The cognitive appraisal component of the study revealed that 'appraisals of hate-eliciting events were opposite those for love events in that they were appraised as unpleasant, effortful, and involving a high level of obstacles; their course was unpredictable, and compared with anger, subjects felt less in control of the situation'.[40] This matches Davitz's findings that feeling 'gripped by the situation' and being 'caught up and overwhelmed by the feeling' were central components of hatred.

From this data, the dominant elements of hatred that we have seen are that is most likely to be caused by a sense of betrayal or humiliation, and unsurprisingly, also negative self-perception. It is more likely to be directed towards people we are close to. Physiologically, it is associated with bodily and muscle tension. Hatred can lead to the desire for revenge, and to physically harm, and can also manifest in violent verbal and physical outbursts. On the other hand, it can also lead to a desire to avoid, and accordingly, to actions of ignoring someone or acting coldly towards them. It is associated with a feeling of a lack of control and being overwhelmed. Finally, it can last very briefly, but also endure.

What is Hatred?: Sociological Approaches

Sociological approaches to the study of emotions examine the functions and effects of expressing or acting on an emotion with regard to their impact on relationships with others. These relationships operate on multiple levels; for instance, they can be dyadic (between two individuals), oriented towards an ingroup, or oriented towards an outgroup. 'Positive' emotions in such models have an obvious utility; gratitude, for

[40] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948).

example, encourages reciprocity and cooperation. The utility of an emotion such as hatred is far less obvious. However, nearly all scholars working with sociological models accept that (at least some) 'negative' emotions can be useful so long as they are expressed in the right circumstances, towards the right targets, and are manifested appropriately. Embarrassment, for example, is an emotion that we might consider 'negative' in that it is unpleasant to experience it, but it serves a useful reconciliatory purpose. Equally, 'positive' emotions, when expressed in the wrong circumstances, towards the wrong targets, and manifested inappropriately can be destructive. Our discussion of sociological models will be focused on negative emotions, since hatred in academic literature is always considered a 'negative' emotion. Ideally we would be able to focus specifically on hatred in our discussion, but given that hatred is often absent from these discussions, and that it is conflated and intertwined with other 'negative' emotions such as disgust and contempt, we will frequently be forced to turn to those hate-adjacent emotions.

Agneta Fischer and Anthony Manstead identify two social functions of emotion: an affiliation function, which helps 'form and maintain positive social relationships'; and a distancing function, which aims to 'establish or maintain a social position relative to others, and to preserve our self-esteem, identity, or power, sometimes at the expense of others'.[41] Some emotions might have a more obvious affiliation or distancing functions than others – joy and gratitude are obvious candidates for affiliation functions, whereas anger, contempt, and hatred are obvious candidates for distancing functions. Fischer and Manstead argue that both negative and positive emotions, whether distancing or affiliating, can be socially functional (or dysfunctional) depending on the circumstances, noting that 'anger, contempt, and even hate can be socially functional if they help to protect the self from destructive relations with others.'[42] Distancing functions may also be necessary for pursuing individual, rather than group, goals. If we wish to beat someone in competition, for example, emotions that serve to distance us may be more useful than those which would enhance affiliation.[43]

[41] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 424).
[42] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 246).
[43] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 245).

The social distancing function 'results from the negative appraisals of the actions or character of the person', and they give examples of 'tendencies' caused by certain emotions. Anger and hate, they suggest, result in tendencies 'to attack the other', whereas contempt's tendency is 'to treat the other as an inferior being'.[44] But negative emotions can also have, in the right circumstances, an affiliation function, positive emotions can also have a distancing function, and the same emotion might have either function depending on the circumstances. Fischer and Manstead claim that 'the evidence suggests that negative emotions serve three specific social functions that all promote the more general affiliation function, namely, *signalling*, *support*, and *social change*.'[45] But the extent to which a negative emotion can serve an affiliation function differs between individual emotions. If is far easier to make an argument for an affiliation function for anger than it is for contempt or hatred.

For instance, anger, though it might have a short-term distancing effect can, in the long term, lead to affiliative outcomes. A subject's expression of anger both reveals to its target that the angry person feels they have been wronged, or wants the target to modify their behaviour. In response, a target might accept that they have wronged the angry person, and take steps towards reconciliation such as apologising or displaying remorse or guilt.[46] Fischer and Manstead point to the numerous works of other scholars that have revealed that verbal displays of anger, perhaps contrary to what we might expect, can aid the angry person in negotiation situations (though of course, it may backfire if the other party does not respond to anger in the way we might hope).[47]

But even hatred and contempt can still have an affiliative function, albeit far narrower than that of anger. Emotions that demonstrate a distancing function at an intergroup level – i.e. felt by an individual towards an outgroup – can simultaneously have an affiliative function with other members of the ingroup. Thus, when expressed towards an outgroup, hatred and contempt could help strengthen identification with the ingroup.[48]

[44] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 429).
[45] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 427).
[46] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 429).
[47] Fischer & Manstead (2016: 429); See Van Kleef & Côté (2008) for the negative impact that hierarchical power dynamics can have on someone's response to displays of appropriate and inappropriate anger in negotiations.
[48] Fischer and Manstead (2016: 431-2).

In attempting to understand the role of hatred at the intergroup level, Eran Halperin conducted several studies using participants from the general Jewish population of Israel. Based on the results of the first preliminary study of 30 participants Halperin proposes the following 'working definition' of hatred:[49]

> Hatred is a powerful, extreme, and persistent emotion that rejects the group toward which it is directed in a generalized and totalistic fashion. Group-based hatred is provoked in consequence to recurrent offenses committed against the individual or his or her group. These offenses are perceived as intentional, unjust, threatening the person or his or her group, and of a nature with which in practice the individual has difficulty coping. This hatred includes cognitive elements that make a clear ideological, moral, and cultural differentiation between the in-group and the out-group while delegitimizing the out-group. The affective element of hatred is secondary, and it is manifested in unpleasant physical symptoms as well as in anger, fear, and a strong negative feeling toward the out-group to the point of a desire to harm and even destroy it. In the majority of cases, this desire is not realized and therefore is channeled to other behavioral directions, such as isolation from the object of the hatred, delight at the expense of the hated other, or taking part in political action against him or her.'[50]

The strongest support was for hatred as 'an immoral or nonlegitimate emotion' (93.3%); a belief in the superiority of the ingroup (90%); the intentional nature of the offensive action committed by the outgroup and the belief that it is likely to reoccur (73.3%); an accompanying emotional response of anger (90%); and a desire for something bad to happen to the outgroup and a 'need' to engage in violent action against the outgroup (83.3%), with 'complete detachment from the object of the hatred' being the predominantly reported actual course of action participants would take (83.3%).[51]

This gives us a core prototypical definition of hatred as an immoral or nonlegitimate emotion which is frequently accompanied by anger, a desire for something bad to happen to the outgroup, an equally strong detachment from the outgroup, and a belief in: the superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup, the intentional nature of the

[49] Note that Halperin also did not state which language these interviews were conducted in, or what word was used to mean 'hatred' if it was not English. The same is true for the second study. In the third study Halperin states that they initial phone interviews were conducted 'by native speakers in Hebrew and Russian', (2008: 726) which suggests that at least these two languages were used. No discussion is given to the terms used or any issues of translation.
[50] Halperin (2008: 718).
[51] Halperin (2008: 717-18).

offensive actions of the outgroup and the high likelihood that they will behave in such a way again in future.

The next of Halperin's studies, conducted with a group of 240 Israeli-Jewish university students, examined the relationship between hatred, fear, and anger. The results indicated that after a perceived (significant) offence has been caused by the outgroup towards either the individual or to other members of their ingroup, anger develops based on the belief that the offense was not "deserved". If the participants judged that their group's or their own ability to cope with future incidents of such affronts was low, then fear also developed. In cases where the offending party was perceived to have acted deliberately to harm the individual or others within the ingroup *and* the actions were judged to be representative of a 'generalized evil character' of the outgroup, then group-based hatred developed.[52] There was still a significant positive correlation between fear and hate, but it was notably lower than the correlation between anger and hate. Halperin's conclusion is that 'hatred enables the individual to cope with feelings of fear and moderates them, while at the same time, the experience of anger continues to exist and is, in fact, sometimes "fueled" and intensified by appraisals associated with hatred'.[53]

Halperin's final study focused on the behavioural component of group-based hatred. This study is of particular interest to us because participants were asked to rate the intensity of eight separate emotional states: (angry, irritated, revolted, afraid, scared, worried, hatred, hostility) in response to various hypothetical scenarios. Anger, revulsion, hatred, and hostility are all terms that, as we have seen, appear to be closely related in English (though again, the language in which this study was conducted was not specified). Hostility and hatred were grouped together under 'hatred'; angry, irritated, and revolted under 'anger'; and afraid, scared, and worried were grouped under 'fear'.[54] Participants were also asked to express their approval (on a scale of 1-6) for four different 'emotion goals': 'Live and let live (create a safe environment)', 'change attitudes and perceptions of out-group members (corrections)', 'removal or destruction of out-group', and 'do evil to out-group'; and five different 'action

[52] Halperin (2008: 723-24).
[53] Halperin (2008: 724).
[54] Halperin (2008: 726). Note that this gives only two emotion words related to hatred as opposed to three for both anger and fear.

tendencies': 'avoid any social relations with out-group', 'support of education channels to create perceptual change', 'physical and violent action', 'support of political and social exclusion of out-group', and 'disengagement and separation (social and political) between the two groups'.[55]

The results indicated that only hatred is associated with the willingness to do evil to, remove, or destroy the outgroup and that only anger is associated with a willingness to attempt to change the perception of the outgroup or 'improve' it.[56] Fear is 'exclusively related to the tendency towards preventing any contact with the out-group', whereas hatred has a wider range of action tendencies: 'support for political and social exclusion, violent actions, and disengagement of the groups'.[57] In relation to intractable conflicts, then, anger has a 'positive' desire that tends towards diffusing a situation, whereas fear seeks to avoid the object of fear. Hatred lacks any desire to diffuse the situation and instead desires violence, exclusion, and disengagement. Halperin suggests the absence of a desire to attempt to 'improve' the outgroup when it is hated 'reflects a despair of any potential change.'[58]

Further research by Halperin and others has solidified these findings with regard to intractable conflicts. Halperin, Alexandra Russell, Carol Dweck, and James Gross argue that it is the presence or absence of hatred that is the predominant factor in whether anger will be constructive or destructive,[59] and Halperin confidently claims after further studies on Jewish Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians that not only is hatred 'a major emotional barrier to peace', but that 'it is the only emotion that reduces support for symbolic compromise, reconciliation, and even stands as an obstacle to every attempt to acquire positive knowledge' about the outgroup (in this case, Palestinians).[60]

The focus on intractable conflict means Halperin's work provides us with further ideas which we should bear in mind when examining the works of Hesiod, given that

[55] Halperin (2008: 728).
[56] Roseman, Weist & Swartz found these desires to be associated with anger. However, hatred was missing from their study (1994).
[57] Halperin (2008: 728-9).
[58] Halperin (2008: 729).
[59] Halperin et al. (2011).
[60] Halperin (2011a: 40). See also Halperin (2011b).

there are certainly instances of what we might call 'intractable' conflict in Hesiod's poems. The potential interrelations of anger and fear with hatred is something which we should therefore be aware of during our examination of the poems. When looking for evidence of an emotional script for hatred, we should also look for evidence of the absence or presence of anger and fear, and whether these have any impact on how hate is manifested.

Halperin's work focuses on inter-group violence. Less work has been done on intra-group violence, but the work of Benny Temkin and Niza Yanay provides us with some useful insight into this area. Temkin and Yanay examined hate mail sent to members of the Movement for Citizens Rights and for Peace (CRM) – an Israeli political party. The hate mail was sent by Israeli citizens who clearly considered that the targets of their letters *should* belong to the same social ingroup as themselves. Temkin and Yanay argue that 'functionally, the discourse of aggressive political letters can best be understood as aiming at the attainment of two main goals: *to punish* and *to persuade*.'[61]

The letters expressed desires for harm to come to the targets, and overtly expressed that the writer was excluding them from their social/national group. But they also expressed a desire for the target to repent of their ways, abandon their current political and ideological stances, and return to the collective. This desire was expressed both through attempts to frighten (threats of violence if they do not change) and through more positive means (implying the benefits they will accrue if they change their ways).[62] The letters utilised Nazi terminology and symbols, which Temkin and Yanay suggest clearly demonstrates that 'the writers share the collective fears, anxieties, hate, and pain culturally associated with holocaust images.'[63] This in itself indicates the acknowledgement of a shared cultural identity.

The CRM, according to Temkin and Yanay, are seen as promoting values that weaken 'the moral basis of the national strength'. Thus, the letters are not only acts of

[61] Temkin & Yanay (1988: 472).
[62] Temkin & Yanay (1988: 473-76).
[63] Temkin & Yanay (1988: 177).

aggression, but they are also 'the expression of an intense sense of danger and fear'.[64] Hatred in this intra-group setting is a response to a fear that the moral character of the society, and its identity, are deteriorating. The letters suggest that in this intra-group setting, some forms of aggression (particularly, verbal aggression) aim both at punishment, but also attempt to change the mind of the hated target so that they may be reintegrated and the moral values and identity of the society refortified.

What is Hatred?: Psychological Perspectives

There are numerous psychological approaches we could take to examining hatred, but some of the recent work of Robert Sternberg focuses specifically on hatred, making it an ideal candidate for our current enterprise. Sternberg proposes a 'triangular theory of the structure of hate', arguing that what we call hatred is not a single emotion, but consists of three components. The first of these components is the 'negation of intimacy (distancing), which seeks to distance the hater from the hated target. This distance is frequently sought 'because that individual arouses repulsion and disgust in the person who experiences hate'. The feelings of this component are 'somewhat' slow to develop and fade. [65] The second component is passion, 'which expresses itself as intense anger or fear in response to a threat.' Whilst the two can lead to very different actions (anger to approach, fear to avoid), both are a response to a perceived threat.[66] Unlike the distancing component, the passion component is 'typically rapid in its growth and often rapid in its demise.'[67] The final component is 'decision-commitment', 'which is characterized by cognitions of devaluation and diminution through contempt for the targeted group'. As with the distancing component, decision-commitment is usually slow in onset and slow in cessation.[68]

Based on these three components, Sternberg produces a model comprising seven different 'types' of hate based on which of the above components is present:[69]

[64] Temkin & Yanay (1988: 478; 480).
[65] Sternberg (2003: 306).
[66] Sternberg (2003: 307).
[67] Sternberg (2003: 308).
[68] Sternberg (2003: 308).
[69] Sternberg documents them in a table; I find a Venn diagram better reveals the overlapping natures of the three components of the triangular theory.



Fig. 2

These different types of hate can lead to different results and courses of action (or inaction) and feelings about the target. For instance, in isolation the 'cool hate' of the negation of intimacy/disgust component produces a desire to have nothing to do with the hated other, to view them as subhuman, and perhaps to express 'visceral prejudice' against them. But when combined with the passion/anger-fear component to produce revulsion or 'boiling hate', the target is not only viewed as subhuman, but also as a threat requiring some course of action to eliminate or reduce. When the passion/anger-fear component is combined with the decision-commitment/contempt component, producing revilement or 'seething hate', individuals are not only currently seen as a threat (as with boiling hate, but unlike cool hate), but 'always have been'.[70] We may expect, based on Sternberg's characterisation of the decision-commitment/contempt component as one in which 'the hater is likely to feel contempt toward the target individual or group, viewing the target as barely human or even as subhuman', to find that in revilement the target is also viewed as subhuman. Instead,

[70] Sternberg (2003: 312).

Sternberg suggests, that 'in these cases, the targeted group may be portrayed not as subhuman but as more than human'.[71] I shall not discuss the details of the remaining 'types' of hatred because Sternberg admits that these seven different types are 'probably not exhaustive, and, because they represent limiting cases, they are not mutually exclusive.' Once again we are presented with a model with which neat distinctions can be drawn in abstract, but which blur and disappear in real life situations. Given this, we may query the practical utility of being able to distinguish these different types.

Sternberg proceeds to propose that hatred should be understood as a 'story' because it, like love, has a 'story-like' quality that characterises its essence.[72] Different stories involve different types of hatred. However, this analysis in terms of stories only demonstrates further the inapplicability of such neat categories to reality. For example, the story of the 'impure other (vs. pure in-group)', for which it is hypothesised that the element of the triangle of hate it will most incite is negation of intimacy/disgust can be indistinguishable from the story of the 'morally bankrupt (vs. morally sound)', for which it is hypothesised that the elements it will most incite are negation of intimacy/disgust *and* decision-commitment/contempt. And both of these may be indistinguishable from the story of the 'enemy of God (vs. Servant of God)' for which it is hypothesised that the elements it will most incite are Passion/anger-fear and decision-commitment/contempt, but not negation of intimacy/disgust.

What is of interest to us in Sternberg's model is that disgust in and of itself *might* be understood, in certain circumstances, as a form of hatred, as might contempt, or anger, or fear. Equally, we might take any combination of these emotions as a form of hatred.

The fact that all these different attempts to theorise about hatred cannot do so without also mentioning emotions such as anger, contempt and disgust (among others) strongly indicates that, when we turn to examine hatred in Hesiod, we cannot fully do so without also being aware of how it might intersect with, or relate to, these other associated emotions.

[71] Sternberg (2003: 312).
[72] Sternberg (2003: 313).

Hatred in Ancient Greek Literature

Having established some idea of hatred based on contemporary investigations, let us turn now to the ancient sources. All the ancient Greek sources that address emotions approach them from the point of view of philosophy, though ethical, psychological and cognitive ideas are nearly always inextricable. It is not my intention to survey the concept of hatred in all ancient sources – indeed, a detailed discussion of all of them would take multiple books. But it will be useful to comment on at least one ancient source other than Hesiod, in order to understand the differences and similarities between ancient and modern approaches. Doing so will allow us some insight into hatred in the cultural context of ancient Greece. This is not to say that the conception of hatred from one ancient author will neatly transpose onto what we see represented in Hesiod, but it will allow us some insight into how contemporary theories of hatred might overlap or differ from ancient notions of hatred.

The fullest account of hatred in ancient Greece is found in the works of Aristotle (384–322 BCE). Aristotle is of particular interest to us because he is, as David Konstan puts it, 'the only one among the major Greek philosophers to accept the emotions as a natural and normal part of human life, attempting neither to abolish them utterly nor to reduce them to mere wraiths of living passion'.[73] Instead, Aristotle's emotional model highlights the correct expression of emotion as a form of virtue. This is not the same as a sociological model of emotion, but there is much overlap. A virtuous person is aware of their place within society and acts in a way that does not disrupt their ingroup.

Hatred appears in Aristotle's list of passions (*pathē*) in the *Nichomachean Ethics* ($1105^{b}21$-4): desire (ἐπιθυμία, *epithumia*), anger (ὀργή, *orgē*), fear (φόβος*, phobos*), boldness (θάρσος, *tharsos*), envy (φθόνος, *phthonos*), joy (χαρά, *chara*), love/friendship (φιλία*, philia*), hatred (μῖσος, *misos*), longing (πόθος, *pothos*), emulation (ζῆλος*, zēlos*), and pity (ἔλεος, *eleos*).[74] It also appears in the list of *pathē*

[73] Konstan (2006a: 41).
[74] These translations should not, of course, be taken as perfectly correlating with the ideas they represent in the Greek.

given in the *Rhetoric*, where Aristotle arranges emotions in parts of opposites: anger (*orgē*) and calmness (πρᾳότης, *praotēs*),[75] love/friendship (*philia*) and hatred (*misos*), fear (*phobos*) and courage (*tharsos*),[76] shame (αἰσχύνη, *aischunē*) and shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία, *anaischuntia*), gratitude (χάρις, *charis*)[77] and ingratitude (ἀχαριστία, *acharistia*), pity (*eleos*) and indignation (τὸ νεμεσᾶν, *to nemesan*),[78] and envy (*phthonos*) and emulation (*zēlos*).

Aristotle does not provide a direct definition of hatred. Instead, our understanding of it is gleaned from how he distinguishes it from anger, and how he frames it as the opposite of love (*philia*) and specifically directs us to understand it through these oppositions (*Rhet.* 2.4, 1382[a]1-2). In his own discussion, he predominantly discusses it in contrast with anger. Given this, we must understand how he defines anger in order to understand how hatred differs from it. Aristotle has a very specific definition of anger:

> Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ ⟨τι⟩ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τινι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τί πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ.
> (*Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378[a]30 - 1378[b]4)

> Let us define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or perceived revenge for a real or perceived slight against a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally) because this individual has done, or was about to do, something against him or one of his friends. Lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is possible for himself.[79]

[75] 'Calmness' is the most frequently used translation of *praotēs*, but Konstan (2006a: 77-90) suggests that it might more usefully be translated as 'satisfaction'.
[76] Frequently translated as 'confidence'.
[77] This has commonly been translated as 'kindness', but I am convinced by Konstan's argument that 'gratitude' is a better fit (2006a: 156-68). I have therefore translated its opposite as ingratitude.
[78] Literally, 'to be indignant', but it is commonly translated as a noun by scholars of Aristotle.
[79] All translations of the *Rhetoric* adapted from Freese's translation. Freese's translation sticks closely to Aristotle's clumsy style. I see no reason to inflict this upon the reader and have thus opted to make the English more presentable.

Here, anger, *orgē*, involves a longing for revenge, accompanied by a feeling of pain (λύπη, *lupē*) in response to an *undeserved* 'slight' (ὀλιγωρία, *oligōria*).[80] Compare this to Davitz's study, where both anger and hatred were associated with a desire for revenge, but hatred more so than anger (54% for hate, 40% for anger), and the mere 2% of participants in Fitness and Fletcher's study who reported the urge to take revenge in the case of anger, compared to 15% in the case of hatred.[81]

The slight which causes Aristotle's anger can be in the past or present, targeted at either oneself or one's friend, and must be undeserved; a deserved slight does not provoke anger. Anger can only be directed towards an individual. Recall that in Halperin's studies of intractable conflict, anger was indeed associated with an offence (or slight) that the subjects felt was undeserved. Of course, the very important difference here is that Halperin's subjects very much felt angry at a whole group of people, rather than an individual.[82]

Aristotle's anger contains an element of pleasure in anticipating the fulfilment of that revenge; for this desire to be pleasurable the revenge must be obtainable and thus anger is only felt in situations where revenge is possible. This is similar to the results obtained by Fitness's workplace study, and Fitness and Fletcher's study of close relationships where anger gave way to hatred in situations where anger could not be expressed, or the subject felt 'less control in the situation'.[83] It also, to a certain extent, matches the results obtained by Halperin, where anger was associated with a desire to do something about the situation, whereas hatred appeared in situations where the subjects felt despair at being able to change the situation.[84] Of course, there is another very notable difference here between Aristotle and Halperin, in that in Halperin's studies, anger was not necessarily focused on revenge, but could also include a more positive desire to try and diffuse a situation.

[80] Konstan argues that the *lupē* that accompanies anger 'may not' be the same as the pain that the slight itself might. The painful slight might *cause* anger, but anger itself is also *accompanied* by a pain that is an intrinsic quality of the *pathos*. (2006a: 278 n6).
[81] Davitz (1969: 35-36, 64-65); Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 946).
[82] Halperin (2008: 723-24).
[83] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 948); Fitness (2000: 157).
[84] Halperin (2008: 729).

Later in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle tells us that 'anger is curable by time' (2.4, 1382^{a}7-8). In the *Nichomachean Ethics* he states more specifically that anger ends when revenge has been achieved (1126a) – something which may take more or less time depending on how the individual in question reacts to anger. The irascible person shows their anger immediately, and thus their anger ends quickly, but the bitter person keeps their anger in, and thus remains angry for a longer time.

As to the 'slights' which cause anger, Aristotle defines *oligōria* as 'the manifestation of an opinion that something appears to be worthless' (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον [*Rhet.* 2.2, 1378^{b}10-12]),[85] and initially lists three types of *oligōria*: καταφρόνησις (*kataphronēsis*, 'contempt'), ἐπηρεασμός (*epēreasmos*, 'spite') and ὕβρις (*hubris* 'insult').

Contempt is a slight because it is a judgement that something has no value (1378^{b}15-17). This encompasses a wide range of social situations: we might be angry at someone who speaks contemptuously of something we hold worthwhile (especially if we are insecure about whether we ourselves actually possess the quality we value [1379^{a}30 - 1379^{b}1]), or at someone who feigns ignorance or employs sarcasm when we ourselves are being sincere, because this implies that they think the topic at hand has no value (1379^{b}30-32).

In the case of spite, a person who is spiteful places obstacles in the way of another, not for any personal gain, but simply to prevent the other person gaining anything. Such behaviour demonstrates that the spiteful person neither fears nor seeks the friendship of the person they spite which, again, would suggest that they think the person they spite is worthless. *Hubris* is to do or say things that bring shame to the target, not in order to exact revenge, as would be the case in anger, but because they think doing so shows their superiority (1379^{b}5-6).

In contrast to anger, Aristotle defines enmity (ἔχθρας, *echthras*) and hatred (μισεῖν, *misein*), thus:

[85] Based on this definition we might find it unsurprising that the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ) gives 'contempt' as a meaning of the word.

ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, διαβολή. ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δ' ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ' οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ. καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δ' οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

(2.4, 1382[a]2-15)

The causes of enmity are anger, spitefulness, and slander. Anger arises from acts committed against us, enmity even from those that are not. For if we imagine a man to be of a certain character, we hate him. Anger always has an individual as its object – Callias or Socrates, for instance. On the other hand, hatred can also apply to classes; for example, everyone hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time, but hatred is not. The aim of anger is pain, whilst hatred aims at evil; for the angry man wishes to see what happens, but to one who hates it does not matter. All the things that cause pain are perceptible, while things that are especially evil – such as injustice or folly – are the least perceptible, because the presence of evil does not cause pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred is not; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but one who hates never does; for the former wishes that the object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should cease to exist.

The action that produces hatred need not be directed against us. We can hate people simply for belonging to a certain class of people – a thief need not have stolen from us personally for us to hate them, we can hate them simply on the grounds that they *are* a thief. In other words, we can hate them for actions they have committed against others, if those actions show that they belong to a certain class of people. Although, as I have already noted, Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield's study of hatred steered away from groups such as 'racists', which may have impacted their results in this regard, they did ask subjects about groups of people they hated, such as pickpockets. Only 5% of their participants reported such 'group' hatred.[86] However, Halperin's studies are all consummate proof that hatred can very much be felt against a whole class of people. Halperin's studies also suggested that hatred developed when there had been a deliberate slight *and* the actions of the member(s) of the outgroup were considered to

[86] Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield (2007: 154).

be indicative of a 'generalized evil character'.[87]

There are two key differences between Aristotle's definition of hatred and what has been demonstrated by contemporary research. Firstly, whilst Aristotle thinks that hatred is not curable by time, recent studies show that it can indeed end, especially in the case of interpersonal relationships. Further, in such situations hatred might also last a very short time, though it may indeed last longer than anger, and of the two, is more likely to have a longer duration. However, when hatred is present in the case of intractable conflicts, it is far from certain how we might go about ending it. Thus, whilst Aristotle does not distinguish between hatred directed at individuals or at groups, his observations regarding duration are far more applicable to hatred directed towards groups than hatred directed towards individuals. Secondly, that whilst Aristotle provides injustice as a key example of a painless evil that would provoke hatred, contemporary research suggests that injustice is far more likely to provoke anger, whilst humiliation might be a more important cause of hatred.[88]

What this discussion has shown is that whilst Aristotle may disagree about the specifics, he shares very similar concerns with contemporary researchers as to the causes, duration, targets and goals of hatred. And whilst contemporary research shows that hatred can indeed end without the destruction of the hated target, there remains a concern, especially in intractable conflict, that hatred has far more destructive goals than anger. Thus, Aristotle and contemporary approaches to the study of hatred can aid our understanding of hatred in Hesiod.

Studying Hesiod's Hatred

'Hatred' is, of course, not mentioned at all by Hesiod, who instead uses στυγέω (*stugeō*) and the related adjectives στυγερός (*stugeros*), and στυγερώπης (*stugerōpēs*), as well as ἐχθρός (*echthros*), ἔχθω (*echthō*) and ὀδύσσομαι (*odussomai*).[89] These are all words that by common consensus of scholarship we have taken to be meaningfully translatable as 'hate'. The lack of precise semantic overlap between two words that

[87] Halperin (2008: 723-24).
[88] Fitness & Fletcher (1993: 947); Fletcher (2000: 156).
[89] The word μισέω *(miseō)*, which Aristotle frequently uses, is absent in Hesiod.

'mean' the same thing in different languages is a simple fact of translation, but its impact is crucial, nonetheless. Though I take as a starting point a group of words identified as being translatable as 'hate', the ultimate goal is to understand the emotional structures Hesiod has applied those words to. Thus, the reader must bear in mind that when I discuss Hesiod's 'hatred' I mean 'the emotion represented by the cluster of Greek words discussed, which have been identified as meaningfully translatable by the English word hatred.'

Given the overlap that has been demonstrated between hatred and other emotions – notably contempt, disgust, and anger, we must examine these words as well. As Donald Lateiner and Demos Spatharas have noted, there are no surviving ancient sources that discuss or define disgust, but Aristotle *does* comment on 'situations that arouse disgust'.[90] They identify three main words as meaning 'disgust': ἀηδία (*aēdia*), βδελυρία (*bdeluria*), and δυσχέρεια (*duschereia*), but as they themselves acknowledge, these words 'comprehend a wide spectrum of meanings that English distinguishes and expresses by "annoyance, surfeit, displeasure, distaste, disgust," even "impudence"'.[91] There are two other words that the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ) relate to disgust: σικχαντός (*sikchantos*, 'disgusting', 'loathsome') and μυσάττομαι (*musattomai*, 'feel disgust at', 'loathe'). None of these words identified by Lateiner and Spatharas or LSJ appears in Hesiod. Floris Overduin notes that 'disgust was never a topical element of Greek didactic epic. The fountainhead of the genre, Hesiod's *Works and Days*, may feature some of the less elevated aspects of life… it does not, however, include disgust'. Even when there are instances when we might, as modern readers, expect to find disgust, Hesiod mentions them 'in a context of miasma, of offensiveness to gods, not men'.[92]

We find a much wider range of words that are related to contempt: ἐξουδένωμα (*exoudenōma*), καταφρόνημα (*kataphronēma*), ὑπεροψία (*huperopsia*), ὑπερφρόνησις (*huperphronēsis*), ὀνοστός (*onostos*), περιφρονητικός (*periphronētikos*) εὐπεριφρόνητος (*euperiphronētos*), καταβάλλω (*kataballō*), ἀναίνομαι (*anainomai*), and *oligōria*, among others. Other words meaning 'contempt' are more metaphorical,

[90] Lateiner & Spatharas (2017: 5).
[91] Lateiner & Spatharas (2017: 5).
[92] Overduin (2017: 143).

and demonstrate actions associated with contempt-scripts. For example, ὑπεροράω (*huperoraō*), ὑπερφρονέω (*huperphroneō*), and καταφρονέω (*kataphroneō*), can mean 'to look down upon', καταπτύω (*kataptuō*) can mean 'to spit upon', and σκυβαλίζω (*skubalizō*) can mean 'to look on as dung'. Despite this plethora of words, only *oligōros* appears in Hesiod. In verse 447 of the *Theogony* it is used refer to the ability of Hecate to enact a literal decrease in the numbers of livestock owned by the man, just as she can increase their numbers if she so chooses; it has no connotation of contempt.

What of anger? The *orgē* that Aristotle uses for anger is absent in Hesiod, but several other words do appear. The predominant word is χόλος (*cholos*), but ὀχθέω (*ochtheō*) also appears once. Other words that could potentially mean anger also appear; I shall discuss these as they arise.

Of course, a specific emotion need not be explicitly mentioned in a text in order for it to be understood that a certain character is feeling that certain emotion, but examining the instances in which a word appears is the necessary starting point. This analysis will be supplemented by examining both ancient and contemporary etymologies for key words (i.e. the names/qualities of Styx and her children). I utilise ancient etymologies not because they can be considered reliable indicators of the evolution and origins of the meanings of certain words – they emphatically cannot – but because they reveal conceptual connections made between words by the authors. Insight into how people *thought* words were related is as valuable in terms of insight as how words actually *are* related.

Once the nature of the emotion represented by a certain word has been examined using these approaches, we will have an understanding of the types of relationships and situations that the emotion appears in, how it operates, what types of actions it provokes, what, if any, moral sentiments are attached to it, and how it is physically portrayed. Using this information we can then tentatively look elsewhere in the text to see if there are other instances in which the script associated with the emotion word is present, even when the emotion word itself is not. This line of enquiry can only be pursued cautiously because, without a direct statement of what the emotion in question is, there is always room for error.

The subject of Chapter One will be Styx herself, her role as oath, and river, and how the two intertwine, both with each other, and with her identity as hatred. The second and third chapters tackle Styx's children, first as individuals, and then in relation to Zeus and Styx, revealing both the nature of the qualities they represent and the function and role of those qualities in the ordering of Zeus' universe. The final chapter will take the script of hatred that has been generated by understanding its relation to the qualities represented by Styx's own role as oath and river, as well the relationship between hatred and the children of Styx, and use this in order to examine both characters who hate and who are hated in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*. After this we will be in a position to examine whether there are instances in the poems where a hate script is present despite the absence of an explicit mention of hatred. The conclusion will draw together everything we have learned, and point out some of the differences and similarities between the contemporary ideas of hatred which we have discussed, and what Hesiod presents us with.

Chapter 1. Styx and Cosmogony

Introduction

The focus of this chapter will be Hesiod's *Theogony*, the most influential of the ancient Greek cosmogonies. There are many deities one might look at as figures of hate within the *Theogony* (Thanatos, the Erinyes, or Eris, for example), but Styx must be the primary candidate due to the very meaning of her name. Although Nikoletta Kanavou claims that there are no Greek personal names that attach to στυγέω (*stugeō*, 'I hate'),[93] Hjalmar Frisk and Pierre Chantraine both find the attachment of Στύξ (Styx), to *stugeō* so obvious that they combine the two words in single entries under *stugeō* in their respective etymological dictionaries.[94] The abundance of verses Hesiod bestows upon Styx in comparison to any other such deity makes her role and features deserving of detailed attention. Indeed, Hesiod states that Styx is the most important of the children of Okeanos and Tethys (361). Given some of the other daughters of Okeanos, this is no trivial claim. According to Hesiod, Styx is more important that Metis, Zeus' first wife whom he swallows; and Eurynome, Zeus' third wife, who bears him Aglaia, Euphrosune and Thalia – the three Charites, or Graces. Indeed, Styx's name in mentioned five times in the *Theogony* (361, 383, 397, 775, 805), whilst Metis is named only twice (358, 886). This alone indicates the importance of understanding Styx in our attempts to understand the *Theogony* as a whole.

Hesiod's usage of deities as cosmogonical forces in the creation and ordering of the world means that the *Theogony* offers an explanation of the role of hatred in the forming and structuring of the cosmos; a role which has multiple aspects and manifestations. This idea will be at the centre of my enquiry throughout this chapter To begin I must first outline the most important features of the character and role of Styx as described in the *Theogony*. I shall then discuss the previous scholarship that has attempted to deal with these features, in order to point out the main problem with the approaches such scholarship has tended to take: that such readings usually ignore or attempt to explain away Styx's role as personified hatred, rather than using it as a

[93] Kanavou (2013: 176).
[94] Frisk (1970: 812-13); Chantraine (1999: 1065-66).

tool with which to analyse her appearance and role within the text. It is the determined eschewing of this fact, I argue, which leaves these previous attempts to explain the myth unable to cope with the figure of Styx.

The rest of the chapter will focus on demonstrating that a reading that embraces Styx's role as hatred and uses it as a tool to analyse the text, rather than as a fact that needs to be explained away, provides a far more complete picture of her role within the *Theogony* and of the text as a whole. Through the lens of Styx as hatred I shall discuss her role as oath, as physical river, and as denizen of Tartaros. Though I list these as discrete items here, my analysis will reveal a complex interrelationship between these elements.

Outline of Styx in the *Theogony*

The goddess Styx is mentioned several times in the *Theogony*: first as the most important of the children of Okeanos and Tethys (361), then in connection with the Titanomachy. In the latter instance she and her children (Nike, Zelos, Kratos, and Bie), on the advice of her father, and in order to earn the honours Zeus promises to those who aid him, are the first to take the side of Zeus in the fight (their father, Pallas, is not mentioned as joining the fight, nor ever mentioned again). This earns her children the honour of being forever in Zeus' company, and Styx herself the perhaps more dubious honour of becoming the oath of the gods (383-401). Later in the *Theogony* we get a detailed description of the physical river of the Styx, as well as where the goddess herself lives, and the punishment for breaking an oath sworn on her (775-806). We shall return to discuss these scenes in greater detail later.

The Ellipsis of "Hatred" in Previous Scholarship on Styx

Having established the very basics of the account of the Styx with which Hesiod has furnished us, let us now turn to examine the previous scholarship that has attempted to deal with this material. This does not constitute a large body of work; it is not a topic that has been given much scholarly consideration. In those explanations that have been attempted the focus has rarely been directly on Styx herself, and never on explaining the role of hatred in the Titanomachy, Zeus' subsequent reign, or the

ordering of the universe at large. Her children, when they are mentioned, are always taken simply to be tools which Zeus must acquire, and though the oath of the gods is often discussed, it is, as far as possible, discussed without relation to Styx herself. When her name is mentioned it is reduced to being synonymous with the oath she presides over. Styx tends to be treated instead as something to be explained away, a piece left over after the puzzle has seemingly been completed. Whilst the works of these scholars may be invaluable in approaching other aspects of Hesiod's work, I draw attention to them now in order to highlight the failure of their approaches to satisfactorily explain the presence and role of Styx in this text, and thus also to the necessity for new attempts to understand Styx as a figure of importance in and of herself. I do not believe an acceptance of the fuller significance of Styx beyond oath-making will negate many of the interpretations these scholars make about other aspects of Hesiod's works; on the contrary, such an acceptance may in fact strengthen or enrich these interpretations.

Daniel Blickman dismisses any relationship between the character of Styx and those of her children, considering Styx only as 'oath' and rejecting any association between her children and her role as oath. Blickman ignores both the prior fact of her existence as a goddess (and a mother) before becoming this oath, and the implicit meaning of her name.[95] Blickman's explanation for why Styx becomes the oath of the gods is that, being the first to offer her assistance, and thus the first to whom Zeus must keep his oath, it is only fitting that she become an embodiment of that kept oath and of all the other oaths Zeus will keep.[96] In Hesiod's cosmogony this oath/promise that Zeus offers to those who aid him is the first instance of the use of something which resembles an oath; it is an oath made before the conditions for the trustworthiness of an oath have be established. Thus, the fulfilment of his first oath must in some way provide a reassurance that this, and all other promises, will also be fulfilled – the precedent must be set. In swearing and keeping an oath, Zeus creates the conditions for swearing and keeping *all* oaths, and also sets up part of the order and justice of his new reign – a reign established on the fulfilling of the promise to honour the other gods.[97]

[95] Blickman (1987: 349-50).
[96] Blickman (1987: 349-50). This is a common interpretation.
[97] Blickman (1987: 348).

This is a very pleasing explanation of some of the details of the Styx oath: it accounts for why the first being to whom Zeus swears an oath would be the appropriate arbiter for all oaths the gods make henceforth. However, it fails to account for the fact that Styx is a goddess whose very name means 'hate' and thus ignores the question of why that first person should be Hate as oppose to anyone else. Blickman's argument regarding the relationship between Styx and her children dismisses a thematic connection, instead stating only that the children are essential to maintaining the reign of Zeus and in order to keep the children of Styx at his side he must honour his oath to their mother.[98] But still the question remains: as the first to aid Zeus, as the oath of the gods, why Styx – why Hate?

In *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, Friedrich Solmsen acknowledges that Hesiod is clearly fascinated with Styx, and suggests this fascination originates both in the mysterious and esoteric 'Styx water' mentioned in the *Iliad* and Hesiod's own obsession with oaths.[99] Given a pre-existing, but barely explained river whose waters act as the oath of the gods, how could Hesiod not expand this myth and attempt to make sense of it within the framework of what Solmsen asserts is Hesiod's main objective: 'to exalt the status and personality of Zeus'?[100] Solmsen's claim is that, obsessed with Styx and her oath, the only way Hesiod can work them into his *Theogony* is to have the personified Styx aid Zeus in his hour of greatest need, and that she does this by supplying the children who would become essential for maintaining his reign. The reward for such aid is to become the oath that binds the gods, and for her children, whose names Solmsen translates as 'Power, Victory, Strength and Zeal',[101] to become the permanent attendants of Zeus.

Solmsen denies any resemblance in character between Styx and her children and explains this mismatch between a seemingly negatively-attributed mother and

[98] Blickman (1987: 351).
[99] Solmsen (1949: 33).
[100] Solmsen (1949: 32).
[101] Solmsen (1949: 32). It is not immediately obvious which, out of Kratos and Bie, is 'Power' and which 'Strength', because Solmsen changes the order of the children from that given by the text. It can possibly be inferred from p. 33, when Solmsen writes 'Kratos, Nike, and the other two…'; only a few lines later the order is shifted again and becomes 'Nike, Kratos, Bia, and Zelos', though Kratos and Nike still hold the first two places. Given this, the idea that Solmsen meant 'Kratos' to be understood as 'Power' is reasonable.

seemingly positively-attributed children as a result of the fact that Hesiod's desire to explain the position of Styx trumps all other narrative, structural and cohesive considerations.[102] But Solmsen never explains why Styx and her children are so mismatched. Solmsen creates this mismatch between Styx and her children by firstly assuming that hatred is a negative thing in Hesiod's cosmos, and secondly by giving the children unambiguously morally positive translations, a decision which is necessitated by a confusion between Zeus as representing a pragmatically "better" order, and Zeus representing a morally "good" order.

Solmsen offers one translation for the name of each of children of Styx, but all bar Nike can be translated in several different ways: Kratos could be 'Force' or 'Strength' or 'Might', Bie could be 'Violence' or 'Force', and Zelos might also be translated as 'Envy' or 'Rivalry'.[103] To a modern reader these names fit the character of their mother as Hatred far better, given that such a reader is far more likely to assume that they are all – including 'hate' – more "negative" terms. As we shall discover throughout the following chapters, these terms were far more nuanced for Hesiod than Solmsen acknowledges. This has the unfortunate consequence for Solmsen of adding a note of ambiguity to the ethical character of Zeus. No such problem would arise if one also accepted a more nuanced, Machiavellian (or perhaps, Sisyphean) view of Zeus, in which he represents a pragmatic stability rather than absolute moral goodness (for both Archaic and modern readers). Even excluding the myriad myths of the violence of Zeus that can be found in the *Iliad* and elsewhere, within the *Theogony* Zeus uses violence to maintain his position, as when punishing Prometheus (521-5) and when the monster Typhoeus is born (820-868).[104] Violence has a place in Hesiod's world and is a tool for Zeus to utilise on occasion.

In relation to Zelos, Solmsen acknowledges that in the *Works and Days* Hesiod refers to Zelos in a very negative light, but dismisses the idea that this is the same Zelos as

[102] Solmsen (1949: 33-34).
[103] These are not exhaustive lists, as we shall see in Chapters Two and Three.
[104] Solmsen (1982: 11-12) thinks this passage is the work of an epigone clearly attempting to out-do Hesiod's Titanomachy. But as Hermann Fränkel points out, it is common within Hesiod for the same things to be represented multiple times, from different perspectives (1975: 105). Three is a common total for such repetitions. The fight against Typhoeus forms part of a list of battles Zeus must fight in order to assume leadership. This is as good enough a reason to count the passage genuine as Solmsen's is to count the passage a later addition. For further arguments supporting the authenticity of this passage, see West (1966: 379-83).

in the *Theogony*. He argues that just as Hesiod posits two different figures of Eris (Strife) – one useful to man, one disruptive to man – there are also two individual figures of Zelos, one (a morally good one) unique to the *Theogony* and the other (morally dubious) one unique to the *Works and Days*.[105] But, as we will see in Chapter Two, there are good reasons to associate the Zelos of the *Works and Days* with the son of Styx. Moreover, Hesiod himself does not distinguish two figures nor claim there is a second Zelos. If one puts aside Solmsen's assumption that Zeus is morally "good" and that therefore, by association, Zelos must also be morally "good", then there is no reason to avoid the ethically ambiguous translation 'Rivalry' for Zelos, or to assume that there must be two separate figures of Zelos.

Martin West's attempt to explain the phenomena of the Styx oath takes a very similar line to that of Solmsen. He imagines a thought process that begins with an unexplained tradition in which the gods swear on the Styx. He then imagines Hesiod attempting to explain this tradition by reasoning that, if it is the case that the gods swear on the Styx, then Zeus must have decreed it. This leads to the question of why Zeus ordained such a role for Styx, and to the conclusion that he must have done so as a reward for services rendered. West's imagining of Hesiod's reasoning continues with the idea that these services would in all likelihood be in connection with the Titanomachy, but that it would be unlikely that Styx herself would have fought. If Styx herself did not fight then it must have been her children who did. But how could her children be so important to the outcome of the war? Because they are Victory (Nike) and Strength (Bie) - the other two are forgotten.[106]

There are several problems with West's explanation of the relationship between Styx's role as mother of these allegorical deities, her role as first to aid Zeus, and her role as the oath of the gods. Firstly, West provides no justification for the claim that it is unlikely that Styx herself would have fought; there is nothing in her character that suggests she could not, or should not, be fighting herself and there is certainly nothing in the *Theogony* which supports this claim. Indeed, in the description of the physical

[105] Solmsen (1949: 32 & 32 n. 96).
[106] West (1966: 272-73). Given that West discusses the children out of order, it is impossible to be certain which child's name is being translated as 'Strength'; indeed, in one sentence it is 'Victory and Power' who are the significant figures, but only a few lines later it is 'Victory and Strength' but it is Bie who is named as such in West's 1988 translation; it seems reasonable to assume without evidence to the contrary that it is Bie who is being referred to here.

fighting that ensues, Hesiod explicitly mentions that both male and female gods fought: θήλειαί τε καὶ ἄρσενες ('both female and male' [667]).[107] She is also possibly present, fighting along with her children, on the north frieze of the Pergamon metopes, which depicts the Titanomachy.[108]

Secondly, both West's and Solmsen's explanations remove from the modern scholar the task of attempting to explain why such "good" children were born of such a "bad" mother by undermining the importance of their genealogical connection. How did Hate (Styx) create Victory and Strength (following West) /Might (following Solmsen)? Only in order to explain why Styx is the oath of the gods. Essentially, they are declaring the connection between Styx and her children a fudge. In doing so they are suggesting that a specific part of the text, which coincidentally happens to be a section they have found troubling in some form, is devoid of significance – a claim for which we have no textual evidence, or indeed, supporting evidence of any kind.

Finally, both Solmsen and West make the same mistake as Blickman, in that they are happy to claim the Styx's children are allegorical and simply represent qualities Zeus needs to strengthen his reign, but are seemingly very against applying the same type of reading to Styx herself. Furthermore, their analysis stops with the idea that Styx's children are the personifications of the qualities they are named after, but, as Ruth Padel points out, though in modern society personification is often treated as an empty, shallow trope, for the Ancient Greeks it was a far more meaningful device.[109] That Zelos, Nike, Kratos, and Bie are personifications has implications for how we should attempt to understand them, and it is a topic worth investigating – we cannot simply state that they are personifications and consider the matter closed. To state that they are personifications is to begin the discussion, not to end it. We find ourselves left with the question of what it means for the children of Styx – and Styx herself – to

[107] Translation of inset quotes of the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* are by Lattimore. Shorter quotes are my own translation unless otherwise stated. Source for the Greek text of the *Theogony*: Solmsen, Merkelbach & West (1970).
[108] Picard (1940: 170-71) believes that the figure is Styx, surrounded by her children, as does Vian (1951: 21-23), but the attribution is not certain; because there is no defining trait which allows us to identify the figure beyond all doubt, their identification is based on their own theories as to what the overarching theme of the north frieze is (water deities, in the case of Picard, cosmological order in the case of Vian). Other scholars have identified the figure more commonly as Nyx (Puchstein 1910: 38-39; Robert 1911: 238; Kähler 1948: 52-53; and Simon 1975: 12-13) or Demeter (Winnefeld 1910: 146; and Schefold 1959: 128).
[109] Padel (1992: 158-59).

be personifications of certain qualities.

Susan Lye focuses on the relationship between Styx as oath and the geographical nature of Styx's waters, noting how they both function as boundaries;[110] this is a topic that I too shall explore. But just as with the others, Lye passes over in silence the identity of Styx – whether personification or geographical feature – as hatred.

The questions and issues all these scholars avoid – the identity of Styx as Hate, why Hate would have such children as Hesiod gives her, why she would be first to aid Zeus, and why the figure of Hate would be suitable to be the witness and punishers of the oaths of the gods – are the precise questions whose neglect prevents a full understanding and comprehension of how Hesiod's cosmogony works. Without addressing these issues we can never hope to fully understand what roles various forces and emotions have in the shaping of Hesiod's universe, establishing the order of Zeus and the Olympians, and the shaping of the beginning of civil life. And it is these questions that we shall now explore in full in the following section.

Oath

To understand fully the role of Styx as oath (ὅρκος, *horkos*), one must have a wider understanding of the role and use of oaths; the Styx oath as described by Hesiod is not typical of the tradition of oath-taking in Greek culture and in order to discuss how the Styx oath deviates from the norm, it is necessary first to establish precisely what the norm *is*. In this section I shall first establish what I feel to be the best definition of an oath before moving on to discuss the representation of oaths in Hesiod. After this we shall then be in a position to turn back to Styx and the oath she presents and discuss how her role as hatred makes her a fitting oath goddess, and how such a goddess fits into the new ordered universe of Zeus.

Richard Janko concisely explains an oath in the following way: 'to take an oath is in effect to invoke powers greater than oneself to uphold the truth of a declaration, by

[110] Lye (2009).

putting a curse upon oneself if it is false'.[111] Oaths can be either promissory or assertory in nature. Promissory oaths bind the swearer to a future pattern of behaviour, such as the oath Hektor and Agamemnon agree to make, binding them to stop warring and to allow the fate of Helen and their respective armies to be determined by the outcome of a duel between Alexander and Menelaos (*Il.* III 59-120). Here the participants invoke a curse that if the oath should be broken, the guilty party shall be killed – their brains smashed out on the floor – along with their children, and their wives taken into slavery. They invoke Ge, Zeus, and Helios to witness their oath (III 276-301). Assertory oaths bind the swearer to the truth of statements they make regarding the past. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon, at the behest of Odysseus, swears an assertory oath that he has not touched Briseis (XIX 241-68). Here he invokes Zeus, Ge, Helios, and the Erinyes as witnesses, and offers a conditional curse that the gods will bring him many pains if this is a false oath. Oaths *can* occasionally contain blessings, but these are the exception rather than the rule. Blessings never appear in oaths that lack curses, and the blessings are rarely as detailed as the corresponding curses.[112] Both promissory and assertory oaths are represented by Hesiod, though the latter is more common.

Recent scholarship on oaths has highlighted their importance as a tool for social cohesion and stability, and the great frequency with which people from varied social groups used them in a wide range of situations.[113] But it is nonetheless the case that a sense of mistrust is an intrinsic element of oaths.[114] Indeed, Frederick Paley states that 'an oath presupposes some kind of contention. Oaths would be wholly needless if men lived in perfect amity. The Greeks especially were so prone to deceit, that nothing short of very strong inculcations of the sanctity of an oath would ensure it being kept.'[115]

Writing in the 2nd-3rd centuries CE, Clement of Alexandria confirms this general concept by stating the exception: the faithful man is pious and lives in accordance

[111] Janko (1992: 194).
[112] Fletcher (2012: 8).
[113] See Kitts (2005); Sommerstein & Fletcher (2007); Fletcher (2012); Sommerstein & Bayliss, (2013).
[114] Burkert notes this (1985: 253), and Sommerstein does acknowledge that oaths require an element of distrust to be present, and that this can be present even amongst friends, if the stakes are high enough (Sommerstein and Fletcher 2007: 3).
[115] Paley (1883: 199).

with the truth, and therefore needs no oath to bolster his word, because it would be impossible for him to lie (*Stromata* VII. 8). The ensuing discussion will show, however, that Hesiod placed significant emphasis on the double-edged nature of the oath, underlining that it was a tool that could be misused and which could backfire. As useful as it was, there was cause enough to also fear it – perhaps even resent it, if we take the attitude of hatred from the *Theogony*'s Olympian gods towards Styx as evidence of a wider attitude towards oaths.

Our discussion will begin with the other figure of oath in the Hesiodic poems – Horkos. There are several notable mentions of Horkos in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*. In the *Theogony* this god of oaths is one of the many children of Eris (herself described here as στυγερή, *stugerē* 'hateful' [226]), for whom no father is given, and whose names read as a list of things that both arise from strife and which cause strife (226-32): Toil (Ponos),[116] Forgetfulness (Lethe),[117] Famine (Limos), Pain (Algea), Battles (Hysminai), Combats (Makhai), Murder (Phonoi), Slaughter (Androktasiai), Quarrels (Neikea), Lies (Pseudea), Arguments (Logoi), Disputes (Amphilogiai), Lawlessness (Dysnomia), Folly (Ate), and Oath (Horkos).[118] Coming at the end of this list of children of Eris (the same position in which we find Styx when the daughters of Tethys and Ouranos are listed [337-61] – that position oft reserved for the most important child), Horkos is described as ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους / πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ – 'he who most ruins (πημαίνει, *pēmainei*) men on earth when anyone intentionally swears falsely' (231-32).

It should be noted that this *pēmainei* shares a common root with the 'misery' (πῆμα, *pēma*) that describes the Styx oath later in the poem (μέγα πῆμα θεοῖσιν 'a great misery to the gods' [792]). This association of oaths and misery is repeated in the *Works and Days*, where Horkos is described as the child Eris bore to bring 'misery to

[116] Although *ponos* can refer to the toil of work and labour, it is also frequently used to refer to the toil of suffering and distress (e.g. *Il.* XIX 227).
[117] Note that in verse 55 *lēthē* is seen as a good thing – the muses, daughter of Mnemosyne (Memory), bring forgetfulness of troubles' – an odd claim, given that Hesiod invokes them to help him recount a series of troubles and struggles.
[118] This is not to claim that these things must always cause strife, or be caused by strife, or that we must consider them all to be negative forces, although the list of the children of Eris is perhaps the closest Hesiod gets to a catalogue of offspring who seem clearly all "positive" or all "negative".

perjurers' (τέκε πῆμ' ἐπιόρκοις, [804]). Although this line in the *Works and Days* suggests a misery specific to the perjurer, verses 231-2 of the *Theogony* are not so specific in suggesting to whom Horkos will bring misery. The trigger is still the event of someone knowingly swearing falsely, but the ensuing misery is not described as being specific to the perjurer, but more generally 'to men on earth'. Likewise, when Styx is described as bringing misery (*pēma*) to the gods (792), it is not as bringing misery to those gods who have (hypothetically) perjured themselves, but to all the gods. In this way Hesiod emphasises the maleficent aspect of oaths.

This theme of the negative aspect of Horkos is continued if we examine the verses in which he is mentioned in the *Works and Days* more closely:

> Πέμπτας δ' ἐξαλέασθαι, ἐπεὶ χαλεπαί τε καὶ αἰναί·
> ἐν πέμπτῃ γάρ φασιν Ἐρινύας ἀμφιπολεύειν
> Ὅρκον γεινόμενον, τὸν Ἔρις τέκε πῆμ' ἐπιόρκοις.
>
> (802-4)

> Beware of all of the fifth days; they are harsh
> and angry; it was on
> the fifth, they say, that the Erinyes
> assisted at the bearing
> of Oath, whom Strife bore, to be a plague
> on those who take false oath.

Here Hesiod also tells us that Horkos was born on a fifth and that the Erinyes were present at his birth. This fact is given as an explanation for the advice Hesiod gives here against attempting to do anything on the fifths. Given that Horkos is here described as bringing *pēma* (misery) to perjurers, which is surely a good thing, we may question why Hesiod then considers the fifths such dark days. We cannot argue that it is simply because of the presence of the Erinyes, for their presence is inextricable from Horkos': they are there for him. We can, however, make sense of it if all mortals have reason to fear that Horkos may bring them misery. And why should they worry about the misery Horkos brings? For the same reason they fear the Erinyes. The Erinyes are generally malevolent goddesses, born from Ge and the spilled blood of Ouranos when Kronos castrates him (*Th.* 183-87), an act for which

they require vengeance (472-73).[119] The Erinyes only appear when a blood crime has been committed; Hesiod does not portray them as watching over families or bestowing good fortune upon those who respect blood-ties, only as punishing those who break them. Associating Horkos with such figures reaffirms the idea that Horkos' oath function is purely retaliatory, concerned only with those who break oaths.[120] He does not reward those who keep their oaths, nor can he be prayed to in order to help one keep a difficult oath, he can only act as a deterrent through being the punishment that awaits those who break their oaths. But even the innocent fear punishment – this is the nature of a deterrent. Thus, it makes sense that the day on which Horkos was born would be avoided by all as an ill day.[121]

Adding to this emerging picture of the negative aspects of Horkos is his lineage. As noted above, Horkos is a child of Eris and comes at the end of a list of children who appear to be named after things that arise from, and from which arises, strife. The very fact that Horkos is a child of Eris, therefore, indicates that oaths arise out of strife. This certainly makes sense: if there is no disagreement, no situation to resolve, no issue of mistrust, then there is no reason to swear curse-containing oaths to demonstrate one's sincerity or reliability. Oaths are required only when people need reassurance that someone they do not trust will speak the truth, or behave as they said

[119] Other deities too, are born from this event: the Giants and the Melian nymphs also come from Ge and the blood of Ouranos, and Aphrodite is created here, too, but from the genitals falling into the ocean, rather than the drops of blood that fall to the earth. The Erinyes, however, are very clearly a direct response to the act of violence.

[120] Apostolos Athanassakis notes the same point regarding the connection between Horkos and the Erinyes, i.e., that it shows that Horkos is associated with punishment and revenge. (1983: 93).

[121] If we look beyond Hesiod for evidence of how oaths were considered in archaic Greece we find a story in Herodotus' *Histories* (6.86) recounted by Leotychides involving Glaucos, a Spartan, making an oath to safeguard some property and return it only to those who showed the agreed upon tokens. However, when this happens, Glaucos feigns ignorance of the oath. He then asks the Delphic oracle whether he should keep his oath. The oracle replies that though it may be more profitable in the present for Glaucos to perjure himself, Oath (Horkos) has a nameless son who pursues and utterly destroys the perjurer, and his house. The children of him who keeps his oath, however, will be happier in the future. Glaucos begs the oracle's forgiveness but is told that the thought is as bad as the deed. Leotychides ends the story by saying that there is in Sparta that day not a single living relative left of Glaucos.

In the *Iliad* we find characters skilled in manipulating oaths to their own advantage. Agamemnon relates how Hera tricked Zeus into swearing an oath that was detrimental to his son Herakles by first making him swear that his next born son will receive great power, and then ensuring that this son was not Herakles (XIX 85-130). Zeus' folly here is to swear an oath regarding a future he is more certain of than he should be. Hera also manages to use the language of the oaths to swear to Zeus that she was not involved in Poseidon's attack on the Trojans even though she played a large part in making it possible. Thus she manages to avoid any retribution for her actions (XV 35-46). In these examples we see Hera mastering the language of oaths in order to benefit herself and harm others. Oaths are dangerous tools, and the inexperienced can often be tricked into swearing detrimental oaths and extracting useless oaths.

they would. Thus, even though they are used as tools to attempt to resolve strife, they are still created by those situations they are designed to defuse. Indeed, in one of his *Olympian* odes, Pindar suggests that to swear an oath is to involve oneself in the strife:

> οὔτε δύσηρις ἐὼν οὔτ᾽ ὢν φιλόνικος ἄγαν,
> καὶ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμόσσαις τοῦτό γέ οἱ σαφέως
> μαρτυρήσω…
>
> I, who am not prone to quarrel, nor too fond of victory,
> having sworn a great oath, will clearly
> bear witness for him…
>
> (6.19-21)

He, Pindar tells us, is not a quarrelsome person, but in the event of a quarrel, he will join in by providing oath-sworn testimony. To swear an oath can itself be part of an act of strife.

The other children of Eris can also be said to cause strife, not just to be caused *by* strife – can the same be said of Horkos? Certainly this is true in the case of broken oaths. The clearest example of this is the oath broken by the Trojans in the *Iliad*, which causes the resumption of the war (IV 85-126). But can an oath that is not broken also cause strife? Evidence for such an idea is found in a fragment of the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* (Fr. 155 73-84 = OCT Fr. 204), in which the famed oath of Tyndareos is described. This is the oath, of course, which binds the suitors of Helen to wage war with any man who steals her from the chosen suitor. The fragment ends with the detail that Zeus is planning to stir up war among humans, to wipe out most of the race. There is no reason to doubt, despite the lacunas in the text, that the war being referred to is the Trojan War. Here, then, we have a source of strife whose cause is inextricably linked to the oath the suitors swore in an attempt to avoid strife: instead, it becomes part of the cause of the strife. The *Catalogue*, is, of course, generally no longer considered to be by Hesiod, but Janko, analysing the style and language of the work, argues that it can be dated to around the same time as Hesiod.[122] An awareness of this story could certainly help explain Hesiod's suggestions that oaths bring misery to all men, rather than just those who break oaths.

[122] Janko (1982: 85-87).

It also points to the idea that, like the other children of Eris, oaths can be said to cause strife – even when they are not broken.

In turning back to *Theogony* we find Horkos is associated specifically with broken oaths, compounding his negative image. His role is to punish those who break their oaths, and in doing so, to ensure that oaths can continue to function in a way that is beneficial to society. But at the same time his presence serves as a constant reminder that oaths *can* be broken. He highlights the failings of the oath.

Stephanie Nelson observes that the list of the children and grandchildren of Nyx (herself born from Chaos) is contrasted with many of the children of Zeus listed later in the poem. The children of Zeus provide the other side of the coin, as it were, to the powers of the progeny of Nyx: 'thus Zeus' children, Peace, Good Order, and Justice, are born to complement the children of Strife, Battles, Disorder, and Oath, the avenger of perjury'.[123] It is easy to see the opposition between Good Order and Disorder, and Battles and Peace, but the opposition between Dike and Horkos is not quite so straightforward;[124] they are not clearly contrasted pairs as the others are. In fact in *Works and Days* 217-37 Horkos and Dike are described together: τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν ('Horkos keeps pace with crooked judgements' [219]) and Dike follows, weeping, those who have dishonestly seized her, and brings ill to those who do not deal with her honestly (223-24). Here, then, we see Horkos and Dike in very similar roles, and that justice too, can bring calamity to those who attempt to underhandedly misdirect and avoid it. We also see that Hesiod closely associated justice and "straight-judgements" with truth-telling and oath-keeping. But whereas those who give honest judgements to friends and strangers and behave in a just manner receive myriad benefits for doing so (225-37), there is no benefit associated with Horkos. Again we see that he is there to punish you should you perjure yourself, but unlike Dike he does not provide any blessing. Whilst the other descendants of Nyx work in opposition to the children of Zeus – one brings war, their

[123] Nelson (1998: 45). The only (other) discrepancies in the overall list are Philotes and the Hesperides, who, if following a model of 'good = child of Zeus' and 'bad = descendant of Nyx', one might reasonably assign to Zeus, whereas they are in fact also children of Nyx.

[124] This argument assumes the utilization of a simple binary opposition by Hesiod, but Hesiod challenges these simple binary oppositions frequently – as is the case with Dike and Horkos above. We must be constantly wary then, of uncritically assuming any of them are simply oppositional pairs.

counterpart peace, etc. – Horkos and Dike work in harmony, to punish or reward those who use oaths. This difference suggests the fundamental importance of oaths to Hesiod's conception of Zeus' universe. Oaths, though often negatively inflected, cannot be replaced by justice, but rather they supplement each other.

We have now established several points regarding oaths: the definition, nature and format that oaths took. We have also observed that, with regards to the figure of Horkos, Hesiod tends to focus more on the negative aspects and perceptions of oaths rather than on their usefulness or benefits. Now let us turn back to the Styx oath and the *Theogony* and examine how this too fits into, and is best explained with reference to, the larger trend within Hesiod's work of highlighting the dangerous and intimidating aspect of oaths. We will then be in a position to understand why, therefore, Styx is a fitting goddess for this role, and also how and why such a force has a place in Zeus' universe.

Before all else, it is worth noting that within the *Theogony* as a whole, there are only three figures described as στυγερός (*stugeros*, 'hated, loathed, abhorred'): the Moirai (211), Eris (226), and Styx (775), and Styx is only described with this adjective in relation to her role as oath: she is not described as such when she is mentioned in the list of the Okeanids, nor when we are told whom she joins with and who her children are, nor even when she is first made the oath of the gods as her reward. Only when she is firmly established and fulfilling her function as oath is she described as *stugeros*. The oath of the gods is explicitly a hated thing.

To understand why she is so hated as oath, it will prove illuminating to examine those verses in which the punishment awaiting those who break an oath they have sworn on the Styx is outlined:

> ὅς κεν τῆς ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐπομόσσῃ
> ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,
> κεῖται νήυτμος τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν· [795]
> οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἀμβροσίης καὶ νέκταρος ἔρχεται ἆσσον
> βρώσιος, ἀλλά τε κεῖται ἀνάπνευστος καὶ ἄναυδος
> στρωτοῖς ἐν λεχέεσσι, κακὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ κῶμα καλύπτει.
> αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νοῦσον τελέσει μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,
> ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἄεθλος· [800]

εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαμείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων,
οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἐς βουλὴν ἐπιμίσγεται οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ δαῖτας
ἐννέα πάντ᾽ ἔτεα· δεκάτῳ δ᾽ ἐπιμίσγεται αὖτις
εἶρας ἐς ἀθανάτων οἳ Ὄλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχουσιν.
(793-804)

And whoever of the gods,
who keeps the summits of snowy
Olympos, pours of this water,
and swears on it, and is foresworn,
is laid flat, and does not breathe,
until a year is completed;
nor is this god let come near ambrosia
and nectar
to eat, but with no voice in him,
and no breath, he is laid out
flat, on a made bed, and the evil coma
covers him.
But when, in the course of a great year,
he is over his sickness,
there follows on in succession another trial,
yet harsher:
for nine years he is cut off
from all part of the everlasting
gods, nor has anything to do
with their counsels, their festivals
for nine years entire, but in the tenth
he once more mingles
in the assemblies of the gods
who have their homes on Olympos.

The observant reader may have already noticed the deviation of the Styx oath from the description of an oath given above: when a deity swears an oath on the Styx, they add no explicit conditional curse. There is a specific curse already implied when one swears on the Styx; she is both the witness and the punisher. Though Hesiod is our only extant source who describes a punishment for breaking a Styx oath, no Styx oath in any other source carries an additional conditional curse with it, suggesting that the idea of Styx as witness, judge and executioner – as avenger – for the oath was more widely held. The great detail that Hesiod gives regarding the punishment for breaking a Styx oath achieves the same effect as the constant association of Horkos with broken oaths – it is a reminder of the precarious position in which the swearer places themselves, and the precarious nature of a society or ordered universe founded on such a contract. To make an oath is to raise the spectre of the punishment should one

break it. It is putting oneself in a position of potential danger – of being threatened. These facts begin to explain why Styx is more explicitly hated by the gods than Horkos is by mortals – the same figure represents both the oath itself and the punishment for breaking it. The difference between an oath and the conditional curse has been confounded, meaning that the oath itself shares the fear and hate directed towards the potential punishment and the consequences of that punishment.

But this is not the only reason why Styx is a fitting goddess of this role. Though the gods are deathless, breaking an oath on the Styx clearly brings them as close to death as such a figure can be brought – the curse mimics many of the 'symptoms' of death – no breath,[125] no movement, no engaging in the eating and drinking necessary for (mortal) life. Both ancient and contemporary etymologies for 'Styx' reinforce this association with death-like qualities. As far as ancient etymological sources are concerned, the *Epimerismi Homerici* (late 9th century CE) gives Styx as the word from which στυγέῃ, 'hate, abhor' derives, and also as the source of the meaning of the word (186, b).[126] The *Etymologicum Magnum* (compiled from earlier sources circa 1150 CE) comments that 'some say that *stugnos* derives from Styx', giving the explanation that the ancient Greeks named unpleasant things after cold things, and pleasant things after warm things (Kallierges 731: 15-18).[127] Hatred is conceived of as something frigid, something that disrupts life, affects breathing, action, and the ability to consume food: it is something that *prevents*.

Turning to contemporary etymologists, Frisk and Chantraine, though admitting that the etymology is not certain, draw comparison to the Russian stýgnuti/stugnuti, meaning 'cold' or 'frozen'; Robert Beekes mentions the comparison, but is more sceptical of its veracity.[128] Stuart Mann's *An Indo-European Comparative Dictionary* suggests that both 'sthug-' and its variant 'sthugeros' are the root of the Greek *stugeō* and *stugeros* and, in middle high German and low German respectively, of *stücken* (eradicate; stiffen; attack) and *stukkern* (stop dead; solidify).[129] It is notable that the

[125] ψυχή (*psuchē*), of course, has meanings of both 'breath' and 'life'. The ideas are intimately connected.
[126] Following Dyck's system from *Epimerismi Homerici*: line of *Iliad* I, followed by the source of the gloss (1995).
[127] Following Gaisford's paginations from *Etymologicum Magnum* (1848).
[128] Frisk (1970: 812-13); Chantraine (1977: 1065-66); Beekes (2010: 1416-17).
[129] Mann (1984: 1328).

qualities suggested by these etymologies are all qualities associated with death, and with the effects of the waters of Styx.

Further details also reinforce the association with death. Padel comments on the usage of language associated with water to describe the actions of death, sleep, and mist, which are described as being 'poured' (from χέω, *cheō*, 'pour') over the eyes of humans and, in the case of sleep, gods too.[130] The waters of Styx, 'pouring down' (καταλείβεται, *kataleibetai* [786]) from the high rocks and 'poured' (ἀπολλείψας, *apoleipsas* [793]) in libation, pour sleep upon the forsworn god.[131] The language of liquids and waters is also associated with innards and emotions. Styx's waters flow around the dark underworld, like the inner liquids which cause passions in the human body.[132] The similarity of the imagery of inner liquids and chthonic waters leads Padel to wonder if 'passion itself is not felt to be a kind of loss of consciousness'.[133] The passion of hatred could induce a type of κῶμα (*kōma*, 'coma' [798]) inflicted upon the foresworn god – those who, having fallen victim of the threatened punishment, have most cause to hate her as a direct source of the harm that has come to them. The overlap in terminology that describes the inner workings of the body, how it experiences emotion, and how it experiences disease and turmoil reinforce the dangerous nature of emotions, and especially of the emotion of hatred represented by Styx and her waters. But *kōma* is not the inevitable result of swearing on the Styx. Only those who fail to keep their oaths – those who fail to use oaths properly – experience a loss of consciousness. Though they cascade into the underworld, Styx's waters start in the world above. Hatred, like oath, has a usage, and rules which govern improper and proper usage of it. It need not be experienced as a loss of consciousness if experienced properly.

Regarding the length of the punishment inflicted by the Styx curse, Richard Caldwell notes that the number ten is often chosen to represent long durations (cf. the anvil

[130] Padel (1994: 78); Padel points to *Il.* XIV 165 (Zeus falls asleep), 696 (Sarpedon's [temporary] death), XIII 544 (the death of Aphareus), and XX 321 (Poseidon pours mist over the eyes of Achilles).
[131] Recall those words associated with contempt that can mean 'to look down upon' (*huperoraō*, *huperphroneō*, and *kataphroneō*) and 'to spit upon' (*kataptuō*).
[132] See Padel (1994: 81-88) for a full discussion of the use of liquid imagery to describe the emotional physiology of people in a variety of sources, and its overlap and shared sources with the terminology of disease.
[133] Padel (1994: 79).

which would fall for nine days and would reach Tartaros on the tenth [722-25], and the duration in years of the Titanomachy itself), and that such length and division (nine and one) corresponds to the Greek notions of pregnancy and childbirth, where the child is born in the tenth month.[134] We could then interpret the Styx oath as a cycle of death and renewal for the punished god.[135] The first year represents death, in which the god lies breathless and unmoving, with the nine years spent in isolation afterwards corresponding to a pregnancy at the end of which the perjured god is reborn into the company of the other gods.[136]

Hesiod states that the second part of Styx' punishment is more arduous than the first (799-800). If the first year of punishment represents death, then the next nine years can be read as representing time spent in the underworld – outside of, and exiled from, the newly ordered universe of Zeus. It is a period in which a god is deprived of their due honours[137] – a punishment enforced by a goddess who was once herself deprived of honours, and who was then given as her honours the role of enforcing obedience to Zeus' reign by being able to deprive others of what she herself was once deprived of. It is not difficult to understand therefore why she is hated by the other gods or why she is a particularly appropriate figure for this role: she deprives the offending god of what it is to be a god, bringing them as close to death as they can be brought. She inflicts upon them the same lack of acknowledgement of their power and divinity which she herself was subject to before the reign of Zeus. They become as she still is – ostracised from Olympos. It follows from this that the punishment for breaking the Styx oath is to cast out the offending god not just literally from the company of the other gods, but to cast them temporarily – and temporally – back outside Zeus' newly ordered and more just universe, returning them to the time before their new hierarchy and order was established: they are cast out, suddenly finding themselves on the wrong side of the fence, but still subject to its power.

[134] Caldwell (2009: 51 n. 84).
[135] This would fit with one of the conceptual themes that Johnson notes many of the inhabitants of Tartaros represent: 'the cyclical phenomena of night, day, sleep, and death.' (1999: 12).
[136] For modern readers, a comparison to baptism appears obvious, as of course, is the comparison to the later myth of Achilles being dipped in the Styx by Thetis to bestow invulnerability upon him, but there is no evidence for this story in the archaic period. For a discussion of the development of the story of Achilles' invulnerability and his being dipped in the Styx, and the potential relation to baptism, see Burgess (1995).
[137] Compare also Empedocles (fr. 8b = DK 31 B115).

Finally, in establishing Styx as the oath of the gods as a reward for helping Zeus, there is an inevitable implication that before this point, there was no oath to which the gods were bound. Styx represents a new limitation on their powers, a new consequence for an action that previously had no (significant) consequence for them. Thus we might suppose that some of the hatred can be accounted for simply by the fact that she represents a new rule, a new consequence, a new threat, a new limit to what they can and cannot do. In this way we can see Styx as bringing misery to all the gods (μέγα πῆμα θεοῖσιν [792]) just as Horkos might bring misery to all humans, regardless of whether or not they ever break (or even take) an oath.

The two roles of Styx, then, as hatred and as oath, are well matched and closely interwoven. But Styx is an appropriate figure for another reason also: by making Styx the oath of the gods and the insurance that he will keep his oath to honour all, Hesiod's Zeus makes Styx the solution to future conflict amongst the gods. Like Eris, mother of Horkos, Styx represents a quality that helps necessitate the need for oaths in the first place. By making Styx the oath of the gods, Zeus not only reins in the Olympian deities and prevents their rebelling, but also limits the powers of the chthonic deities, and negates the threat they pose by bending their conflict-causing natures to conflict resolution instead. In essence, Zeus cunningly makes part of the problem the solution to the problem.

We should remember, too, Blickman's analysis of Styx as oath, in which Zeus, by keeping his oath to Styx in such a way as to make her the guarantor of all future oaths, makes her and oaths a fundamental part of the stability, order and justice of his newly established reign – 'the foundation of civilised society'.[138] Once again, in this analysis it is appropriate that the guarantor of oaths, who must, for the sake of stability, be the first person Zeus kept his oath to, be a figure who was given no honour or recognition in the previous order – a figure previously held in contempt by the old order. In keeping his promise to those who received no honours before, Zeus is strengthening

[138] Blickman (1987: 350). Of course, we must question what is meant by such a loaded term as 'civilized society'. Lamberton pointedly remarks of the existence of Styx as oath, and of her subsequent ability to limit the actions of the gods, that she 'is a function of the cynicism and realism of Hesiod's conception of power. That these fundamentally lawless superhuman entities should take into consideration any factor beyond their own immediate gratification in the exercise of their vast powers is something that requires explanation. It is the Styx, privileged to serve as their oath, that keeps them honest' (1988: 88).

the power of his oath – he will keep his promises to those that were previously shunned. Thus, if we claim that Zeus' keeping his promise to Styx, and his making her the oath of the gods is part of the foundation of a new, stable, and just world order, we must acknowledge that this new order is stable and just because it has room for a figure such as Styx. If Zeus' universe is more balanced and stable, it is because it has a place for hatred.

Contrary then, to the opinions of previous scholarship, the role of Styx as guarantor of oaths and her characterisation as both hate and as hateful are entirely intelligible. The causal connection between hate and oath may not be obvious or direct, but within the context of the *Theogony* and the establishing of the new, just, reign of Zeus, it is a highly important connection. The identity of Styx not just as an un-honoured and hated figure, but as the personification of hatred itself – which Zeus is willing to make one of the strongest foundations of his new reign – makes a powerful statement about the composition of this new universe: there is room in it for all who choose to accept his leadership. Perhaps more fundamentally, the choice of Styx represents a nuanced view of the societal value of oaths – they are useful, but are in their own way a necessary evil, needed only when strife, distrust, and hatred appear. In short, Hate was an appropriate figure to become oath; it is appropriate to hate the oath provided one abides by it, and it is being forced to abide by it that makes the oath hated.

The Topology of Styx

There has been much debate about the authenticity of parts, or all, of the Tartaros passage, in which we find the detailed description of Styx's abode and the courses her waters take. Paul Mazon rejects the entire passage as a later interpolation, as Solmsen also came to do, arguing that the passage relating to Styx 'moves with a smooth elegance quite alien to the genuine Hesiod.'[139] West and David Johnson argue for the authenticity of much, or all, of the passage. West's argument for the authenticity of verses relating to Styx is a subtle textual one: when Styx is presented as a solution to strife amongst the gods, the order of the appearance of certain key words therein (ἔρις, strife [782]; νεῖκος, quarrel [782]; ψεύδηται, speak falsely [783]; ὅρκον, oath [784];

[139] Mazon (1928: 14-15); Solmsen (1982: 14-18, 16). Solmsen was initially more sympathetic to the authenticity of the passage (1949: 60-62, 60 n. 197).

πῆμα, misery [792]; and ἐπίορκον…ἐπομόσσῃ, swear falsely [793]) matches precisely the order in which these same words appear in the list and description of the children of Eris in verses 226-32. This correspondence is so subtle, and 'so clearly subconscious' that it must show the repeated thought process of a single author.[140] In the same vein, Peter Walcot and Richard Hamilton have both pointed to a correlation, albeit imperfect, between the order of the genealogies of the gods and that of the gods in Tartaros: first come (the sources of) Gaia, Tartaros, Ouranos and Pontos, then (the house of) Nyx and Hemera, (the houses of) Hypnos and Thanatos,[141] then (the house of) Hades, Kerberos (as guard), and then Styx.[142]

Johnson's argument too, relies on the unity of the text, noting that 'the passage is unified by ring-composition and the sort of juxtaposition which typifies Hesiod's method of composition'.[143] Johnson further notes that the Styx passage itself fits into this composition well, pointing to the similarity of her punishment to mortal death to explain the thematic connect which links Styx to the figure of Hades, whose description hers follows on from.[144] At the very limits of Tartaros, she is as far away from the Titans as she can be, and presents a suitable counterpoint. She acts as a barrier to stop such strife as that which led to the imprisonment of the Titans from occurring again, as we see in verses 782-793.[145] Regarding the rest of the Tartaros passage, I follow Johnson's interpretation, whose detailed analysis, though too long to discuss here, produces a reading of great clarity, and the coherent picture of Tartaros that in itself makes good case for the authenticity of the passage. For the reader who remains unconvinced by these arguments, I can only hope that my own analysis of the passage and of its integral role in the whole poem will sway their mind.

It is undeniable that the topology of Styx (*Th.* 775-92), and of Tartaros in general, does not lend itself to straightforward interpretation. Any attempt to create an idea of the physical geography of the underworld based on this passage would quickly

[140] West (1966: 357). It should be noted that West rejects at least 734-35 and 740-45 as later interpolations, but admits that 'unsubstantiated suspicion is all that one has to go on' (p. 50).
[141] These two are reversed – in verse 212 Thanatos is mentioned first.
[142] Walcot (1966: 46); Hamilton (1989: 22-23). The discrepancy Hamilton notes is that in the description of Tartaros Hades should come after Styx, rather than before, but Nyx and Hemera (124) should also come before Ouranos (127) and Pontos (132).
[143] Johnson (1999: 8).
[144] Johnson (1999: 9).
[145] Johnson (1999: 10).

become lost in contradictions and physical impossibilities; the topology of Tartaros is neither stable nor neat. A topographical interpretation of the description, as many scholars have discovered, leads to a confusing mess for the cartographer. As Johnson notes, 'If we insist on looking for some sort of topographical sense in the description of Tartarus, then, we must conclude either that Hesiod has done a very poor job of it or that his text is irredeemably corrupt.'[146] But the meaning of this topology becomes apparent if we follow Johnson and Hermann Fränkel in reading narrative proximity as indicative of thematic or conceptual similarity rather than fixed physical contiguity.[147] When multiple, conflicting descriptions of the same place, figure or object are given, it is not with the intention of confounding the reader but, as Fränkel states, 'to inspect it ever afresh from changing viewpoints'.[148] It is through this lens that I intend to analyse Hesiod's description of Styx, investigating what the physical descriptions reveal about Styx's role in Zeus' new ordered world, and in Hesiod's own cosmogonical thinking.

Styx's abode is described immediately after the house of Hades and Persephone (767-776). Positioning Styx next to Hades is appropriate given their shared qualities of being hated by the gods, and of being immovable objects. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon describes how Hades is hated by all because he cannot be reasoned or bargained with:

> Ἄϊδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἠδ' ἀδάμαστος,
> τοὔνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν **ἔχθιστος** ἁπάντων:
> (IX 158)

> Lord Death [i.e., Hades] indeed is deaf to appeal, implacable;
> of all gods therefore he is the most **abhorrent**
> to mortal men.[149]

Within the description of the underworld in the *Theogony*, Thanatos, the personification of death, is also described as 'hated' (the word is *echthros*, rather than *stugeros*). Death is as inevitable as Styx oaths are unbreakable. And as already discussed, the curse for breaking a Styx oath – to lie breathless and cold, without eating or drinking – is as close to death as it is possible for an immortal to come.

[146] Johnson (1999: 10).
[147] Johnson (1999: 10-13); Fränkel (1975).
[148] Fränkel (1975: 105).
[149] All translations of the *Iliad* from Fitzgerald (1984).

Styx's house itself appears to be a waterfall that reaches the sky:[150]

> Ἔνθα δὲ ναιετάει στυγερὴ θεὸς ἀθανάτοισι,
> δεινὴ Στύξ, θυγάτηρ ἀψορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο
> πρεσβυτάτη. νόσφιν δὲ θεῶν κλυτὰ δώματα ναίει,
> μακρῇσιν πέτρῃσι κατηρεφέ' · ἀμφὶ δὲ πάντη
> κίοσιν ἀργυρέοισι πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἐστήρικται.
> (775-79)
>
> And there is housed a goddess
> loathed even by the immortals:
> dreaded Styx, eldest daughter of Ocean,
> who flows back
> on himself, and apart from the other gods
> she lives in her famous palace
> which is overroofed with towering rocks,
> and the whole circuit
> is undergirded with silver columns,
> and pushes heaven.

James Frazer, who identifies Hesiod's mythic river with the physical Arcadian river of the same name, explains this description as relating to icicles that form on the river in winter, making the 'silver columns', and suggests that low clouds covering the top of a waterfall could give the impression that the water was descending from heaven itself.[151] The conjecture that the 'silver columns' which 'push heaven' (779) allude to a waterfall is corroborated by the description of Styx water at 785-87:

> …ὕδωρ
> ψυχρόν, ὅ τ᾽ ἐκ πέτρης καταλείβεται ἠλιβάτοιο
> ὑψηλῆς·
>
> that cold water that pours down
> from a steep sky-climbing
> cliffside…[152]

[150] Compare the Ganges, which according to Vālmīki was drawn down from the Milky Way and after flowing through mortal realms, flowed into the netherworld (*Rāmāyana, Bālakāṇḍa* Sarga 43). It too, was a river on which oaths were made (Steven Darian, 1978: 153). There is also the Leiptr from Scandinavian mythology. Texts referencing this river are not abundant, but it appears twice in the *Poetic Edda*. In the *Lay of Grimnir* it appears as a river, which, having flowed through mortal lands, then gushed down to Hel (v.28), and there is a single recorded instance, in the *Second Lay of Helgi*, of Dag swearing an oath on this river (v.31). This connection was drawn to my attention by Scharfe's 1972 article 'The Sacred Water of the Ganges and the Styx-Water', the analysis and conclusions of which I disagree with entirely.

[151] Frazer (1898: 253).

[152] Translation adapted from Lattimore, who has translated καταλείβεται (*kataleibetai*) as 'drizzles'.

Johnson too, reads the silver columns as icicles, making them part of the river itself.[153] Whether or not the Arcadian Styx is among the sources of Styx mythology, we should also read this imagery symbolically. Such images as frozen columns make sense, given the effect of the Styx upon the perjuring God and the previously discussed etymology of the name. Coldness, stiffness, and lifelessness are represented here physically by the frozen waters.

Indeed, the complexities of the physical description of Styx are what allows her to fulfil her physical and topographical function: once again in these verses we are faced with a physically confusing but conceptually revealing description – how can Styx's house be both next to the house of Hades and also attached to the heavens? Hesiod's description here seems to suggest that the waterfall of the Styx falls over the edge of the world, into Tartaros below, where it there becomes a chthonic river:[154]

…ὕδωρ
ψυχρόν, ὅ τ᾽ ἐκ πέτρης καταλείβεται ἠλιβάτοιο
ὑψηλῆς· πολλὸν δὲ ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
ἐξ ἱεροῦ ποταμοῖο ῥέει διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν,
Ὠκεανοῖο κέρας, δεκάτη δ᾽ ἐπὶ μοῖρα δέδασται·
ἐννέα μὲν περὶ γῆν τε καὶ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης [790]
δίνῃς ἀργυρέῃς εἰλιγμένος εἰς ἅλα πίπτει,
ἢ δὲ μί᾽ ἐκ πέτρης προρέει, μέγα πῆμα θεοῖσιν.
(785-92)

that cold water that pours down
  from a steep sky-climbing
cliffside and it is one horn
  of the Ocean stream, and travels
off that holy river a great course
  through night's blackness
under the wide-wayed earth,

There is no reason to do so. I have changed this throughout.

[153] Johnson (1999: 24).

[154] Pocock (1962) makes a rather pedantic argument that scholars have misunderstood Styx, and that she is not a river at all. This argument is based on the fact that ποταμός (*potamos*, 'river') – a masculine word – is not used of Styx – which always appears in the feminine. However, Pocock cites two cases where *potamos* does occur 'in connexion' with Styx. One of these is the above passage in Hesiod. Pocock argues that in this instance, *potamos* refers to Okeanos, not Styx. Given that Styx is described here as being one tenth of Okeanos it is unclear how we are supposed to conceive of Okeanos as a river without also conceiving of Styx as such. Regardless of the occurrence of *potamos*, Styx is indisputably described as flowing (786; 792). If the water behaves as a river we may as well call it a river.

and this water is a tenth part
of all, for in nine loops
of silver-swirling waters, around
the earth and the sea's wide ridges
he tumbles into salt water,
but this tenth part, a great misery for the gods,
flows out from a rock.[155]

West, in passing, suggests that the description might simply mean that Hesiod conceives of Tartaros, despite being under the world, as also having its own sky. However, this is unlikely given that, as West also points out, when we are given a description of Iris being sent to fetch the water of the Styx, she crosses the ocean to do so (ἐπ᾽ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης [781]).[156] This suggests that Styx's abode may be at the very edge of the world, but does not suggest it is underneath it. Furthermore, one cannot help but think that a separate sky for Tartaros would be a significant detail in Hesiod's cosmogony, and would be granted more than a single, implied reference; Ge/Gaia (earth), Pontos (sea), Ouranos (heaven), and Tartaros are all fundamental deities created at the very beginning of Hesiod's universe (116-32) – the world must be created before it can be populated.[157] There is no mention in these first verses before the birth of Kronos of any deity who might be thought to provide a heaven for Tartaros. The interpretation of the structure of Hesiod's world followed by Solmsen and Johnson makes more sense of the passage: heaven, earth, sea, and Tartaros all meet at the horizon.[158] It is not clear in what sense these planes meet, given that Styx must still have space to cascade down into Tartaros, but to spend time pondering this would be to fall into the trap of trying to read a conceptual topology as a physical one. The important point for our current purposes is to note that in being anchored to the heavens, Styx crosses the boundary between Tartaros and the world above.[159]

In commenting on the more general topology of Tartaros given to us in this section,

[155] Adapted from Lattimore to maintain the translation of *pēma* as 'misery', and to maintain a more literal translation of 'ἐκ πέτρης προρέει' as 'flows out from a rock.'
[156] West (1966: 372).
[157] However, as Lye rightly notes, 'Styx, no less than these three gods, should be considered a physical entity, one whose form reflects her moral dimensions. Although Gaia, Ouranos, and Tartarus become the basic physical frame for the world, the world does not gain final stability and order until Styx appears.' (2009: 7-8). This is not when Styx first appears narratively or chronologically, nor even when it is first mentioned that Zeus made her the oath of the gods, but when her physicality is first described in Tartaros – after the end of the Titanomachy and the fall of Typhoeus.
[158] Solmsen (1950: 243); Johnson (1999: 16).
[159] In doing so she also traverses Gaia, thus having presence in all three sections of the cosmos, as highlighted by Lye (2009: 25).

Pietro Pucci suggests that the confusing physical imagery is deliberate: Zeus' victory in the Titanomachy has brought order to the parts of the cosmos which are now under Zeus' control. This does not include Tartaros, hence it continues as an unordered chaos.[160] On this reading we can interpret Styx as a physical barrier, poised at the edges of these two worlds, both separating and joining them. Indeed, Johnson reads the ἀμφὶ δὲ πάντη of verse 778 as indicating that 'Styx approaches or touches the sky all around the horizon',[161] tallying with the idea that, as one tenth of the world-encircling Okeanos (790-791), Styx too might encircle the world. The fact that Styx appears here as a literal fence suggests that a conceptual connection, supplemented by the phonic similarity, may have existed between *horkos* (oath) and ἕρκος, (*herkos*, fence). Indeed, etymologists have long flirted with this connection – Frisk raises the possibility that *horkos* is derived from *herkos* and Beekes states that they are 'formally…connected'; Chantraine is very dubious about the veracity.[162] But it is also an etymology found in some ancient etymologies. The earliest etymology is given by Aelius Herodian (2nd century CE), who derives *horkos* from ὅρος (*horos,* 'boundary, limit') (Περὶ παθῶν 3.2.387 19-26).[163] Several centuries later, Orion (5th century) gives Herodian's etymology, but also supplies his own, deriving *horkos* from ἐπαρκεῖν (*eparkein* 'to assist') (Omicron, p. 111: 1).[164] With the 9th century grammarian Georgios Choiroboscos (*Epimerismi in Psalmos* v.3 p. 192),[165] and the 12th century grammarian Johannes Tzetzes (*Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem*, *Il.* I 233 Sch. 58), we finally reach a derivation from *herkos*. Later still, Pseudo-Zonaras (13th century) gives the derivation from εἴργειν, (*eirgein*, 'to shut in') (Omicron, p. 1461).[166] Thus we see that even in those earlier etymologies, with the exception of Orion (who still documents Herodian's etymology), even when the derivation is not from *herkos*, the semantic connection is still being made to a fence-like force: something which contains, constrains, and limits. Given the fact that this connection has been noticed by so many scholars over the centuries, and given the overlap between Styx circling Tartaros (just as the fence which holds in the Titans does), it

[160] Pucci (2009: 64-65). See also Lye (2009).
[161] Johnson (1999: 24).
[162] Frisk (1970; 2418-19); Beekes (2010: 1103-104); Chantraine (1999: 820-21). Note that both Horkios and Herkeios are epithets of Zeus.
[163] Following Lentz's notations from the collected volume *Grammatici Graeci* (1870).
[164] Following Sturz's paginations from *Orionis Thebani etymologicon* (1820).
[165] Following Gaisford's paginations from *Georgii Choeroboscl epimerismi in Psalmos* (1842).
[166] Following Tittmann's paginations from *Iohannis Zonarae lexicon ex tribus codicibus manuscriptis* (1808).

seems reasonable to conclude that this connection would also have been visible to Hesiod and his audience. Styx then becomes one of the many fences that keep the Titans in place.[167] But just as the oath is a reminder that people can be untrustworthy, a fence is a reminder that something must be kept in/out; it separates off something that is otherwise connected. In serving its function as a fence, it also reminds one of how close the fenced-off things actually are. As Lye notes, 'The fact that the oath is something which *limits* is inherent in Styx's nature as a river, a geographical feature which separates sections of a physical landscape but also links them through a common boundary'.[168] But her importance is not just as a physical barrier, but also as representative of the new justice of Zeus, and as part of the foundation for the order Zeus has established in the upper world. Beyond the physical boundary of the Styx there is no rule that can impose order, making her also a marker, symbolically and physically, of the limit of Zeus' power.

As mentioned previously, the Styx oath also represents an order imposed on the Olympians, an order which restricts their powers. As a representative of this order, Styx is hated by them. She holds them in to the new ordered system, just as Tartaros holds those who fell. As Hatred, and as someone with a hated role, Styx belongs in Tartaros; as oath and therefore as a foundational pillar of the order of Zeus, she belongs properly in the world above. Thus her home shares the confusing topology of the underworld, and bridges the upper and lower worlds at the horizon, and her presence in each is marginalised, very literally – she is pushed to the edges of both worlds, fencing them apart. Positioned at such an isolated place in the upper world, it becomes necessary for gods who wish to swear an oath on the waters of the Styx to send Iris to fetch some of the Styx's waters in a golden jug, and perhaps also – contra Homer – Styx herself.[169] Here, Styx appears also as a necessary evil, a feared weapon, which one needs to keep but does not want too close to one's home, for fear that it

[167] This would bring the number of fences to three: the first is the *herkos* mentioned in 726, the second is the τεῖχος (*teichos*) of 733 – the wall in which Poseidon's door is located, the third is Styx. The fences are another instance of Hesiod's fondness for groupings of three (remember the three Cyclopes, the three Hekatoncheires, and lonely Styx, all as the essential component to Zeus' victory); Johnson's reading of Tartaros posits three separate functions for Tartaros as a whole. Of course, on a metatextual level we can detect a fourth fence in the ring composition of the Tartaros passage itself.

[168] Lye (2009: 12). See also Beaulieu's chapter '*Hygra keleutha*: The Paths of the Sea' (2016).

[169] West (1966: 343) suggests that despite the fact that verses 784-85 have Iris depart with a golden jug, which would suggest she is going only to collect water, the ἀγγελίη (*angeliē*) of verse 781 indicates a formal summons to the goddess. In turn, I think, such a summons could be suggestive of an active role for the goddess Styx in judging whether the swearer has perjured themselves or not.

will ultimately hurt oneself. As a river she represents the hated death with her ice cold waters, and ringing the exiled Titans – just as a god who breaks her oath will be exiled. Thus the topology of Styx emphasises the same quality as her role as the oath of the gods.

Conclusion

In examining Styx as oath, we have seen the impact that hate can have on the hated target – it disrupts life and ostracises the target. She is the coldness we have seen frequently associated with hatred. It threatens death. She inflicts the humiliation of being deprived of honours for an act of breaking one's oath – an act of betrayal through lying or failing to do as a one said they would. As a hated object, Styx is herself ostracised and pushed to the edges of the world. As oath and its punishment she is a threat that looms, making her an object of hatred. But being a necessary force, she is pushed to the edges of the ingroup's domain, marking the boundary beyond which members must be expulsed. The duration of the punishment inflicted by hated is long, but not eternal. It might represent a desire to kill, but in lieu of that, it causes expulsion from society – the ingroup – and a loss of rights and power. This is a punishment agreed upon by all who accepted Zeus' offer of a place in his society.

Hatred is provoked by breach of a social norm fundamental to the stability of Zeus' universe. It might be a single action by a single individual, but the breaking of an oath is dangerous enough that it doing so would make one hated, and it places one in a hated category of oath-breakers. It reminds us that the state of the universe might not be permanent, and that it endures as it is because disruptive members can be expunged – and hatred is the mechanism by which they are cast out. Styx, hatred, is essential.

Chapter 2. The Children of Styx, Part I: Zelos and Nike

Introduction

Having examined the connection between hatred highlighted by Styx's role as oath, her geographic physicality and her identity as Hate, we now turn to examine the much overlooked connection between Styx and her children in order to understand the relationship between hatred and the qualities represented by those children. In this chapter I shall first examine the four as a whole, discussing their placement in the *Theogony*, and how Hesiod may have perceived them and their relationship to their mother as a figure both hated and representing hatred. I shall then move on to discuss first Zelos and then Nike. The discussion of Nike will necessitate a discussion of Hekate: a figure who, we are told, can dispense *nikē* to mortals. The understanding of Hekate which will be revealed has great significance for how we comprehend the nature and role of Styx, and thus this chapter will end with an analysis of how what we have learned enhances our understanding of her. Kratos and Bie will then be discussed in Chapter Three. Through the individual analysis of the children across both this and the following chapter, it will quickly become apparent that the qualities they represent are as closely interlinked with each other as they are with hatred, and this interrelationship will be the topic of Chapter Four.

We have already touched briefly upon some of the qualities of the children of Styx and the various ways of translating and understanding their names. We have seen that the common approach is to understand these deities and their qualities in relation to their place at Zeus' side, and that the fact of their mother being Styx (and Hate) is treated as nothing more than an unfortunate coincidence. My own approach is instead to examine these deities and their qualities in relation to their genealogical connection to their mother Styx. I take as my starting point the idea that if Hesiod has made these deities the children of Styx it is because he had good cause to do so. I therefore argue that the qualities represented by her children, and the qualities of Styx herself, were seen by Hesiod as somehow connected, and my intent is to examine and explore the nature of that connection.

The Four Children

The children of Styx are first introduced in the *Theogony* shortly after their parents, and are only briefly described before Hesiod moves on to describe their relationship to Zeus and their permanent place in his company after the Titanomachy. The children are all named and described within two verses:

> Στὺξ δ' ἔτεκ' Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ Πάλλαντι μιγεῖσα
> Ζῆλον καὶ Νίκην καλλίσφυρον ἐν μεγάροισιν,
> καὶ Κράτος ἠδὲ Βίην ἀριδείκετα γείνατο τέκνα.
> (383-85)

> And Styx, daughter of Okeanos,
> lying in love with Pallas,
> bore in their halls Rivalry
> and sweet-stepping Victory,
> and also Power and Force,
> who are her conspicuous children,
> …

In these verses we have two main pieces of information with which to decide what to make of the children of Styx as a whole: the first is their names, the second is the single adjective used to describe them. Beyond these verses we are told that they followed their mother when, on the advice of her father, she sided with Zeus in the Titanomachy (397-98); and that, because of this, her children are now forever by the side of Zeus (401-2).[170] The dearth of information suggests that her children are primarily allegorical in nature – their main function is as representations of the qualities they are named after, but as I have already suggested, Padel is right in pointing out that we must treat archaic Greek personification and allegory seriously, rather than as the throw-away-representations they are often treated as in contemporary literature.[171] Marcel Detienne and Jean-Paul Vernant, though they still comment on Hesiod's 'tendency to make pure abstractions into gods', argue in relation to Metis that it would be a mistake to attribute her personification to 'the poet's own imagination' and to dismiss her as one of these 'abstractions'.[172] I would

[170] Hamilton (1989: 21) suggests that the 'father' whose 'advice' she follows is Zeus, rather than her biological father Okeanos, and that the advice being referred to is Zeus' claim that he will honour those who were unhonoured before.
[171] Padel (1992: 158-59).
[172] Detienne & Vernant (1991: 57).

argue it would be equally mistaken to do this in the case of the children of Styx – indeed, the text gives us no reason to consider them simply as abstractions. As Detienne and Vernant go on to point out, to do so would be to overlook an 'essential element of religious thought — the need to name, classify and order the forces of the beyond.' They conclude, like Padel, that these figures cannot be dismissed simply as metaphor, as abstract concepts given physical form but not autonomy. Instead, 'they are true religious "powers" which preside over clearly defined types of activity and which operate within specific sectors of reality.'[173] The children of Styx are agents with the ability to act and influence the universe and we must seek to understand how Hesiod conceived of them operating.

To understand the children of Styx fully we must begin by investigating the sole adjective describing them – ἀριδείκετα (*arideiketa*). We must explore what it reveals about how the children are considered. One might assume that *arideiketa* is simply a positive term, lending weight to any argument that promotes the children of Styx as unambiguously good figures, but I believe the truth of the matter is more complex than this.

With a few exceptions, the consensus of scholarship is to take the *arideiketa* of verse 385 as applying to all four children, though there is a certain ambiguity in the verses which is often maintained in translations and which has led to some scholars applying the word only to Kratos and Bie. Let us examine the word itself. *Arideiketos* is not a common word. Richard Cunliffe's *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* gives 'distinguished', 'renowned', 'conspicuous' and 'exalted' as reasonable meanings of *arideiketos* based on its usage in the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*.[174] Marcel Hofinger's *Lexicon Hesiodeum* gives for *arideiketos* the unsure meaning 'très remarquable? accueilli avec beaucoup d'honneurs, très salue?' (Very outstanding? Received with many honours, much celebrated?').[175] The *arideiketa* of verse 385 is variously translated as 'illustrious',[176] 'wonderful',[177] 'glorious',[178] 'outstanding',[179]

[173] Detienne & Vernant (1991: 57).
[174] Cunliffe (2012: 54).
[175] Hofinger (1975-78: 80).
[176] Athanassakis (1983: 22). Note that Athanassakis applies it only to Kratos and Bie.
[177] Evelyn-White (1914: 107).
[178] Mair (1908: 45); Frazer (1983: 51); Hine; (2005: 67)
[179] West (1988: 14).

'famous',[180] and 'eminent'[181] – all meanings with positive connotations. In contrast to these, Richard Lattimore has opted for the more neutral 'conspicuous'. But is this translation justified? Should we understand Hesiod as meaning the same by the word as Homer does, or is Hofinger's hesitation indicative of a more ambiguous meaning? In order to ascertain this we must consider how Hesiod uses the word in other contexts. In the extant works he uses *arideiketa* only four times in total. Of these, one is found in fragment 196.2 = 154a;[182] not enough of the text survives to allow us to understand anything from this occurrence. The other three instances are all within the *Theogony*: once in verse 385 above, and twice more rather close together – in verses 532 and 543. We must examine these latter two instances to help determine how we should understand the *arideiketa* of verse 385.

The first of these other two instances is in reference to Herakles, who is described as Zeus' ἀριδείκετον υἱόν (*arideiketon huion*) – his *arideiketon* son [532]). Hesiod has just narrated how Herakles killed, with the consent of Zeus, the eagle that had been tormenting Prometheus. It is noteworthy that Herakles is also frequently associated with the quality of βίη (*biē*) – that which is represented by Styx's child of the same name. Indeed, of all the figures in the *Theogony*, Herakles is most frequently associated with *biē*. He is mentioned seven separate times within the *Theogony*, and is described as possessing *biē* in four of them (289, 315, 332, 943), and is also represented killing five various monsters – Geryones (287-89), the Lernaean Hydra (318) the Nemean Lion (332), Orthos (293), and the aforementioned eagle (526-7). There is a significant overlap between the instances in which Herakles appears killing a monster, and those in which he is described in relation to his possession of *biē*.[183] This overlap reveals an obvious association of the word *biē* with violence, killing, and death. It is significant, then, that we find *arideiketa* used to describe both Styx's daughter Bie and a man so frequently described as possessing *biē*. However we choose to translate the word, there is a clear association with violence.

The second instance of *arideiketa* occurs only eleven lines after the Heraklean

[180] Nelson (2009: 37). Note Nelson also applies the word only to Kratos and Bie.
[181] Most (2007a: 35).
[182] 196.2 = Solmsen et al.'s (1970) numbering, 154a = Most's (2007a) numbering.
[183] The exceptions to this are a lack of reference to *biē* in the instance of his killing the eagle tormenting Prometheus (526-27), and a reference to it when at 943 Hesiod gives us the brief catalogue of mortal women who have produced sons by Zeus.

example, in relation to Prometheus himself.[184] The scene is that in which Prometheus presents two offerings to Zeus, one of which has the appearance of being wholesome but is actually inedible, the other of which is disguised as inedible or unappetising, but which is actually the higher quality portion. Zeus addresses Prometheus thusly:

> "Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων **ἀριδείκετ**᾽ ἀνάκτων,
> ὦ πέπον, ὡς **ἑτεροζήλως** διεδάσσαο μοίρας."
> (543-44)

> "Son of Iapetos, **conspicuous** among all Kings,
> old friend, oh how **prejudicially**
> you divided the portions."

To fully understand the meaning of *arideiketa* in this context we must first look at other aspects of Zeus' address to Prometheus. To begin with, let us inspect the word that Lattimore has here translated as 'prejudicially'; ἑτεροζήλως (*heterozēlōs*) is a compound of ἕτερος (*heteros*) and ζῆλος (*zēlos*). *Heteros* means 'one *or* the other of a pair' and *zēlos* of course, is the quality represented by the child of Styx bearing the same name.[185] As mentioned in Chapter One (and as we shall discuss in more detail below), this word (*zēlos*) can be translated as 'emulation', but also as 'envy' or 'rivalry', amongst others. The pair of offerings that Prometheus has presented for Zeus to choose from are not equally enviable, not equal in rivalry.

This comment by Zeus is laced with something akin to Socratic irony – he who is playing the fool is actually the one who knows more, and reveals himself as such, if only one has the wit to understand his true meaning. Prometheus *has* divided the portions unfairly, but, unbeknownst to Prometheus, Zeus *is* aware of which portion is truly the greater one; thus, when he acknowledges the unfair imbalance between the portions, he is relying on the ambiguity of his claim to declare that he knows the portion Prometheus is presenting him with is actually the lesser portion, whilst on the surface appearing to fall for Prometheus' deception of believing that he has been given the greater portion.

[184] Note that Prometheus is actually a cousin of the children of Styx. His mother Klymene is also a daughter of Okeanos.
[185] Hofinger gives 'avec partialité' ('with partiality') for *heterozēlōs*; Cunliffe does not know the word.

The ὦ πέπον (*ō pepon*) of line 544 could be read as following the same deceptive rhetorical cunning, in that it can be taken as a term of endearment as meaning something like 'kind' or 'gentle', or as an insult, meaning 'weak', 'coward' (the word only appears twice in the *Theogony*, [544, 560] both times used by Zeus of Prometheus).[186] Zeus' cunning here is to utilise the positive meanings of these words to disguise the true, negative content of what he is saying. Just as Prometheus has dressed up one portion of the offerings to look appetising despite its unappetising content, so Zeus disguises his insults as friendship.

This cunning rhetoric is important because cunning and wit are the spheres in which Prometheus, the trickster, and Zeus, who swallowed Metis ('wisdom', 'craft'), are rivals, struggling to emulate (and then outdo) each other. Consequently, when Zeus reveals himself as understanding the true nature of the inequality of the two portions, whilst simultaneously concealing this fact from Prometheus, and when he secretly insults Prometheus to his face, he demonstrates the equal applicability of '*heterozēlōs*' to the rivalry between himself and Prometheus, and reveals the true nature of the imbalanced in it. He is proving that his is the greater portion of cunning, and that his will be the glory. *Heterozēlōs*, then, highlights the uneven rivalry between these two figures.

Given that *heterozēlōs* and *pepon* are both used in this ambiguous, Socratically double-edged sense, it is reasonable to assume that *arideiketos* should be understood in the same way. Whilst his greeting appears reverential, and his understanding of the inequality of the offerings incorrect, Zeus is also, unbeknownst to Prometheus, telling him that his *arideiketos* reputation shall be one of infamy, rather than fame. *Arideiketos*, then, is being used here in a negative sense, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the positive sense.

Both the fact that the word can be used in the same instance, relying on the understanding of both positive and negative meanings, and the fact that it is used to describe both Zeus' beloved son, and Zeus' hated rival, highlight the inherent ambiguity of the term for Hesiod. Therefore, when used to describe the children of

[186] It also appears twice in the *Shield of Herakles*, in verses 350 and 357. Both are part of Herakles' address to Cycnus, first in a positive sense, then in a negative sense.

Styx, it reinforces the ambiguity of their position: they have the potential to be friend, but equally to be foe; and they have the potential to be either superior or inferior to him. They are associated with, and born from Hate – an infamous and dangerous figure – and still gain a 'glorious' renown when they become the allies and attendants of Zeus.

Indeed such a nuanced position would be quite typical of Hesiod; as Kenneth McKay points out, Hesiod frequently depicts gods and monsters as both good and bad depending on the situation, highlighting Eris, Philotes, Horkos, and Nemesis as key examples.[187] To this list I would add the children of Styx, Styx herself, and even Zeus himself. Lattimore's morally neutral translation reflects the spirit of Hesiod's text far better than the morally positive translations of other scholars. Ultimately, Hesiod's poems suggest that the children of Styx have no fixed moral alignment: they could be good or bad, helpful or dangerous. For Hesiod, those qualities associated with hatred are neither always a bad thing, nor always a good thing: hatred might produce something dangerous; equally, it might produce something helpful.

Using this understanding of *arideiketos* as an indication of the ambiguous nature of the children of Styx, I now turn to consider each child individually, using the text to probe how we should understand the children of Styx. I will examine in further detail first their names, and then the contexts in which they appear either as personifications or as qualities. This will allow us to form a far more nuanced and complete picture of what the children represent and thus their nature as personifications. Having built up this fuller picture of the children we will then be in a position to consider how the qualities represented by these deities relate to that of their mother Styx. Are her children manifestations of hate? Are they things which hate causes – manifestations of the *results* of hate? Or are they perhaps things which hate *seeks* – does the hateful person seek out *zēlos, nikē, kratos*, and *biē*? We could also ask whether they themselves are things that cause hate. It can be argued that this final understanding is unlikely because it would insert a causal anachronism into Hesiod's genealogy. But it may not be possible to fully extricate a unidirectional causal relationship between Styx and her children. Nor indeed is this necessarily desirable: a vicious circle might

[187] McKay (1959: 385-86).

be both unavoidable and appropriate, and the precedent for such a bidirectional causality has already been set with the children of Eris. Ultimately, understanding the relationship between Styx and her children will enhance our understanding of Styx herself.

Zelos

Within the *Theogony* the quality represented by Zelos is the least mentioned of the children of Styx. The sole mention of *zēlos* occurs in the passage naming him as a child of Styx (348), and outside of this instance, there are no *zēlos*-related words that reference the quality he represents. But Zelos also appears in the *Works and Days* (195):

> **ζῆλος** δ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι
> δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁμαρτήσει στυγερώπης.
> (195-96)

> The spirit of **Envy**, with grim face
> and screaming voice, who delights
> in evil, will be the constant companion
> of wretched humanity…

This appearance yields a notably more detailed description than the single mention, with its single adjective, that we are given in the *Theogony*. It also makes Zelos the only child of Styx given a distinct, personified form. Further, two instances of a verb form, ζηλόω (*zēloō*), appear in that poem.

It is unsurprising, given the scarcity of the word *zēlos* in Hesiod's works, that the relevant entry in Hofinger's Hesiodic lexicon gives just two meanings: '*envie*' and '*jalousie*' (envy, jealousy).[188] Cunliffe does not have the word, but has an adjectival form, ζηλήμων, and also gives 'jealous, envious'.[189] Modern translators have provided a far broader range of meanings. In verse 384 of the *Theogony* Lattimore gives the translation of 'Zelos' as 'Rivalry', as do Paley, Apostolos Athanassakis, and

[188] Note that the French '*envie*' and the English 'envy' are not semantically equivalent, and *envie* is commonly used to express any desire or wish, and can also be used to mean 'I feel like (doing)...' or 'I want to (do)…'
[189] Cunliffe (2012: 176).

Glenn Most.[190] This meaning contains a 'negative' implication – it represents a potential threat. In the same vein, Nelson chooses 'Envy'.[191] On the other hand West and Christopher Rowe choose to translate the name as the more 'positive' qualities of 'Glory' and 'Aspiration'.[192] Mazon gives '*Zèle*' (Zeal).[193] Hugh Evelyn-White translates the word as 'Emulation', Solmsen as 'Zeal', and Daryl Hine as 'emulous Zelos'.[194] Frazer opts for the delightfully succinct 'spirit of Zeal in the Vindication of one's rights'.[195] I list so many translations for two reasons. Firstly, to demonstrate the breadth of ideas, with both functional and dysfunctional qualities, that translators have seen in the figure of Zelos in the *Theogony*: note that West alone gives two different translations, with different meanings: 'Glory' itself, and 'Aspiration' – the pursuit of a glory not yet possessed. Secondly, to underline the significance of the fact that when it comes to the appearance of Zelos in the *Works and Days*, where he is depicted with a grimness usually associated with the Furies (195), nearly all of them converge on the translation of 'Envy', and take it to be a proper noun,[196] thus interpreting the verse as referring to Zelos.[197]

Some scholars have found troubling the idea that a single figure of Zelos could be associated with both the good Eris and Zeus, and also with the bad Eris. Commenting on the Zelos of the *Theogony*, Solmsen takes it as beyond obvious that the Zelos of the *Works and Days* cannot be the same figure; the reasoning being that since there are two Erides, there must be a both a good and a bad Zelos to respectively accompany each of them. The Zelos accompanying Zeus could only be that which accompanies the good Eris, an idea apparently so self evident that Solmsen feels no need to state it explicitly. But this is a weak argument: Hesiod does indeed split the figure of Eris in two, but Eris is the exception, not the rule; there are many examples within both texts of deities who appear negative and positive depending on the

[190] Paley (1883: 215); Athanassakis (1983: 46); Most (2007a: 35).
[191] Nelson (2009: 37). In an earlier work Nelson gives 'Striving' (1998: 103).
[192] West (1966: 272); Rowe (1978: 130-31).
[193] Mazon (1928: 46).
[194] Evelyn-White (1914: 107); Solmsen (1949: 32); Hine (2005: 67).
[195] Frazer (1983: 52).
[196] Evelyn-White (1914: 17); West (1978: 203), (1988: 42); Hine (2005: 30); Most (2006: 103); Nelson (2009: 14). The exceptions are Paley, who gives 'jealousy' (1883: 31), and Mazon, who gives 'jalousie' (1928: 93).
[197] In the text itself West's edition gives 'ζῆλος', but in the commentary, 'Ζῆλος' (1978: 104, 203). Similarly, Evelyn-White has 'ζῆλος' in the Greek, but translates it as 'Envy' (1914: 16, 17).

circumstances.[198] Hesiod spends several verses explaining how there are two Erides, but does not claim anywhere that there are two Zeloi. Rowe and West too, assume they must be two separate figures, but neither provide any evidence to justify their interpretations.[199]

Thomas Sinclair deems the word to be *zēlos*, not Zelos; Mazon also adopts this approach, and Athanassakis' translation follows suit, giving 'envy' rather than 'Envy'.[200] But this is not a defensible textual interpretation. The word in question has three different adjectives attached to it, vividly personifying it (we shall discuss these in detail shortly).[201] Regardless of capitalisations, the word is literally given flesh: it is Zelos. Zelos *is zēlos*.

Given the negative context in which it appears, the translation of *zēlos* as 'Envy' suggests that envy is a negative thing. But this is at odds with the understanding of *zēlos* presented by modern scholarship, which argues that *zēlos* is a positive quality/emotion. They posit a difference between 'jealousy' and 'envy' and argue that the negative 'jealousy' is represented by a separate word – φθόνος (*phthonos*).[202] In order to understand the semantic remit of Hesiod's Zelos then, we must understand not only his usage of *zēlos*, but that of *phthonos* as well. If Hesiod appears to use the two words to represent different things, then we must understand the appearance of Zelos in the *Works and Days* to be representing something positive. If the two words are used interchangeably then we can understand both the Zelos of the *Works and Days* and of the *Theogony* in a negative light.

Establishing this will be the first step in completing our picture of the nature of Zelos. As a second step we must examine the role of Zelos in the *Works and Days*, and what this can tell us about him. The final step is to consider both ancient and contemporary etymologies of the word. Having gathered the evidence we will then be in a position

[198] It is worth noting that even the negative Eris must be honoured by mortals according to Hesiod (*Works and Days* 15-16). Just like Styx, the 'evil' Strife too, by necessity (ἀνάγκη), must be given her due honours, through the will/plans (βουλή) of the gods. One assumes that her honours are received by the literal act of engaging in war. In which case, war too, is not simply inevitable, but necessary.
[199] Solmsen (1949: 32); Rowe (1978: 130-31); West (1978: 203).
[200] Sinclair (1932: 24); Mazon (1963: 58); Athanassakis (1983: 72).
[201] Canevaro (2015: 184) makes the same point.
[202] Remember that this is the translation Paley gives for *zēlos*.

to begin building an understanding of the nature of Zelos and his role in Zeus' universe. This information will, in turn, develop our understanding of the nature of relationship between *zēlos*/Zelos and Zeus, and between *zēlos*/Zelos and hate/Styx, and the implications this has for the concept of Hesiod's 'hate'.

Zēlos and *Phthonos*

As mentioned above, it is understood by scholars of ancient Greek that *zēlos* and *phthonos* represent ideas that were, and still are, closely interlinked, yet still distinct. They take Aristotle's definitions of the two words as a starting point. Aristotle describes *phthonos* as:

> … A kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods already mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it.
>
> (*Rh*. 2.9-10, 1387^{b}23-25)

Phthonos is, as Konstan puts it, of all the emotions Aristotle discusses in the *Rhetoric* 'the only one that he treats as unqualifiedly negative.'[203] It is a pain felt because someone else has something one does not, regardless of how useful that thing would be to oneself. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he states it even more bluntly – *phthonos* is a pain felt at the deserved success of other people (3.7.1 = 1233^{b}18-19). Whether their successes or goods are ones which are already possessed by the person feeling *phthonos* is irrelevant. *Zēlos*, on the other hand, is good in Aristotle's eyes, though the fact that he feels it necessary to carefully distinguish the two and explain how they are different perhaps suggests that to others, the difference was not as obvious as Aristotle makes it appear:

> … *Zēlos* is a feeling of pain at the revealed presence of highly valued goods, which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of someone who naturally resembles us – pain not due to the fact that another possesses them but to the fact that we ourselves do not. *Zēlos* therefore is virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas bearing *phthonos* is base and characteristic of base men; for one, owing to *zēlos*, fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the other, owing to *phthonos*, is to prevent his neighbour from possessing them.
>
> (*Rh*. 2.11, 1388^{a}31-38)

[203] Konstan (2006a: 113).

As illuminating as this is for the understanding of *zēlos* and *phthonos* in the Classical era, it cannot be assumed that these Aristotelian distinctions are retrospectively applicable to the Archaic period. Whilst *phthonos* does not appear at all in Hesiod, a verb form, φθονέω (*phthoneō*), does appear, the meaning(s) of which Hofinger gives as '*jalouser*, *envier*' (to be jealous of, to desire or envy). Remember that for *zēlos* the meanings given are: '*envie*' and '*jalousie*' (envy, jealousy). Hofinger's definitions suggest no difference between *zēlos* and *phthonos* in Hesiod's usage, supporting the notion that Aristotle's distinctions between these two words are not present in Hesiod. Cunliffe's Homeric lexicon, too, lacks *phthonos* but has *phthoneō*, and gives it as meaning 'to dislike the idea of something, be dissatisfied at the prospect of it, begrudge the doing of it'. Although vague, this idea of dissatisfaction at an event or action is more in line with Aristotle's definition of *phthonos* as a pain felt by the sight of the good fortune of others.

In order to establish whether Hesiod perceived a difference between *zēlos* and *phthonos* (and thus what this might reveal about further semantic associations of *zēlos*), we must investigate the usage of the words in his texts. In what circumstances and situations does Zelos appear or have influence? Does Hesiod use *phthonos* in a way in which a sense of 'jealousy' is clear? Does he use it in a way in which 'envy' is to be understood? What about *zēlos*? Is it understood as either, or both of, the senses 'jealousy' and 'envy'? Given the various contexts in which Hesiod uses the words, which we shall discuss momentarily, the most likely scenario is that the words are used indiscriminately to represent both of the concepts Aristotle discusses: the desire to obtain for oneself the goods another possesses, and the desire to deprive the another of the goods they possess.

As previously mentioned, within the *Theogony* there is no instance of *zēlos* or *zēlos*-related words outside the naming of the child. But not only does Zelos also appear in the *Works and Days* (195), but, two instances of a verb form, ζηλόω (*zēloō*), appear in that poem (23, 312). In the case of *phthonos* we find it in neither text, but in the *Works and Days* a verb form, φθονέω (*phthoneō*) appears once (26).

The two instances in which *zēloō* appears both occur with a positive economic or

productive sense, describing how competition, vying with each other, will spur all on to labour and make their lot greater (23) or make one the envy of one's neighbours (312). However, the single use of *phthoneō* occurs in this same positive context (26). Here, the feelings of *zēloō* and *phthoneō* are associated with the positive Strife who encourages men to better themselves through a competitive desire to have more than one's neighbour:

> εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων
> πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν
> οἶκόν τ᾽ εὖ θέσθαι· **ζηλοῖ** δέ τε γείτονα γείτων
> εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ᾽· ἀγαθὴ δ᾽ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.
> καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, [25]
> καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ **φθονέει** καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.
> (21-26)

> A man looks at his neighbour who is rich:
> then he too
> wants to work; for the rich man presses on with
> his ploughing and planting
> and the ordering of his state.
> So the neighbour **envies** the neighbour
> who presses on toward wealth. Such strife
> is a good friend to mortals.
> Then potter bears grudge against potter,
> and craftsman against craftsman,
> tramp is **jealous** of tramp,
> and singer of singer.[204]

This Strife is a non-violent conflict or rivalry based on man's envy of his neighbour, though it is notable that according to Hesiod this strife still the bearing of a 'grudge' (κοτέω, *koteō* [25]) between competitors.

Whilst it is accepted that *zēloō* is appropriate for the good Eris, the appearance of *phthoneō* and *koteō* in verses 25-26 has provoked some debate amongst commentators. They are widely understood to be a pre-existing proverb.[205] Paley notes that other scholars have, based on a claim that the verses 'contain a sentiment scarcely consistent with the preceding', argued them to be a later interpolation.[206]

[204] Adapted from Lattimore, who translates the single instance of κοτέει twice – first as 'is… enemy', then as 'is… rival', distorting the similarity between *koteei* and the *phthoneei* of the subsequent verse.
[205] Sinclair (1932: 5); Rowe (1978: 106); West (1978: 147).
[206] Paley (1883: 9).

Phthoneō and *koteō* are simply not appropriate for the good Eris. However, Paley is not convinced and thinks that while the awkwardness of verse 24 is suggestive of interpolation, it would have been added to clarify that the *phthoneō* and *koteō* of verses 25-26 do indeed belong to the good Eris.

Solmsen et al. express no sentiment that it might be an interpolation, nor does West. West does take *koteō* and *phthoneō* to be at odds with the 'spirit of the good Eris', but thinks that 'the idea of rivalry makes these lines relevant enough to Hesiod.'[207] West also agrees that the lines likely refer to a pre-existing proverb, based on the usage of the uncontracted *-eei* or *-eein*, but does not conclude that this must indicate the lines are foreign. Instead, West suggests that it is the very pattern of the ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων of verse 24 that 'put into his mind' the pre-existing proverbs.[208]

Rowe suggests that the fact that Hesiod is employing pre-existing proverbs means that their meanings 'fit the context in some respect, but not in others.'[209] This conclusion is unjustifiable. The fact that Hesiod chose to employ a pre-existing proverb does indeed tell us that he found at least something in the verses to be highly relevant, but we have no grounds on which to assume that he did not consider *all* of it relevant. If Hesiod uses these two proverbs it only strengthens the idea that the concepts of *zēlos* and *phthonos* were seen as interchangeable by Hesiod. Further, given that this is the sole use of *phthoneō*, and that both it and *zēloō* are being used to indicate the same emotion felt towards those more prosperous, we can take this as an indicator Hesiod understood the two words to be able to function as very near synonyms.

Konstan points out that *phthonos* is simply a rarer word in archaic literature – the noun does not appear at all, and the verb only very rarely.[210] The word appears a handful of times between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Konstan discusses these instances and reasonably suggests that the evident meaning in the *Iliad* is 'refuse' or 'begrudge' and that in the *Odyssey* the sense is generally something as light as 'deny', but at least in one instance (18.15-18) appears to have a stronger meaning of 'begrudge' or

[207] West (1978: 147).
[208] West (1978: 147).
[209] Rowe (1978: 106).
[210] Konstan (2006a: 118-19).

'resent'.[211] The sharp distinctions that others scholars have wished to make between *phthoneō and zēloō* are not appropriate to the archaic period: *phthoneō* need not be understood as wholly negative.

So: at *Works and Days* 23-26 both *phthoneō* and *zēlos* appear within a positive context.[212] It is in this same context that *zēloō* appears again in verse 312, as Hesiod describes how other people will envy his brother Perses if he works and grows rich:

> ἐξ ἔργων δ᾽ ἄνδρες πολύμηλοί τ᾽ ἀφνειοί τε,
> καί τ᾽ ἐργαζόμενος πολὺ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισιν
> [ἔσσεαι ἠδὲ βροτοῖς· μάλα γὰρ **στυγέουσιν** ἀεργούς]. [310]
> ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ᾽ ὄνειδος.
> εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε **ζηλώσει** ἀεργὸς
> πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ.
> (308-13)

> It is from work that men grow rich and own flocks
> and herds;
> by work, too, they become much better friends
> of the immortals.
> [and to men too, for they hate the people
> who do not labor].
> Work is no disgrace; the disgrace is not working;
> and if you do work, the lazy man will soon begin
> to be envious
> as you grow rich, for with riches go nobility
> and honour

The reader may notice that στυγέουσιν (*stugeousin*) appears here, in verse 310. However, verse 310 is of dubious authenticity. It is absent from all of the ancient papyrological testimonia (but is attested by three of the four best manuscripts). I am, for once, convinced that the line is inauthentic. But even without verse 310, a word for hatred still occurs within the passage:

> Πέρση, δῖον γένος, ὄφρα σε **Λιμὸς**
> **ἐχθαίρῃ**, φιλέῃ δέ σ᾽ ἐυστέφανος Δημήτηρ
> αἰδοίη, βιότου δὲ τεὴν πιμπλῇσι καλιήν:

[211] Ibid.
[212] Sanders discusses this passage in his book *Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens*, but claims that verses 25-26 refer to the bad Eris (2004: 40). I can see no justification for this reading, and know of no other scholar who supports it.

λιμὸς γάρ τοι πάμπαν ἀεργῷ σύμφορος ἀνδρί.
(299-302)

Work, O Perses, illustrious-born, work on,
so that **Famine**
will hate you, and august and garlanded Demeter
will be your friend, and fill your barn
with substance of living;
Famine is the unworking man's most constant
companion.[213]

Famine hates (ἐχθαίρῃ *echthairēi*) the man who works. Lattimore here takes λιμός (*limos*) to be the personification of Famine. Limos is personified in the *Theogony* as one of the children of Eris (226-27). For the man who works, Famine is opposed and counteracted by the benevolent Demeter. She loves (φιλέῃ, *phileēi*), and just as Famine's hatred means he stays away from such a man, Demeter's love means that she has a presence in his house – she fills his barn with grain. If both Famine and Demeter are physical gods, and Demeter's love indicates a physical presence in the industrious man's house, then it is reasonable to interpret the hatred of Famine as meaning that he stays away from the man and his house. Such a reading is further supported by the fact that earlier in the *Works and Days*, the same idea of physical presence also appears:

οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἰθυδίκῃσι μετ᾽ ἀνδράσι **λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ**
οὐδ᾽ **ἄτη**, θαλίῃς δὲ μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται.
(230-31)

Those men who give right judgment,
famine does not **accompany** them,
nor **folly**, they do their work
as if work were a holiday.

Famine, along with **ἄτη** (*atē*, 'folly' – another child of Eris), does not accompany (ὀπηδεῖ, *opēdei*) the just man. We can then read verses 299-302 as an expansion of 230-31: Famine does not accompany the good man, and the reason is that he hates him. The argument for understanding the meaning of *echthairēi* in verse 300 as 'stays away from', then, is strong.

[213] Adapted from Lattimore, to render ἐχθαίρῃ as 'will hate'.

What has this to do with Zelos? Hesiod does not just tell us who Famine hates and avoids – he also tells us who Famine accompanies (and therefore loves): 'Famine is the unworking (ἀεργῷ, *aergōi*) man's most constant // companion' (302). And it is this same unworking man (ἀεργίη, *aergiē* [311])[214] who acts upon *zēlos* (*zēloō*, [312]. Famine then, loves the unworking man who experiences *zēlos*, and Famine's hatred is directed towards the same target as the unworking man's envy.

What does this mean for verse 312, and the fact that the industrious man becomes enviable?[215] Demeter loves the enviable man because of his productivity. She provides aid to him. But being enviable is inseparable from being a target of envy, as we see at the end of the final age of man. What does it mean for Demeter to stay with the target of envy? She loves him not because she envies him but because he has made himself enviable to others – and he has done so in the correct way, by channelling his efforts into his work: a form of rivalry acceptable between those who could, and should, be equals. In one situation then, we see the same figure can be an object both of hatred and of love because they are enviable. The ability to toil, to work to better oneself, is caused by the ability to experience *zēlos* positively. But it also simultaneously generates a negative *zēlos* in those who lack the fortitude of character to experience the positive *zēlos* in response to the productivity of the good man.

Thus, when Hesiod encourages Perses to become enviable in verse 310 he is advising something good, yet dangerous. Being enviable ensures the blessing of the gods, but also runs the risk of making oneself a potential victim of the lazy man who does not work himself. *Zēlos* makes the gods love you, and it *might* make another emulate you, act as you have done, and thus achieve for themselves what you also have, *or* it may make them jealous of what you possess and encourage them to take it, to deprive you of it as well as possessing it themself.

Despite the current age of man using *zēlos* as a tool to aid him in his productivity,

[214] One is the adjective form, the other the noun form of the same word.
[215] West thinks that this verse is devoid of the idea of spurring the idle man to work – the goal here is only to become enviable. (West: 1978: 234) But, as we have seen, *zēlos* spurs action. It must either cause the enviable man to be attacked by the envious person, or spur the envious person to work.

Hesiod's world starts with the gold age of man which is lacking in envy, in which the world gives up its fruit ἄφθονον (*aphthonon*) – without envy (*Works and Days* 118). This ease of survival means that work – the good Eris – is also unnecessary. The good Eris, like envy, only became necessary when labour also became necessary for survival and growth. If envy is useful to men now, it is because they live in a hostile world where the earth guards its fruits more jealously, where labour (the good Eris) is necessary, and so, therefore, is Zelos, as a motivation for that labour.

If we take linguistic usage to reflect conceptual categories, then, we must reach the same conclusion as Hofinger: Hesiod does not use differentiating terms for positive and negative envy. Hesiod's envy, indifferently designated as *zēlos* or *phthonos*, is something which spurs one to try to acquire goods for oneself when allied to the good Eris (21-26), and to deprive others of those goods when allied to the bad Eris (189-96). Indeed, why these two elements of *zēlos should* be distinguished from each other is not necessarily obvious: when resources are scarce it is frequently the case that in seeking to obtain something for yourself you also, intentionally or unintentionally, deprive someone else of it. When wanting to have a thing for oneself requires depriving someone else of it, desiring something for oneself and desiring to deprive someone else of it become indistinguishable. Thus, I argue, Hesiod portrays *zēlos* as something that can be both good – a motivator to work and action – or bad – as a source of conflict. It is a motivator to increase one's own lot, but also to decrease the lot of others. The upshot of this is that the Zelos of the *Works and Days* can represent both a positive figure, and a negative figure and thus, so too can the Zelos of the *Theogony*: he is a figure of ambiguous moral alignment, of function and dysfunction.

Zelos in the *Works and Days*

We now turn to look at the two instances of the personified Zelos between the two poems and what the details of the Zelos of the *Works and Days* can tell us about the Zelos of the *Theogony*. The unarguably unflattering context in which Zelos is presented in verses 189-96, in a detailed description of how the fifth age of men will end, is very much at odds with the hitherto seen positive image of *zēlos* as motivation for improvement and prosperity (21-6, 311-13).

As mentioned earlier, Solmsen argues that the passages in the *Works and Days* concern a different Zelos, and West and Paley also assume this to be the case. But not only is Solmsen's argument from the existence of the two Erides weak, the poem itself supports a reading of this Zelos as the same one who appears in the *Theogony*:

ἕτερος δ' ἑτέρου πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξει.
οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὔτε δικαίου [190]
οὔτ' ἀγαθοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν
ἀνέρες αἰνήσουσι: δίκη δ' ἐν χερσί, καὶ αἰδὼς
οὐκ ἔσται: βλάψει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα
μύθοισιν σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὀμεῖται.
Ζῆλος δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι [195]
δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁμαρτήσει, στυγερώπης.
(*Works and Day* 189-96)

Strong of hand, one man shall seek
the city of another.
There will be no favour for the man
who keeps his oath, for the righteous
and the good man, rather men shall give their praise
to violence
and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm.
Shame will
not be. The vile man will crowd his better out,
and attack him
with twisted accusations and swear an oath
to his story.
The spirit of **Envy**, with grim face
and screaming voice, who delights
in evil, will be the constant companion
of wretched humanity.[216]

Note that this 'Envy' confounds Aristotle's separate categorisations for *zēlos*, which desires to obtain such goods for itself, and *phthonos*, which desires to prevent a neighbour from possessing them. Zelos/*zēlos* no longer encourages men to work their own land and produce their own goods. Instead, being associated now with the bad Eris, Zelos encourages them to sack each other's cities ('one man shall sack the city of the other', [189]) – to improve their own lot by simultaneously lessening the lot of

[216] Note that within these eight lines Hesiod makes two references to the state of oaths – first that those who honour oaths (εὐόρκου, *euorkou*) will not be rewarded, and secondly that men will tell crooked stories and swear oaths to their veracity (μύθοισιν σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὀμεῖται.) This does suggest that in previous times men were rewarded for keeping oaths, but given the fact that Hesiod does not mention so explicitly when talking about Horkos, and explicitly mentions the lack of reward here, the theme of focusing on the negative aspects of oaths is continued.

others. Men will swear false oaths, using crooked words to harm those better than them (193-94), and they will delight in evil (κακόχαρτος, *kakochartos*). The fact that Zelos is here represented as something with both elements of Aristotle's *zēlos* and *phthonos* further undermines the idea that his distinctions are applicable to Hesiod.

Zēlos can be both good – as in verses 21-26 and 311-13 – or it can be morally bad, as in verses 189-96. And verses 189-96 vividly illustrate that dangerous and morally bad side of Zelos: a figure that delights in the misfortunes of others, taking pleasure in depriving others of the possessions or qualities that aroused the envy in the first place.

But this passage does more than reveal the morally ambiguous nature of Zelos by revealing a clearly negative meaning; other elements of it enforce the connection of this Zelos to Styx. Zelos is described as a 'screaming' (δυσκέλαδος, *duskelados*) spirit who 'delights in evil' (*kakochartos*) and with 'grim face' (στυγερώπης, *stugerōpēs*).[217] This final word, which Lattimore has here translated as 'grim face', would be more literally translated as 'hateful look'. The στυγ- root of this epithet for Zelos is a clear reminder that his mother is Styx. The *kakochartos* of verse 196 also links Zelos with the bad, war-causing Eris, who shares this same description in verse 28, strengthening the idea that Zelos can be aligned with both the good and the bad Eris, and making it harder to extricate a separate, wholly negative Zelos from a wholly positive one.[218]

Thus as a whole the passage displays the connection between Zelos and Styx, and also between Zelos and Eris. Whether it is the strife of competing to be richer than one's neighbour by working harder, or the violent strife of war, Zelos is there (we should not forget that one of Zelos' siblings, Bie, is Violence). This wholly demonstrates that it is unreasonable to try and claim that this Zelos is not the Zelos of the *Theogony,* the son of Styx, who takes his place at the side of Zeus. It also reveals some of the qualities associated with Zelos which we must take account of when considering what it means for this nuanced figure to be both the son of Styx, associated with strife and hatred, and also to be in permanent attendance on Zeus in the *Theogony*. Of these two

[217] The idea of delighting in the misfortune of others is an indication of enmity (or a slight) in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.4 1379^{b}20), and an aspect of hatred also noted by Halperin (2008: 718).
[218] West (1978: 203).

relationships, we will examine that between Zelos and Zeus first; but before doing this, it will be pertinent to address the etymological evidence which may inform our understanding of the range of concepts associated with *zēlos*.

Etymology of *Zēlos*

Although the word is scarce in ancient etymologies, the proposed roots of *zēlos* favour a nuanced interpretation of the word, as do those of contemporary etymologists. Of the ancient etymologists we find it first in the work of the 9th century CE grammarian, Theognostus Protospatharius. He derives the word from ζέω (*zeō* 'boil') because zēlos must grow 'exceedingly' (λίαν*, lian*, 'excess')*,* hot (470: 1-6).[219] Pseudo-Zonaras follows the derivation from *zeō*. He also gives a second derivation from ζέειν (*zeein* 'to boil') because 'it causes the soul to be inflamed and makes it burn' (ὁ φλεγμαίνειν καὶ ἐκκαίεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐμποιῶν) (Zeta 956:5-16).[220] We may at first instance recall the comment from the etymology of *stugnos*, explaining that the Greeks name unpleasant things after cold things, and pleasant things after warm things (Kallierges 731: 15-18). But as Padel points out, fire is 'the violent-end of the heat-spectrum. More moderate hope, and joy, "warm" innards in a comforting flow like that produced by wine.'[221] *Zeō*/*zeein* is not a gentle warmth; it is a burning force, here represented in the divine or daemonic figure of Zelos. In this light we see *zēlos* sharing the qualities of fire. It is 'divine violence, fast, asymmetrical in movement, a multiple blast, destructively creative.'[222] Destruction *and* creation. This is *zēlos* as a force that can inspire, but can also lead to ruin. It can urge a man to work to obtain lawfully what others have, and can urge him to deprive others of what they lawfully have.[223]

The ideas of being 'inflamed' with a passion, and of hot temperatures being part of

[219] Following John Cramer's paginations from *Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis bibliothecarum Oxoniensium* (1835).
[220] Following Tittmann's paginations from *Iohannis Zonarae lexicon ex tribus codicibus manuscriptis* (1808). It also appears in Byzantine scholia on Oppian's (2nd century CE) *Halieutica*. *Zeō* and *zeein* are different forms of the same word. Ancient etymologies frequently provide derivations from a specific form of a word, and can give different etymological connections for different forms of the same word.
[221] Padel (1994: 117).
[222] Padel (1994: 117).
[223] Padel also draws attention to the fiery nature of Zeus' lightning-bolt weapons, and the theft of fire by Prometheus, which proves just as much a bane for mankind as it does a boon. (1994: 117 n.12).

the bodily experience of a strong emotion is one common to us today, and was equally present in antiquity (compare: hot-headed, flushed with anger, cheeks burning with embarrassment or shame, burning with desire). Zelos, too, is experienced as heat.

The language of boiling and burning is also very closely linked to language associated with disease – the swelling of the soul described by φλεγμαίνειν (*phlegmainein*) evokes images of fever, abnormal swelling, and ill-health.[224] It is something that disturbs the natural functioning of the body, and those who experience it in turn become threats to the established functioning of hierarchy and the ordered world. True, it is the opposite of the coldness suggested by the potential etymologies of Styx's name, but destruction lies at both extremes of the spectrum. If these ideas of temperature can in some sense suggest the potential bodily experience of hatred and *zēlos*, then it is a violent transition, disruptive to the body, and perhaps also to society as well.

It should also be noted that Pseudo-Zonaras gives the meaning of the related Ζηλήμονες (*zēlēmones*), as φθονεροί (*phthoneroi*) (Zeta 956: 3). And in the *Et. Mag.* the meaning of the word is given as *phthonos*. This suggests that, even as *phthonos* and *zēlos* became more distinct from each other in their meaning and usage, significant semantic overlap still remained.

When we turn to contemporary etymologies, we find that Frisk and Chantraine link *zēlos* with δίζημαι (*dizēmai,* 'to seek') and ζητέω (*zēteō*, 'to search, inquire, investigate'), and more tentatively ζημία (*zēmia*, 'damage, penalty').[225] Beekes follows José García-Ramón in grouping both *zēlos* with *zēteō* and Ζητήρ (*Zētēr* – an epithet of Zeus in Cyprus, according to the 5th-6th century CE grammarian Hesychius [ζ 48 = Latte 1966: 261]).[226] García-Ramón gives 'avenger' as the meaning of *Zētēr*, based on shared etymology with the Ṛg-Vedic *yātár*-, which is used as an epithet of Indra to mean 'avenger' (I 32, 14ab),[227] as well as the fact that words such as

[224] See, for example, Hippocrates *Aphorismi*. 5.58.
[225] Frisk (1960: 612-13); Chantraine (1999: 400).
[226] Beekes (2010: 501); García-Ramón (1999: 90)
[227] The Vedic Indra is himself a figure comparable to Zeus – god of the heavens, king of the other gods, and one whose domain includes lightning and thunder.

'punisher', 'executioner', 'avenger', etc. are common epithets of Zeus.[228] Grouping *zēlos* and *zēteō* with Ζητήρ not only enforces a connection between *zēlos* and Zeus, but also connects the ideas of 'searching' and 'damage' with that of an 'avenger': one who seeks retribution – who seeks to damage their target.[229]

This collection of associated words and ideas suggests a search for retribution, a desire to right a perceived wrong or injustice through inflicting some sort of harm – a punishment – or causing some sort of loss. It allows us to see a way in which a rivalry, even a 'friendly' rivalry, or one based in emulation, is an attempt to 'punish' the other by out-doing them. Beating the rival, becoming better than the person one seeks to emulate, becomes a form of revenge just as much as actively seeking to deprive the other of their goods is. To be better than the other is a punishment for the other having been better in the first place, just as the other being better was experienced as a pain or a punishment. Being inferior was an unpleasant situation that was bad enough to spur the person experiencing it to remedial action, and in the same way, their being superior is a punishment for the other. Armed with this extra knowledge, let us now turn to examine the relationship between Zelos and Zeus.

Zelos and Zeus

What does it mean for Zeus to possess Zelos? It is pertinent to remember García-Ramón's observation that there are many epithets for Zeus based around the idea of vengeance or revenge, and the association drawn between *Zētēr* and *zēlos*. The fact that Zelos ultimately ends up in the *Theogony* as an attendant of Zeus – the god who overthrew his father Kronos and the Titans – is therefore, etymologically speaking, unsurprising.

Given what we now understand of the meanings of the word, we can see that Zelos' allyship to Zeus is testament to the fact that Zeus wanted something for himself and resented another possessing it – he resented his father's possession of authority, and wanted it for himself. Possessing Zelos gave him the spur to do this. But Zeus did not

[228] García-Ramón (1999: 80-81).
[229] García-Ramón also more tentatively groups *zēmia* and ζημιόω (*zēmioō*, 'cause loss, punish') with *zēlos*, *zēteō* and Zētēr based on the semantic overlap between this cluster of words, and traces them to a common root of **ieh₂-*, 'search, enquire' (1999: 79-81).

just gain power for himself; by gaining Zelos as an ally in the Titanomachy, he also deprived the Titans of it. He was in an unenviable position of inferiority, and gained an enviable position of superiority.

What then, do we make of Zeus' possession of Zelos? What does it mean for Zeus to have Envy? Does it mean that he alone experiences envy? Or is it precisely the opposite - will it make others envy him, or attempt to rival him, or emulate him?

If Zeus is experiencing envy himself, then who is it that he could envy? If we take the meaning of *zēlos* as excluding *phthonos*, the question is absurd. However, incorporating *phthonos* allows us to understand Zeus' envy as him guarding something 'jealously', begrudging anyone else the possession of it. Compare the *phthonos theōn* – 'the envy of the gods', in which a god can 'envy' a mortal due to 'the possible loss of what the god already possesses and is reluctant to share with others of lower status, since the very act of sharing itself represents a reduction in privilege'.[230] In this instance, envy is 'a wish to retain exclusively to themselves something which the mortal who threatens to rival the gods stands to acquire and not to lose'.[231] It is obvious, then, why Zeus experiences envy – his envy is in jealously guarding those qualities he has acquired which sustain his rulership and position of power.

But is Zeus also envious in another sense? Are there things which others possess that he desires for himself? After his victory in the Titanomachy, Zeus could be said to be envious of many figures, such as his first wives, Metis (whose potential to produce offspring greater than Zeus makes her a threat), or Themis (who bears him daughters essential to the ordering of his universe, such as Dike and the Fates), amongst others. Although he has defeated his father, he must still go about consolidating his power, acquiring the qualities which he needs to cement his position, including Styx and her children. But Hesiod's *zēlos* also contains the concept of wanting to deprive others of something. In having Zelos, Zeus deprives others of access to the envy needed to spur them to rival him. This is certainly a practical step for a dictatorship, but not a particularly benevolent one.

[230] Walcot (1978: 22).
[231] Walcot (1978: 22).

Thus we can see Zeus' possession of envy as simultaneously his desire to deprive others of something, and the very thing he must deprive them of. Rather than being passively experienced, *zēlos* is a motivation for action. Zelos is an external force, inflicting *zēlos* upon whom he visits. To control Zelos is to control who can experience it.

But *zēlos* is also intrinsically the quality of being enviable – if one is to experience *zēlos*, there must be something for it to be experienced towards: something superior, better, worth possessing. To possess Zelos is to be the most enviable – the most powerful (for if someone else were the most powerful, they would also be the most enviable). To be enviable is to invite a rivalry between oneself and others who would now seek that power. Zeus is the one towards whom others will now direct their envy; he is the one they will attempt to overthrow. Zelos is the dangerous consequence of being successful – others will want to own what their rival has for themselves, and to deprive the rival of it. It is unsurprising then, that after Zeus awards himself such honours, he should immediately have to defend himself from a new threat: he has made himself enviable, and is subsequently attacked by Typhoeus, and finds himself in rivalry with Prometheus.

There is a seemingly obvious contradiction between the two readings above: surely the possession of Zelos cannot simultaneously make others envy Zeus, *and* prevent them from envying him, and evoke envy in Zeus himself? This contradictory ambiguity is not unique to the case of Zelos – we have only to think of the problems Pandora's sealing of *elpis* (hope) in the jar has caused modern interpreters; or the confusion caused by the description of Tartaros; or the stories of the races of men and of Prometheus, which both seek to explain the same phenomena – namely, the change in the relationship between gods and men. We can instead then, return to the advice Johnson gives for attempting to interpret the Tartaros passage, and treat these two ideas – of *zēlos* causing envy and *zēlos* preventing envy as 'multiple representations of the same underlying reality'.[232] Perhaps these contradictions simply underline the dual nature of this emotion: its ability to be both useful and dangerous, the possession

[232] Johnson (1999: 11).

of it always fraught with difficulties to which no simple solution can be applied.

Like his mother, then, we see Zelos as an intrinsically dangerous and useful tool. He is a quality that Zeus must possess in order to be truly supreme, and which no one else can possess, but doing so invites the rivalry of others, raising dangerous opponents who threaten that supremacy. But to prevent others having access to *zēlos* it is to lose that enviable quality which indicates supremacy.

It should be noted that this 'conundrum' applies even if one is committed to a solely positive reading of *zēlos* as 'emulation'. If Zeus possesses emulation in order to make himself one whom others should emulate, then he invites other people to aspire to his position – a troublesome invitation when you are the leader, and have achieved that position through defeating your father in physical combat, and locking him and his allies in Tartaros. But if Zeus possesses emulation in order to prevent others experiencing it and to experience it only himself, this would mean that Zeus has deprived everyone of that which Hesiod represents as key motivation to better themselves. Zelos is dangerous, but necessary.

Zelos and Styx

Having examined the connection between Zeus and Zelos, we must also examine the connection between Zelos and the figure in whose company Zelos previously dwelt: Styx. The concepts of punishment and vengeance implicit in the etymology of *zēlos* also highlight a conceptual connection between envy and hatred in terms of Styx's role as oath: the broken oath must be avenged; the foreswearer must be punished (and halted). But this is not simply vengeance on the part of the oath that was broken. If we return to the idea of *zēlos* as meaning both wanting something for oneself, and wanting to deprive the other of it, and couple this with the fact that it shares its etymological root with *zēmioō* ('cause loss, punish'), then it is easy to understand how for Hesiod *zēlos* could be a desire to punish others because they have something you do not – to make them more like you; or a desire to obtain for yourself what someone else has – to make yourself more like them; or both, at the same time. Being the most enviable is intrinsic to being victorious, and thus victory can also be seen as both an act of gaining the position of being enviable, and depriving others of it.

Through this we can also read the punishment of the Styx oath as being an opportunity for Styx to both deprive a god of what she herself was deprived of, and to claim the honours for herself by actively fulfilling her role in the newly ordered hierarchy of Zeus. Thus the punishment inflicted by Styx is simultaneously a punishment for breaking an oath, and an act of revenge for depriving her of honours in the past, an act of pulling herself up to their honoured positions, and an act of dragging the offending god down to her previous position. Thus the punishment for breaking the Great Oath, an action that makes one the target of hate, is an enaction by Styx of her envy and emulation, of *zēlos*. Her punishment is one of confinement.

We can also apply to Styx the reading in which the possession of Zelos makes one a target of envy: when Zeus grants Styx and her children 'honours' by removing the children from the halls of their mother and placing them eternally by his side, this is an act of envy. Styx possessed Zelos, and thus, despite her lack of honours, was intrinsically enviable (we shall discuss further why this should be so after we have examined Nike). Zeus, in 'rewarding' her for her support, acted on a feeling of envy, took this quality from her and claimed it for himself. His honouring of Styx's children is done in such a way as to further his own ends, increase his own honours, and make himself more enviable. In doing so he deprives Styx of the possession of *zēlos* – the thing which made her a threat.

Finally, we must now consider the relationship between Styx and Zelos in terms of cause and effect. Does it appear that *zēlos* is a manifestation of hate – an effect of it, or something which causes hate? Does envying someone make you hate them, or does hating someone mean you desire to deprive them of things and punish them? Just as our examination of Horkos revealed that an oath can be both something which causes strife, and something which is caused by strife, this bi-directional model is equally applicable to Zelos and Styx: Hate gave birth to Envy – it causes envy, but envy also causes hatred. If Zeus physically took Zelos from Styx because he coveted the child, then that envy was ultimately caused by Styx. Hatred is the driving force behind the enaction of envy, and envy is one of the ways in which hatred can manifest. But Zeus' possession of Zelos will cause him to be simultaneously envied and hated. It is Envy who specifies the targets of hatred, and Zelos will now cause that hatred to be directed

towards Zeus.

Indeed, Typhoeus' assault, coming immediately after the Titanomachy and Zeus' ownership of Zelos, demonstrates the dangerous nature of possessing Zelos, and the inextricable connection between hatred and envy. Envy directs Typhoeus' hatred towards Zeus. The enacting of envious desires – to gain, and to deprive, is produced by hatred.

In the *Works and Days*, the *stugerōpēs*, 'hateful staring' Zelos in the final age of man presents an example where envy manifests hatred as a physical quality. Zelos provides a physical form, created by Styx herself, through which hatred can see. Zelos literally directs the gaze of hatred towards the envied targets. Thomas Rakoczy suggests that Zelos' stare is the first clear indication in literature of the 'Evil Eye' – the concept that a malicious stare from another can cause actual harm to the victim.[233] Padel notes that, as well as being receptacles for information about the world around us, 'eyes are an outward-flowing channel for what is inside: soul, mind, feelings. Emotion stream from them.'[234] Zelos' hateful gaze does not just make visible the hatred he is experiencing, witnessing his hatred can in and of itself be harmful to the viewer.

Approaches, then, that focus only on the mono-directionality of genealogical ancestry as a model for causation ignore the complexities of Hesiod's familial relationships. Hatred and envy can cause each other, be caused by each other, and affect the manifestation of each other. Envy provides a conduit for the manifestation of hatred – a conduit which is created by hatred in order to be able to manifest.

To our script of hatred we can therefore add that it can cause *zēlos* and be caused by *zēlos*. This manifestation of hatred is one which both seeks to possess, and seeks to deprive. It is a desire to hold on to something so that others may not have it. It restricts others' access to resources, and power.

[233] Rakoczy (1996: 53-54).
[234] Padel (1994: 61).

Nike

Despite the fact that Nike is, in contemporary times, undoubtedly the most well known deity of the four that Hesiod names as the children of Styx, her presence in our surviving literary sources is surprisingly scarce. She is absent, for instance, from the *Iliad* (as are all the children of Styx). She does not, as her siblings Kratos and Bie do, appear in any extant tragedies. She is most well known through her Athenocentric form of Athena Nike, and through artistic representations of her on vases, friezes and in sculpture. Although much has been written concerning the archaeology, iconography, artistic representations, and priestesses of the temple of Athena Nike in Athens,[235] little has been written about the goddess Nike from a literary, theoretical, or mythic perspective. Indeed, Lloyd Daly states that 'Nike has no myth and no cult, and so is not a god in the technical sense at least.' Daly further says of her appearance in Hesiod that, 'Such Hesiodic systematization cannot pass for myth.'[236] In the absence of a detailed discussion of what exactly *would* constitute myth, and why this distinction should matter, such comments are unhelpful; regardless of whether her presence in the *Theogony* passes as myth, her presence and function must still be accounted for and examined in detail.

The investigation of Nike/*nikē* shall first examine the description of her given in verse 384 before turning to look for potential clues in the etymology of the word and in related words. Following this, I will examine the instances of *nikē* occurring in the text of the *Theogony*. This will necessitate a lengthy discussion of one instance in particular, when *nikē* is associated with Hekate. Understanding this connection will be highly fruitful, not just in allowing us to fully understand the nature of *nikē*, but also the conception of Styx as hatred and her role as such in Zeus' universe.

Nike's Ankles

Of the four children of Styx, Nike is the only one for whom we are given any physical detail – a single word: καλλίσφυρος (*kallisphuros*) – 'beautiful ankled'. Since the details of the children of Styx are so sparse, we must pay scrupulous attention to

[235] See Mark (1993); Knell (1997); Lougovaya-Ast (2006); & Stewart (2016).
[236] Daly (1953: 1124).

every scrap we are given and what they might tell us about the objects of our study. Thus, I turn now to Nike's ankles, in the hope that they might provide some synecdochical clues.

Nike is not the only figure within the *Theogony* to whom the adjective *kallisphuros* is applied: *kallisphuros* is also used twice of Alkmene (526, 951) and once of Klymene (507) – a sister of Styx named earlier in the catalogue of Okeanos' daughters. The daughters of Okeanos are also collectively described as τανύσφυρος (*tanusphoros*) – 'with long taper ankles' [364]. As well as *kallisphuros* and *tanusphoros*, εὔσφυρος (*eusphoros*), 'beautiful ankles', also occurs: it is used of Medea, the daughter of Aeetes and Idyia – another of Styx's sisters (961).

Mentions of ankles are not uncommon in Greek literature and myth. In the case of men, ankles are often mentioned in reference to some sort of weakness or anomaly in the lower limb (cf. Hephaistos, Oedipus, Talos, Philoktetes), which itself is often linked to the idea of abnormality surrounding procreation.[237] In the case of women, mentions of beautiful or thin ankles are often used, along with such descriptors as 'white armed', as general indicators of beauty.[238] More particularly, in relation to epic, Daniel Levine suggests that 'most epic references to beautiful-ankled females involve their sexual connections with men.'[239] For Levine, this sexual connection need not be that of the literal sexual act – it is enough for the daughter resulting from the union to be described as having beautiful ankles. Nike's ankles, then, could be mentioned, not to describe herself, but because she is the result of the union of Styx and Pallas, just as, Levine argues, Medea's ankles are mentioned because they relate to the description of how her mother, Idyia, was subdued by golden Aphrodite and bore Medea through copulation with Aeetes (961-62).[240] But in the case of Medea, the word order is such that Medea and her beautiful ankles are placed directly next to the act of copulation (Μήδειαν ἐύσφυρον ἐν φιλότητι [961]), whereas in the case of Nike,

[237] Note that deformed children in general were often associated with sterility. See Ogden (1997), esp. 16-17, 32, and 35-36 for a discussion of the link between deformity of the lower limbs and procreation. The most (in)famous discussion of this is, of course, that which is found in Lévi-Strauss' *Anthropologie structurale* (1958).
[238] Besides those ankle-related adjectives already discussed above, see also: χλιδανόσφυρος 'with delicate ankles', and ἁβρόσφυρος 'with delicate ankles', which appear in other ancient authors. Note too that Hesiod describes Aphrodite's 'slender feet' (ποσσὶν ῥαδινοῖσιν [*Th.* 195]).
[239] Levine (2005: 56).
[240] Levine (2005: 56).

Zelos is placed between her and the intermingling of her parents (Στὺξ δ' ἔτεκ' Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ Πάλλαντι **μιγεῖσα** | Ζῆλον καὶ **Νίκην καλλίσφυρον**). The connection is weaker in this instance, therefore, and does not make a satisfactory explanation.[241]

Peter Wilson, though occasionally misinterpreting the ancient sources, suggests an interesting possibility that the reference to Nike's beautiful ankles is part of a wider tradition relating to the establishing of a victory song and dance. The victory song and dance become a sign of closure – a clean and definite end to a conflict – and Nike's role, 'put simply, is to bring a vision of beauty and transcendence to those areas of mortal life – and there are many in the Greek world – where her brothers [Wilson mistakes Bie as male] are active: Violence, Supremacy, and 'Spur to Emulation'.'[242] Whilst the proposition is an interesting one, it holds more weight when considered as part of a wider tradition. There is no suggestion in Hesiod of Nike dancing or being involved with songs, despite the fact that there is ample opportunity for Hesiod to have mentioned this had he chosen to. Her ankles alone cannot be enough to imply this, given that she is not the only female whose ankles are mentioned.

Wilson's also commits a conceptual slip in treating Nike as somehow categorically separate from her siblings: rivalry, force, and violence, are taken as the by-products of hatred, or manifestations of hatred that lend themselves to the pursuit of a goal, with victory being that goal – the thing which hatred seeks, that which resolves the rivalry and ends the use of force and violence, and terminates the initial hatred. Indeed, to a contemporary reader this is the obvious interpretation, but this is to put the cart before the horse. If we wish to interpret Nike this way, we must look to provide evidence for it. The fact that Hesiod lists Nike as the second child of Styx, rather than the last, does not bode favourably for such an interpretation. Without any textual justification to treat them differently, the more natural approach is to consider them under the same light: either we should consider all of the children of Styx as things which hatred produces, all as things which hatred seeks, or, as we have seen with Zelos, consider them all as things which both causes and are caused by hatred. This does not mean we

[241] Levine does make clear that they are not claiming that all ankles imply a sexual element, and even gives the listing of the Okeanids as an example of this. (2005: 57).
[242] Wilson (2007: 258-59).

cannot investigate causal relationships between the children themselves, but without good textual reason to consider *nikē* only as the end result, we must also accept that *nikē* could potentially also be a *cause* of *zēlos*, *kratos*, and *biē*. Indeed, the idea that a victor becomes the subject of the *zēlos* of others ties in precisely with what we have seen of Zelos, and Zeus' victory in the Titanomachy is a necessary pre-requisite of his subsequent violent clash with Typhoeus.

What then, do we make of Nike's ankles? I suggest that it may be of significance that with the exception of Alkmene, for whom no parentage is given, all the figures whose ankles are described are among the daughters and granddaughters of Okeanos. In the case of Styx, Idyia and Klymene, their connection to Okeanos is emphasised each time a mention of ankles occurs: they are reiterated as daughters of Okeanos just as their copulative mate and pretty-ankled offspring are listed. And, as previously mentioned, all of the daughters of Okeanos – even those who remain unnamed – are described as *tanusphoros*. I would suggest, then, that Nike's ankles are mentioned not in relation to her mother's identity as oath, or hatred, but in relation to her mother's identity as a daughter of Okeanos. Why this should be is certainly an intriguing question, but beyond the scope of this current exploration.

Etymology of *Nikē*

Nike's relation to Styx as hatred or oath thus far remains enigmatic. Could the etymology of her name reveal anything of use to us? It is unlikely. The etymology of her name remains uncertain. It is scarce in ancient etymologies. The earliest etymological lexicon that contains an entry for *nikē* is the *Etymologicum Gudianum*, dated to the 10th century CE, itself a compilation of earlier lexica. What earlier sources the *Et. Gud.* may have derived its definitions for *nikē* from remains unknown, but it lists the word twice, with varying etymologies. In the first entry, νίκη is derived from two separate words. The first is δοτικήν (*dotikēn*), meaning 'willingly giving', and the second is from the dative form of εἷς (ἑνί, *heni*), meaning 'one', and ἵκω (*hikō*), 'I come/reach/arrive'. In the second entry we again find the derivation from *heni*, but instead of *hikō*, we find εἴκω (*eikō*) – 'give way, retire, yield' (Nu, p. 409: 37-42).[243]

[243] Following de Stefani's paginations from *Etymologicum Gudianum quod Vocatur* (1909-20).

Delightfully, then, we find an opposition – a conflict – even in the ancient attempts to give the word an etymology. It seems logical to suppose that the derivation from ἐνί alludes to the idea that victory can belong to one side only, and in *hikō* and *eikō* we find the oppositionary ideas of advance and retreat, of reaching for something and of yielding something. This highlights the idea of the transference of something from one side to another (from Styx to Zeus, perhaps?), and between them acknowledge both sides of the conflict – both the winner, and the loser. An ambiguity, then, is maintained in the proffering of these two etymologies, underlining that victory requires not just a winner, but also a loser.

For contemporary etymologists, the hope of an etymological connection between νίκη and νεῖκος (*neikos* 'strife') has been tantalising, but as alluring as these phonetic connections are, they have been soundly rejected by most modern etymologists, and no convincing alternatives have been proposed.[244]

Despite the lack of etymological understanding, a compound form of *nikē,* φιλονικία, (*philonikia*, 'love of victory'), is, in Beekes' words, 'frequently associated with *neikos*'. Indeed, the phenomenon of iotacism in later antiquity introduced *philoneikia* a variant spelling of *philonekos*, and the similarity of this form with *neikos* has led readers of ancient Greek to also treat *philoneikia* as a potentially separate word: 'love of victory' *or*, supposedly, 'love of strife'. But as Phillip Stadter points out, 'the compound adjective with *neikos*, strife, would be **philoneikēs* and the noun **philoneikeia*, neither of which are supported by the evidence.' The fact that *philon(e)ikia* is so frequently associated with *neikos* is not proof of the viability of a meaning of 'love of strife' in contexts where *philoneikia* seems associated with *neikos,* but instead reveals the underlying understanding of scholars that *philonikia*, 'love of victory' can be used in a negative sense.[245]

Stadter contends that *neikos* is never associated with *philon(e)ikia*, but that the word has both positive and negative connotations regardless. This is a rather curious

[244] Frisk notes the absence of a convincing etymology, but still documents the possibility of a derivation from *neikos* (1970: 320-21), a possibility which Chantraine classifies as unlikely (1999: 754-55). Beekes describes the connection as 'semantically gratuitous' (2010: 1022).
[245] Stadter (2014: 273).

position, given that the argument presented is based in part on the idea that Pindar and Thucydides, use *philonikos* 'to refer to contentiousness or hostility', despite the fact that they were writing before the confusion caused by the iotacism.[246] This 'negative' usage closely relates *nikē* to the ideas of feuding and strife represented by *neikos*. Regardless, Stadter is still right to conclude that 'they clearly saw love of victory as being on occasion undesirable'.[247]

Stadter also points to clearly negative uses of the word as far back as the mid 6th – mid 5th century BCE with the work of Simonides (fr. 541 = P.Oxy 2432), where *philonikia* is directly contrasted with being good and living a virtuous life. Victory, or the love of victory, is not always a good thing. Stadter also highlights its usage in Pindar:

> οὔτε δύσηρις ἐὼν οὔτ᾽ ὢν φιλόνικος ἄγαν,
> καὶ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμόσσαις τοῦτό γέ οἱ σαφέως
> μαρτυρήσω
>
> (*Olympian* 6.19-21)

> I, who am not prone to quarrel, nor too fond of victory,
> having sworn a great oath, will clearly
> bear witness for him…

Here Pindar associates the love of victory with a disposition for quarrelling (δύσηρις, *dusēris*). To disagree with someone is to assert the superiority of one's own view or narrative – to trump what the other has said with one's own account: to disagree is to try and claim victory over the other. To love victory is equivalent to loving the strife and quarrels without which victory would be impossible. It is also impossible to fully separate the love of victory from victory itself. If it is sometimes problematic to love victory, this is because victory itself is not intrinsically good. This is the same kind of relationship that we have seen with *zēlos*: acting on it can be productive and praiseworthy, but it can also be destructive and blameworthy.

Esther Eidinow's analysis of *phthonos* in Pindar highlights the importance of the

[246] Stadter (2014: 273). The 'Hellenistic sound shift' to which he refers is the phenomenon of iotacism, in which the pronunciation of certain vowels changed over time, being pronounced more and more like iota.
[247] Stadter (2014: 273).

connection between *phthonos* and victory, describing it as an 'almost symbiotic phenomenon', which in turn means envy 'could be said to play a natural and even necessary role' in acknowledging victory.[248] Eidinow argues that '*phthonos* was part of the expected and accepted emotional reaction to a victorious or prosperous individual who vaunted his success'.[249] This symbiotic relationship between envy and victory demonstrated in Pindar finds its equivalent in Hesiod's representation of Envy and Nike as siblings. They come from, and are part of, the same thing. Where victory is, so is envy.

It is interesting to note that in *Olympian* 6 Pindar also talks about swearing a 'great oath' (μέγαν ὅρκον), in relation not just to quarrel (which I have mentioned previously: see p. 62), but to victory. Being prepared or able to swear an oath, being sure enough of one's position as to be willing to invoke a conditional curse upon oneself is, in this instance, a pivotal component of victory. Equally, the breaking of an oath results in punishment – in defeat. In this instance, then, the dubious nature of oaths and the dubious nature of victory mirror each other – victory should not always be sought, oaths should not always be sworn. Victory sought by the swearing of false oaths will ultimately result in defeat.[250]

The penalty for breaking a Styx-oath can also be seen both as the physical punishment that a god must undergo (*zēlos*), and also as a defeat (*nikē*). All are acts of deprivation. Like the defeated Titans punished by confinement within Tartaros, the perjuring god is entrapped by their oath, forced to spend a year lying on a bed, covered by a deep sleep (κῶμα καλύπτει, *kōma kaluptei* [798]), forced into a position of helplessness and submission, defeated, and punished by the power of oath.

This ties in with what we have already seen in relation to hatred, oath, and *zēlos*. Like the punishment for breaking an oath, and the desire to deprive (*zēlos*), *nikē* is a

[248] Eidinow (2015: 105).
[249] Eidinow (2015: 124).
[250] Eidinow (2015: 103-24) notes some further details of Pindar's poetry in relation to envy (*phthonos*, in Pindar), and victory which are pertinent. Pindar is concerned with attempting to negotiate the negative effect that victory might have, through the *phthonos* of others, on the victor. Eidinow sees *phthonos* in Pindar as playing 'a natural, and even necessary role' Pindar's goal is to encourage the victor to behave appropriately so as to gain 'unbegrudging praise' (p. 105) rather than being the target of a destructive *phthonos*.

manifestation of hatred. Further, the inseparability of victory from defeat and punishment reveals that the punishment of the perjurer is a form of victory - a victory claimed through the maintenance of the ordered universe Zeus has created. But the inseparability of victory and defeat makes *nikē* a cause of hatred. It risks achieving nothing more than inverting the subject and target of *zēlos*, perpetuating a dangerous cycle of hatred. Thus far then, we have seen that outside of Hesiod, victory has an ambiguous quality. This quality fits well with what we have seen of the nature of Styx and Zelos, and what was suggested by *arideiketa*.

Nike in the *Works and Days*

Nikē is mentioned twice in the *Works and Days*, once in verse 211, and once in verse 657. In verse 211 it appears in the fable of the hawk and the nightingale. We shall discuss this instance later, when we examine the fable of the hawk and the nightingale in greater depth in relation to *biē*. In verse 657 Hesiod refers to his own victory:

ἔνθα δ᾽ ἐγὼν ἐπ᾽ ἄεθλα δαΐφρονος Ἀμφιδάμαντος
Χαλκίδα τ᾽ εἰς ἐπέρησα: τὰ δὲ προπεφραδμένα πολλὰ [655]
ἄεθλ᾽ ἔθεσαν παῖδες μεγαλήτορος: ἔνθα μέ φημι
ὕμνῳ **νικήσαντα** φέρειν τρίποδ᾽ ὠτώεντα.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ Μούσῃς Ἑλικωνιάδεσσ᾽ ἀνέθηκα,
ἔνθα με τὸ πρῶτον λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς.
τόσσον τοι νηῶν γε πεπείρημαι πολυγόμφων: [660]
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο:
Μοῦσαι γάρ μ᾽ ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν.
(654-62)

There I crossed over to Chalkis
for the games held in honour
of gallant Amphidamas, for the
sons of this great-hearted
man had set out many chosen prizes. There,
I can claim,
I **won** the contest with a song
and took off an eared tripod;
and this I set up as an offering
to the Muses of Helikon,
where they first made me a master
of melodious singing.
This is all of my experience with intricately bolted
ships, but I can still tell you the thought,
which is of aegis-bearing
Zeus, for the Muses have taught me to sing

immortal poetry.

In the broader context of this passage, Hesiod begins to give Perses some advice on seafaring, but quickly turns to justifying to Perses why he should listen to him specifically on the issue of seafaring, despite not being skilled in seafaring. He has not sailed on the open sea, but he has caught two boats on a very specific journey: Hesiod boards ships in order to reach Chalkis, and the games of Amphidamas. There he wins the prize, and dedicates it to the Muses who first taught him song. This, he briefly tells us, is the justification for his authority on the issue of seafaring. His prize allows him to sing the will of Zeus. He then finally returns to giving advice on the topic.

As noted by Detienne, in being trained to remember, a poet has particular access to the truth (*alētheia*) – a truth that is inextricably linked to memory. In singing the memories the Muse grants access to, the poet manifests them as truth. His act of singing is itself an act of creation.[251] The Muses grant Hesiod the power of song, and he proves he deserves to be a speaker of truth by winning the contest. His authority is granted by victory, and allows him to be able to manifest the reality of Zeus' *nikē* and his ordered universe. In singing of the ordered universe, Hesiod is reinforcing Zeus' order – Hesiod has lent his victory to Zeus and in return has now becomes a conduit for Zeus' will.

Nike and *Nikē* in the *Theogony*

We now turn to investigate the *Theogony* in order to see whether there is evidence to confirm the idea of *nikē* we have formed so far. Luckily, Nike/*nikē* (and related forms) occurs more often than Zelos/*zēlos*. There are eight instances in total of *nikē*, or words that share a stem with *nikē*. These instances almost all occur in close proximity to *kratos* (or *kartos*)[252] and/or *biē* – seven times out of eight, if we include when they are named as the children of Styx. Let us go through these occurrences individually.

[251] Detienne (1991: 35-52, see esp. 44-45).

[252] For the reader not wholly familiar with ancient Greek, it should be noted that *kratos* is frequently subject to metathesis, in which the position of the rho and alpha are transposed. Thus *kratos* and *kartos* are the same word.

In verse 73 Zeus is described as 'having conquered' (νικήσας, *nikēsas*),[253] his father through *kratos* (**κάρτει νικήσας** πατέρα Κρόνον). The connection between *kratos* and *nikē* is emphasised by their placement next to each other. Later in verse 496 Hesiod again mentions Zeus' victory over his father; this time it is described as having been obtained through *biē* (**νικηθεὶς** τέχνῃσι **βίῃφί** τε παιδὸς ἑοῖο). Νικηθεὶς is an active participle form, thus once again emphasising *nikē* as an action – as the act of conquering, of obtaining victory, and the tool which is required for conquering is *biē*. The lack of an English equivalent verb for 'victory' leads to a difference in our conception of the word. For Hesiod, *nikē* is not just something which is sought, it is the act of obtaining it as well.

In verses 627-31 *nikē* is mentioned with *kratos* in relation to the Titanomachy, *nikē* in Ge's explanation of how the Hekatoncheires would help Zeus obtain victory, and *kratos* in the description of the battle Zeus seeks victory in:

αὐτὴ γάρ σφιν ἅπαντα διηνεκέως κατέλεξε,
σὺν κείνοις **νίκην** τε καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.
δηρὸν γὰρ μάρναντο πόνον θυμαλγέ' ἔχοντες [629]
ἀντίον ἀλλήλοισι διὰ **κρατερὰς** ὑσμίνας, [631]
Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐξεγένοντο, [630]

For Gaia had told the gods the whole truth,
from the beginning,
that with these Three **victory** would be won,
and glorious honour.
For a long time now, the Titan gods
and those who were descended
from Kronos had fought each other,
with heart-hurting, **mighty** battles,
ranged in opposition
all through the hard encounters:
…[254]

First we hear of the necessity of the Hekatoncheires for obtaining victory, then we turn back to the κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας, (*krateras huminas*) – the *krateras* battles. Verses 635-38 continue the description of that battle. After this we turn back to the

[253] A verb form of *nikē*.
[254] Adapted from Lattimore. Lattimore maintains the unaltered verse ordering, which I have kept, but I have altered the wording to keep 'mighty' next to 'battles', as it is in the Greek, and changed the translations to be more consistent with the language used elsewhere.

Hekatoncheires as they are addressed by Zeus after being fed nectar and ambrosia:

> "κέκλυτέ μευ, Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
> ὄφρ᾽ εἴπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει. [645]
> ἤδη γὰρ μάλα δηρὸν ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισι
> **νίκης** καὶ **κάρτεος** πέρι μαρνάμεθ᾽ ἤματα πάντα
> Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐκγενόμεσθα.
> ὑμεῖς δὲ μεγάλην τε **βίην** καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους
> φαίνετε Τιτήνεσσιν ἐναντίον ἐν δαΐ λυγρῇ, [650]
> …
>
> (644-50)

> "Hear me, O shining children
> of Ouranos and Gaia
> while I speak out what the heart
> in my breast commands me.
> All our days the Titan gods and we,
> who were born
> of Kronos, have been fighting
> a long time now, in opposed
> battle, for the sake of **victory** and **power**.
> Now, therefore,
> show yourselves against the Titans
> in the grim encounter,
> and show the greatness of your **strength**,
> your hands irresistible;
> …

Zeus tells them what he has been seeking in the battle – *nikē* and *kratos* – and asks them show forth their μεγάλην βίην (*megalēn biēn*), their great *biē* and their invincible hands. It is the demonstrating of their *biē* in the service of Zeus' cause that will help Zeus obtain *nikē* (and Nike).

Narratively, the final instance of *nikē* is again in relation to the Hekatoncheires' involvement in the Titanomachy, as they enact the request of Zeus from 647-9:

> Οἳ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μάχην δριμεῖαν ἔγειραν,
> Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς τε Γύγης τ᾽ ἄατος πολέμοιο, [715]
> οἵ ῥα τριηκοσίας πέτρας στιβαρέων ἀπὸ χειρῶν
> πέμπον ἐπασσυτέρας, κατὰ δ᾽ ἐσκίασαν βελέεσσι
> Τιτῆνας. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
> πέμψαν καὶ **δεσμοῖσιν** ἐν ἀργαλέοισιν ἔδησαν,
> **νικήσαντες** χερσὶν ὑπερθύμους περ ἐόντας,

τόσσον ἔνερθ᾽ ὑπὸ γῆς ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ᾽ ἀπὸ γαίης· [720]
(713-20) [255]

But now the Three, Kottos and Briareos
and Gyes,
insatiate of battle, stirred
the grim fighting in the foremost,
for from their powerful hands they volleyed
three hundred boulders
one after another, and their missile flights
overwhelmed the Titans
in darkness, and these they drove
underneath the wide-wayed
earth, and fastened them there
in painful **bondage**, for now they
had conquered the Titan gods with their hands,
for all their high hearts.
They drove them as far underground
as earth is distant from heaven.[256]

Νικήσαντες (*nikēsantes*) is again a participle form of the verb, as in verse 73. It refers to the Hekatoncheires' conquering of the Titans. But the focus of the poem does not shift immediately to the prizes for the victors. First, we are told the fate of the conquered, launching us into the Tartography. In fact, the Tartography even includes mention of the Hekatoncheires, without mentioning their prize. At the end of the Tartography comes the description of the Styx oath; it is only after this, in verse 816, nearly a hundred verses later, that any type of reward for the Hekatoncheires is mentioned:

αὐτὰρ ἐρισμαράγοιο Διὸς κλειτοὶ ἐπίκουροι
δώματα ναιετάουσιν ἐπ᾽ Ὠκεανοῖο θεμέθλοις,
Κόττος τ᾽ ἠδὲ Γύης· Βριάρεών γε μὲν ἠὺν ἐόντα
γαμβρὸν ἑὸν ποίησε βαρύκτυπος Ἐννοσίγαιος,
δῶκε δὲ Κυμοπόλειαν ὀπυίειν, θυγατέρα ἥν.

(815-19)

[255] Note that *krateras* appears in verse 712, I have not counted this both because it is a dubious claim of 'close' proximity, and because it is contextually separated – the section of the poem which turns its attention to the involvement of the Hekatoncheires in the battle begins at verse 713.
[256] Adapted from Lattimore to keep the translation of *nikē* related words consistent.

only the glorious helpers of Zeus,
  the loud-crashing,
and settled in houses along the foundations
  of the Ocean:
Kottos and Gyes, that is;
  but of strong-grown Briareos
the deep-stroking shaker of the Earth,
  Poseidon, made
a son-in-law, and married him to Kymopoleia,
  his daughter.

These verses end the sequence of the consequences of conquering: first the fate of the conquered is detailed, then we move through to the oath that establishes the rule of awarding honours, and only then can a prize be awarded, and the victory complete. The description of the defeat is an intrinsic part of the consequences of victory.

This is not to claim that *nikē* is ever used to *mean* 'defeat', but that the concept of *nikē* itself includes the understanding that there cannot be *nikē* without there also being defeat.

This is the sole mention of *nikē* without either *kratos* or *biē*. But given that it is in relation to the Hekatoncheires, who, as we have just seen, are closely associated with *kratos* and *biē*, the connection is strongly implied. And yet, the Hekatoncheires do not obtain Nike for themselves. They fight under the leadership of Zeus, lending their *kratos* and *biē* to him.

The noun form, representing the possession of *nikē*, appears only three times: once when she is named a child of Styx, and designated a permanent attendant of Zeus; once in verse 433 (which we will discuss momentarily); and once in verse 628, where Gaia tells Zeus that the Hekatoncheires are essential to *him* gaining victory. These two verses then, demonstrate the possession of Nike by both Styx and Zeus. The Hekatoncheires may conquer, but ultimately, only Zeus obtains the victory.

It is notable in the above verses that this sequence – this prevailing over the oppressor

and then inflicting punishment on them – mirrors the idea of *zēlos* as both aspiring to obtain a superior position, and striving to deprive and punish. The maternal link enforces the conceptual link between Nike and Zelos: to act on *zēlos* is to strive to gain and deprive another of *nikē*; to conquer everyone is to become enviable; the victorious will always be a target of envy and must deal with the constant threat of possible rivals, and possible attempts to emulate them. Just as we have seen previously indicated by *philonikia*, *nikē* can be both good and bad.

Given this, it is unsurprising that the above sequence with the Hekatoncheires matches that of Zeus, and of Styx as oath, which we have already discussed in relation to *zēlos*. The Hekatoncheires are in a position of lacking their due honours, just as Zeus and Styx are. Just as with Styx, their siding with Zeus allows them to prevail over their enemies and punish them in revenge. With the Hekatoncheires, it is the Titans whom they punish by binding in chains (just as they themselves were previously bound); with Styx, she punishes those who dishonour her by breaking their oath. A consequence of this is that in order to maintain Nike, Zeus must honour his oath to Styx. His position as ruler, as possessor of Nike, is dependent on him following his own laws and restrictions. Should he break them, Nike would return to her mother. Hatred is essential to maintaining a victorious position.

Turning back to the appearance of *nikē* in the poem, the final two usages of *nikē* occur together, alongside both *kratos* and *biē*, in the Hymn to Hekate (chronologically after, but narratively before the Titanomachy). It is part of a description of the types of victory the goddess can bestow upon men:

> ἠδ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἐς πόλεμον φθισήνορα θωρήσσωνται
> ἀνέρες, ἔνθα θεὰ παραγίνεται οἷς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσι
> **νίκην** προφρονέως ὀπάσαι καὶ κῦδος ὀρέξαι. [433]
> ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀεθλεύωσ᾽ ἐν ἀγῶνι, [435]
> ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν,
> **νικήσας** δὲ **βίῃ** καὶ **κάρτεϊ** καλὸν ἄεθλον
> ῥεῖα φέρει χαίρων τε, τοκεῦσι δὲ κῦδος ὀπάζει·
> (431-38)

> and when men put on their armour
> to go to battle, where men
> are wasted, the goddess

is readily there also to give out
the **victory** and grant the glory
to whichever side she wishes.
She is great, too,
where men contend in athletics,
and there the goddess stands by those
whom she will, and assists them.
When, **conquering** by **force** and **strength**,
he has won a fine prize,
he lightly and gladly carries it home,
and brings glory to his parents.[257]

First Hekate is described as granting victory (νίκην ὀπάσαι, *nikēn opasai* [433]) and glory (κῦδος ὀρέξαι, *kudos orezai* [433]) in war, and then as standing by (παραγίγνεται, *paragignetai*, [435]) and helping (ὀνίνησιν, *oninēsin* [435]) whom she will when men compete in games. In war she explicitly grants victory and glory, but is this the case in games?

Certainly glory is explicitly granted (κῦδος ὀπάζει, *kudos opazei*). But most translations, as Lattimore's does above, take the *kudos opazei* of verse 438 as meaning 'he, the athlete, brings glory'. However, *kudos opazei* mirrors the *kudos orexai* of verse 433, where Hekate grants glory in games. It is not the athlete who brings glory to his parents: it is Hekate. Glory gained by one member of a family is shared by all, and Hekate is the one who makes this happen. If glory is granted to the athlete's parents, it is because he himself has also been granted glory.

Hekate, then, grants glory to the winner in both war and games, but is it also the case with victory? There is no explicit reference to the granting of victory. Instead, Hekate merely provides help. But what is the nature of this help? The qualities of the athlete that allow him to conquer are *kratos* and *biē*. This is the nature of Hekate's help: providing *kratos* and *biē*. In providing the qualities that produce victory, Hekate also grants them that victory. The fact that in both instances Hekate grants glory alongside victory suggests that she is associated with a positive *nikē* alone.

[257] Adapted from Lattimore (who does not transpose any verses).

Nike and Hatred

We must, of course, address what it means for Hekate to be able to dispense victory, but leaving this aside for the moment, several obvious points emerge from the catalogue of occurrences of *nikē*. Firstly, the frequency with which *kratos* and *biē* are mentioned alongside *nikē* implicitly reinforces the conceptual connection and interrelatedness of the qualities embodied in the children of Styx. Secondly, in terms of the personified Nike, there are two figures who physically possess her (in the sense that she dwells with them), one after the other: Styx, and Zeus. The possession of the physical manifestation of Nike underlines the importance of her connection to these figures. Why Zeus possesses Nike is self-evident, and we have already discussed the connection between victory and presiding over the Great Oath, but what is the connection between victory and hate? If we are not to assume that Nike should be treated differently to her siblings and taken as the resolution to hatred, then we must consider alternative interpretations of the relationship between hatred and victory.

What a bidirectional genealogical reading of Styx and Nike presents us with is not the idea that hatred seeks victory, nor with the idea that victory is the resolution to hatred, but that hatred *causes* victory, and victory *causes* hatred. Just as we have seen with Zelos, Nike is a manifestation of hatred, and a cause of it. Hatred causes the desire to obtain and deprive, to triumph and to defeat. In conquering and obtaining an object one becomes enviable. In obtaining victory and the right to rule, one makes oneself the target of the hatred of those deprived of their enviable position. In triumphing and ruling, one makes oneself the target of the hatred of the defeated, of those who are now envious.

Hatred is a strong force in conflict; it seeks violence and ostracism, while anger still allows the possibility of the cessation of violence, peaceful resolutions, and compromises.[258] In motivating violence, hatred becomes a driving force that spurs people to victory. In the *Iliad* Achilles does not defeat Hektor until he has cause to hate him – until Hektor has deprived him of something by defeating Patroclus. His commitment to the war wavers because it is not his war; he has no reason to hate these men – they have never wronged him. They have never deprived him of anything

[258] Halperin (2008: 728-29).

(*Il.* I 152-56). In the *Theogony*, Zeus gains victory in the Titanomachy because Styx, hate, joins his side.

One might wonder whether the difference between claiming that hatred causes victory and the idea that victory is the resolution to hatred is genuinely significant, but on the former model, there is no implication that hatred ceases once victory is achieved. Thus, even after defeating Hektor, Achilles' hatred for him does not end, and instead causes him to abuse Hektor's corpse for three days. In the same vein Zeus punishes his defeated foes perpetually – the continuous torture of Prometheus being an especially brutal example.

Nike, Hekate, Styx

Let us now turn to address the final figure associated with *nikē*: Hekate. While the connection of *nikē* with Styx and Zeus (and the Hekatoncheires, by association) is to be expected, the connection with Hekate is less obvious. Hekate is a goddess who, like Styx, belongs to an older order; unlike Styx, she is awarded extra honours on top of those she already possessed. The Hymn to Hekate follows immediately after the description of Styx and her children, and the honours bestowed on them. The proximity of the two, the similarity of their narratives, and the fact that Hekate comes to wield the power of one of the children of Styx, suggest that it is worth taking a moment to consider Hekate in more detail.

There is still little consensus amongst scholars as to what to make of the 'Hymn to Hekate' (*Th*. 411-52), which has baffled due to its length and detail. Why should Hekate, unknown to other authors in the form Hesiod presents her, and otherwise a minor deity, be lavished with so many verses, and granted such extraordinary powers? Earlier scholars have argued that this passage is a later interpolation, some based on the unusual content of the material, others based on perceived linguistic or grammatical anomalies.[259] The latter stance has been successfully argued against by West.[260] Instead, West follows the arguments of Wolf Aly and Mazon who both

[259] Jacoby (1926: 158); Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1928: 131); Nilsson (1949: 204-5).
[260] West (1966: 278-79). Rudhardt adds the final nail to the coffin in posing the question 'Si l'éloge D'Hecate était aussi aberrant qu'on le prétend dans le corps de la Theogonie, quel interpolateur aurait-

suggest that the passage is indicative of a local private cult to which Hesiod belonged.[261] The existence of such a cult would explain the broadness of the range of her powers and honours – as a local goddess, she must have the powers necessary to answer the prayers of her worshippers.[262] To my mind Mark Griffith makes a succinct and convincing case against this reading: the lack of a statement of personal connection between poet and goddess and her omission from the proem, 'which *is* specifically addressed to the glory of his patron – and local – deities' is clearly a problem for the local cult argument.[263]

In opposition to the localised approach, Gregory Nagy argues that Hekate's presence is emphasised not because she is a local goddess, but because she is a Pan-Hellenic goddess.[264] A third school of thought is that explanations should more rightly rely solely on interpreting the text of the *Theogony* itself, rather than on speculative extra-textual history.[265] My own stance is in line with those scholars who have argued that the passage fits in appropriately to the thematic and structural elements of the poem.

Like Styx, Hekate is a goddess who is explicitly honoured by Zeus. Unlike Styx, Hekate is a goddess who had honours before choosing to side with Zeus in the Titanomachy.[266] Let us remind ourselves of the exact promises in Zeus' oath:

> ὣς γὰρ ἐβούλευσεν Στὺξ ἄφθιτος Ὠκεανίνη [390]
> ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε πάντας Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητὴς
> ἀθανάτους ἐκάλεσσε θεοὺς ἐς μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον,
> εἶπε δ', ὃς ἂν μετὰ εἷο θεῶν Τιτῆσι μάχοιτο,
> μή τιν' ἀπορραίσειν γεράων, τιμὴν δὲ ἕκαστον
> ἐξέμεν, ἣν τὸ πάρος γε μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
> τὸν δ' ἔφαθ', ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος, [395]

il été assez stupide pour l'y insérer?' (If the praise of Hecate in the body of the Theogony was as absurd as is asserted, what interpolator would have been stupid enough to insert it there?) (1993: 204). The current most authoritative editions of the text (Mazon 1928; West 1966; Solmsen et al. 1970) treat most of the verses as 'authentic Hesiod' with minimal bracketing (Mazon brackets only line 427; West brackets none, but does transpose several verses between 429 and 440; Solmsen et al. bracket 427 and 450-52, and also transpose several lines).

[261] Aly (1913: 35 n. 3); Mazon (1928: 20-24).

[262] West (1966: 277-78).

[263] Griffith (1983: 51-52).

[264] Nagy (1982: 64).

[265] For thorough reviews of previous scholarship on the Hymn to Hekate, see Stoddard (2004: 7-14) and Tsagalis (2009: 135-37).

[266] Hesiod is not explicit that Hekate sides with Zeus, but it can be assumed from the fact that he maintains and increases her honours.

τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἦ θέμις ἐστίν.
(390-96)

For this was the will of Styx,
that Okeanid never-perishing,
on the day when the Olympian flinger
of the lightning
summoned all the immortal gods
to tall Olympos
and said that any god who fought on his side
with the Titans
should never be beaten out of his privilege,
but each should maintain
the position he had before
among the immortals; he said, too,
that the god who under Kronos
had gone without position or privilege
should under him be raised to these,
according to justice.

Hekate had pre-existing honours; Zeus' promise to such figures is to maintain the honours they had before. But this is not what Zeus does. He goes above and beyond his oath and grants her more honours still:

οὐδέ τί μιν Κρονίδης ἐβιήσατο οὐδέ τ᾽ ἀπηύρα
ὅσσ᾽ ἔλαχεν Τιτῆσι μετὰ προτέροισι θεοῖσιν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ἔπλετο δασμός·
οὐδ᾽, ὅτι μουνογενής, ἧσσον θεὰ ἔμμορε τιμῆς,
[καὶ γέρας ἐν γαίῃ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἠδὲ θαλάσσῃ,]
ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς τίεται αὐτήν.
(423-8)[267]

Nor did the son of Kronos use violence
toward her nor deprive her
of the rights she had among the Titan gods
of the older generation
but she holds her apportioned share
as formerly from the beginning,
nor, because she is an only child,
does the goddess have the less honour,
and a privileged place in the earth,
and in the sky, and the sea also;
but as much as others and far more,

[267] Verse 427 is in all the manuscripts and in the papyrus that includes this passage. However, it is grammatically flawed. Some scholars have removed the verse; others transpose it to come before 426. I agree with Van Lennep (1843: 280) and West (1966: 285) that the most obvious solution is to amend the line to καὶ γεράων γαίῃ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἠδὲ θαλάσσῃ, rather than to transpose or discount the line.

seeing that Zeus honours her.

Zeus maintains Hekate's pre-existing honours, though the exact nature of those honours is unclear – they are simply 'the rights she had among the Titan gods', and 'her apportioned share'. On top of this he grants her 'a privileged place in the earth, // and in the sky, and the sea also', and honours her 'as much as others and far more.' This is an extensive list of honours, and we may question why Zeus would so willingly grant her these – both because he does not need to, and because of the sheer extent of her honours, which put her in a position where she may arguably present a threat to Zeus.

But, as we have already seen with Styx, Zeus cunningly grants honours that seem extensive, but which are still carefully controllable by him; he does this in a way which matches his approach to Styx. Just as Lye points out in the case of Styx, Hekate is a representative of the old order of the Titans, and thus, in persisting into Zeus' reign, embodies both the continuity of the generations of gods, and the change.[268] But in bridging the boundary between the order of Zeus and that which came before, she also marks that boundary. She too, can be seen as a fence, separating in a genealogical, generational, and temporal sense the Titans and the Olympians.

Although she is not personified as physical geographic boundary as Styx is, Hekate still represents as a metaphorical geographic boundary: where she has honours, so does Zeus; where her honours end, so do his. Her honours are in earth, sea, and sky. The limit of this area is delineated by Styx, who, in marking the boundary of Zeus' ordered universe, marks the extent of Hekate's honours and his own rule.

It is unsurprising, given the similarities between Hekate and Styx, that Zeus' method of limiting her honours and neutralising her as a threat also exploits the marginality of Hekate's position. Like Styx, Hekate's place is not on Olympos. Instead Zeus follows the same blueprint as employed with Styx: he takes advantage of the liminality of her position and physically separates her from the other gods and the seat of his power. Styx's oath is a covenant only enforced on the gods – mortals have Horkos. It is there to keep the Titans and Zeus' subjects in their place. Styx's power is to do with the

[268] Lye (2009: 16).

immortals only. But Hekate also crosses and represents another boundary.

The nature of this boundary is revealed by what else Hesiod tells us about the remit of Hekate. The first clue we are given about the remit of her honours is in verses 416-18:

> καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ὅτε πού τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
> ἕρδων ἱερὰ καλὰ κατὰ νόμον ἱλάσκηται,
> κικλήσκει Ἑκάτην·
>
> For even now, whenever any one
> of mortal men makes
> a handsome sacrifice in propitiation,
> according to usage,
> he invokes Hekate…

Patricia Marquardt understands these verses to mean 'men summon Hecate when they want to gain favour with the gods in general (ἱλάσκονται [sic]), as though Hecate were an intermediary between men and gods.'[269] This position is also held by Jenny Strauss Clay, who argues that Hekate's role in the *Theogony* is based on the etymology of her name not as 'the willing goddess' but as 'the wilful goddess, the one by whose will – ἕκατι – prayers are fulfilled and success granted.'[270] For Clay, Hekate is a selective uptake inhibitor of human supplication of the gods – the operator of the switchboard for petitions from mortals to gods, who can cancel or connect calls as she wishes. She is a figure to whom one prays because she has the power to block the efficacy of one's prayer, rather than because she has any particular power (or inherent willingness) to grant it. Such a mediatory figure is needed, Clay points out, because of the damage caused by Prometheus to mortal-divine relationships.[271] Certainly such a mediatory role would fit well with her nature as boundary and bridge, that liminal position between the mortal and divine spheres.

In this instance, her function differs somewhat from Styx's. Whilst both have roles relating to the policing of boundaries, Hekate's role is to act as a selective conduit for access between two spheres – she can choose which prayers to allow through and which to block, whereas Styx's role is to deny access to those outside and to eject

[269] Marquardt (1981: 245).
[270] Clay (2003: 135-36).
[271] Clay (1984: 37).

others who break oaths (one might point out that Styx must, presumably, let them back in once their punishment is over, but this is never the focus of her role). This difference in assigned functions points back to the fundamental difference in their nature – 'will' can both allow and refuse connections, 'hatred' only refuses them. Hatred is the breaking, or blocking of a relationship.

One may question, however, whether this reading is really compatible with the poem, in which it clearly seems that it is Hekate herself who has the power to grant victory, honours, and the other things for which men pray to her:

ᾧ δ᾽ ἐθέλῃ, μεγάλως παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν· [429]
ἔν τε δίκῃ βασιλεῦσι παρ᾽ αἰδοίοισι καθίζει, [434]
ἔν τ᾽ ἀγορῇ λαοῖσι μεταπρέπει ὅν κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσιν· [430]
ἠδ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἐς πόλεμον φθισήνορα θωρήσσωνται
ἀνέρες, ἔνθα θεὰ παραγίνεται, οἷς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσι
νίκην προφρονέως ὀπάσαι καὶ κῦδος ὀρέξαι. [433]
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀεθλεύως᾽ ἐν ἀγῶνι, [435]
ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησιν,
νικήσας δὲ βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ καλὸν ἄεθλον
ῥεῖα φέρει χαίρων τε, τοκεῦσι δὲ κῦδος ὀπάζει·
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ ἱππήεσσι παρεστάμεν οἷς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσιν,
καὶ τοῖς οἳ γλαυκὴν δυσπέμφελον ἐργάζονται, [440]
εὔχονται δ᾽ Ἑκάτῃ καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ Ἐννοσιγαίῳ,
ῥηιδίως ἄγρην κυδρὴ θεὸς ὤπασε πολλήν,
ῥεῖα δ᾽ ἀφείλετο φαινομένην, ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷ·
ἐσθλὴ δ᾽ ἐν σταθμοῖσι σὺν Ἑρμῇ ληίδ᾽ ἀέξειν,
βουκολίας [τ᾽] ἀγέλας τε καὶ αἰπόλια πλατέ᾽ αἰγῶν [445]
ποίμνας τ᾽ εἰροπόκων ὀίων, θυμῷ γ᾽ ἐθέλουσα,
ἐξ ὀλίγων βριάει καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν μείονα θῆκεν.
(429-47)

She greatly assists and advantages any man,
as she pleases, and in
the assembly of the people a man shines
when she wishes it,
and when men put on their armor
to go to battle, where men
are wasted, the goddess
is readily there also to give out
the victory and the glory
to whichever side she wishes.
And she sits besides solemn kings when they give
their judgement.
She is great, too,
where men contend in athletics,

and there the goddess stands by those
  whom she will, and assists them.
When, conquering by force and strength,
  he has won a fine prize,
he lightly and gladly carries it home,
  and she brings glory to his parents.
She is great also in standing by the riders
  as she wishes,
and those who on the gray-green,
  the hard-wracking sea, make a living,
and they pray to Hekate
  and to the deep-thunderous Earthshaker,
and lightly the high goddess
  grants a great haul of fish, and lightly
too she takes it away when it has shown,
  if such is her pleasure.
She is great in the farms also
  to help Hermes swell the produce,
and the driven herds of cattle
  and the wide-ranging goat flocks
and the flocks of deep-fleeced sheep,
  all these also at her own pleasure
she weightens to many out of few,
  or makes few out of many.[272]

Clay's argument as to Hekate's switchboard-operator role relies on the two instances in which Hekate is mentioned alongside another god who is more traditionally associated with the sphere in which help is being sought: fishermen pray to Hekate and Poseidon (440-43), and she is also described as helping Hermes in matters relating to farming (444-47). But these two instances are ranged against six instances between 429-439 in which she is described as helping (or hindering) mortals with no mention of other deities who might be appropriately invoked. As we can see in verses 431-34 above, neither Athena nor Ares is mentioned when Hekate is described as giving victory and glory in war. Is it not clearly the case that it is Hekate herself who is answering prayers?

I submit that the answer is 'no', and that the meaning of these verses can be clarified by attention to Zeus' actions. As Marilyn Arthur explains, one of the themes of the *Theogony* is the attempt by Zeus to subsume the power of the female goddesses, and the ability of goddesses to bear children – to function as generative forces,

[272] Adapted from Lattimore in order to retain the word order of verse 437, where νικήσας (*nikēsas*), βίῃ (*biēi* and κάρτεϊ (*kartei*) all appear together.

independent of himself, in his universe.[273]

Styx surrenders her children to his permanent company, allowing him to take on the maternal role of caring for the children.[274] Hekate becomes akin to those kindlier daughters of Zeus, and like those other daughters, virginal – forever to be his daughter, never a wife or mother.[275] Her power becomes his. Just as the other virginal and kindly daughters of Zeus represent *his* justice (*dikē*) and *his* lawfulness (*eunomia*), Hekate represents the will of her surrogate father. Zeus has brought the generative force of Hekate under his control: it is by his will that her honours are reaffirmed, and by his will that she is granted so much power in relation to mortal activities. It is his will that she represents: her will and his are synonymous.

In support of this it should be noted that the ἕκατι (*hekati*) from which Clay derives the etymology of Hekate's name appears only once between both the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*: it is used in verse 4 of the *Works and Days* to describe the *will of Zeus* – 'Διὸς μεγάλοιο **ἕκητι**'.

All of this allows us finally to understand Hekate's ability to dispense victory: she does not do so because she independently wills it so herself or because she possesses *nikē*, but because she is now the embodiment of the will of Zeus. Thus, Hekate has the power to grant victory because Zeus possesses Nike, and Hekate dispenses it at his will.

Hekate and Styx

Arthur's model of the containment of generative forces allows us further insight into the nature of Styx, her treatment by Zeus, and her role in his universe. It is thus appropriate to pause briefly from our discussion of Styx's children to examine what this new model, of the subsuming of female generative power by Zeus, can tell us.

Arthur comments of Styx that she is 'representative of female fecundity in its most

[273] Arthur (1982).
[274] Arthur (1982: 77).
[275] Arthur (1982: 69).

threatening form – the capacity to generate powerful and fearsome children'.[276] Styx is feared by Zeus not because she is oath, but because she is a mother, and has produced a specific group of children. Her generative power produces threats. The questions we must answer, given this reason for fearing her, are: how does Zeus defuse the threat she represents? Is she subsumed in the same way Hekate is, and which her own children are? Does Styx represent the hatred of Zeus as Hekate represents his will?

The answer to the question of whether Styx represents the hatred of Zeus in the same way that Hekate comes to present his will is 'no'. Hekate is subsumed as the will of Zeus because she takes on the role of one of his virginal daughters. Styx, on the other hand, takes on the role of wife. By adopting Styx's children Zeus forms a metaphorical relationship with her of both co-parents and couple. It is Styx's children who become Zeus' children – the manifestations of *his nikē*, *his zēlos*, *his kratos*, and *his biē* – rather than Styx herself.

In opposition to this, we may point to the case of Metis: Zeus gains *mētis* as a quality even though Metis is his wife, rather than adoptive daughter; Metis still becomes *his mētis*. But Zeus does not gain *mētis* from taking Metis as a wife; he gains it from literally consuming her. Styx, on the other hand, is incorporated into his hierarchy, but not into Zeus himself, either physically or subordinated as his adoptive daughter.

On the above model, Styx does not, as Zeus' daughters do, and as her own children come to do, represent a property of Zeus himself. She is Hate, not *Zeus's* hate. Her role in the ordering of Zeus' universe is one of being fundamental for the continued existence of the physical universe, rather than of being a fundamental quality of Zeus' in order for him to rule. Her role as oath marks her as something external to Zeus – her hatred could be directed towards him, should he break his oath. Should he do so, Styx, as mother, would reclaim her children from him, just as she first brought them to him. Zeus, in attempting to control and subsume the generative power of the goddesses, is forced to make concessions – he must switch, as Arthur notes, to a model of reciprocity, in which *timē* is given in response to receiving the aid of Styx

[276] Arthur (1982: 70).

and her children.[277] Controlling the generative power of Styx involves acknowledging her power, and respecting it. The rules that govern how hatred can be functional, rather than dysfunctional, are established.

Styx as Generative Force

To continue to explore the consequences of this model, we must dedicate ourselves to understanding what it means for Hate to be considered a generative force. Styx is not a generative force in the primal sense – she does not, as a figure like Gaia does, create the physical elements of the universe. Rather, she is a more conceptual generative power.[278] Her children are potent and necessary forces operating within the physical universe, stabilising it, and shaping the lives of those within it.

Each child represents qualities of different but overlapping natures: *zēlos* is an emotion (that causes a bodily response), a (rivalrous) relationship to others, a motivation for action, and a status. *Nikē* is also a relationship: a determinant of social status, of victory and defeat. It is also the action of striving towards a goal and status. *Kratos* – as we shall discuss shortly – is both a bodily quality, closely linked to intellectual qualities, a status, and an action. *Biē* is an action.

Hatred can generate emotions, goals, relationships, statuses, physical and intellectual qualities, and action. For a generative hatred to be such a danger to Zeus, the things which it produces must be dangerous. Metis' generative force is dangerous because it is prophesied that it will produce a son who exceeds Zeus. Styx's generative force is dangerous because of the emotions, goals, physical qualities, and actions it can produce, which could result in upheaval, and because those actions might themselves in turn cause hatred. It is a cyclical, self-sustaining generative force, and its by-

[277] Arthur (1982: 73).

[278] One may wonder why Eros does not need to be brought under Zeus' sway as other generative forces are. Apart from the fact that he is not a feminine generative force, and therefore does not represent quite the same type of threat, Arthur argues that he is still subsumed into Zeus' order. Eros becomes an attendant of Aphrodite at her birth. In doing so he 'survives in a "feminized" form… the force which he represents is made gentler and sweeter, or "feminine."' (1982: 67). Aphrodite herself is already a sublimated female generative power, having only male deities involved in her creation – Ouranos, from whose severed genitals she springs, and Kronos, who severs them; she is the embodiment of their generative power. Given this, all Zeus need do to gain control of Eros is to accept Aphrodite into a lower rank of his Olympian hierarchy.

products threaten to generate new hierarchical constructions and orderings of the universe. One might be dubious about including 'violence', as a 'generative force', given that it is considered intrinsically destructive in contemporary Western society – the antithesis of a generative force. This is something which we can only address after we have discussed Bie herself, and thus something we will return to after discussing Kratos, Hesiod's sequentially next child, and then Bie.

Conclusion

To our developing script of hatred, then, we can add that it is manifested by and in relationships of inequality. If not handled correctly, *zēlos* and victory can produce a reciprocal cycle of hatred. Hatred does not seek just to punish, destroy, or ostracise, but explicitly seeks to do so because of a desire for superiority. Hatred is not mindless, or irrational. It is not a negative desire to destroy for the sake of destroying. It is a response to inequalities. It is a desire to destroy the superior position of the other, but it is a positive desire to obtain something for oneself as well. It is generative as well as destructive. But it is also part of the motivation to hang on to a position of superiority, to continue to own the desired object or position. It is a desire for upheaval, but also a desire to maintain that which one thinks beneficial and stable.

Chapter 3. The Children of Styx, Part II: Kratos and Bie

Introduction

We now turn to the remaining two children: Kratos and Bie. As before, I shall address first Kratos, and then Bie, examining the range of meanings of these words, and associated concepts that appear through the analysis of Hesiod's poems. But before we discuss Kratos and Bie as individuals, it is worth commenting on the semantic overlap between *kratos*,[279] *nikē*, and *biē*, especially given, as we have already seen, the frequency with which *kratos* occurs alongside *nikē* and *biē*. To illuminate this, I shall examine the etymologies of the words, revealing the inter-connecting ideas that relate them to each other. I shall then comment on the potential meanings and etymology of *kratos* specifically, noting what we can learn about how it is distinct from *nikē* and *biē*.

Armed with this insight, we shall then examine the occurrences of *kratos* and related words in Hesiod's poems. Doing so will reveal the nature of *kratos* and its place in Zeus' world, as well as the relationship between Zeus and *kratos*, and what it means for Zeus to possess Kratos. Finally, we shall turn to investigate how this new knowledge develops our understanding of the nature of hatred.

Kratos, *Nikē*, and *Biē*

The frequent usage of *kratos* and *biē* in conjunction with *nikē* in the *Theogony* hints at the conceptual connection between them. Indeed, in the case of *kratos* and *nikē*, the LSJ cites *Iliad* I 509 as an example in which *kratos* is used to mean 'victory':

> ἀλλὰ σύ πέρ μιν τεῖσον, Ὀλύμπιε μητίετα Ζεῦ·
> τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι τίθει **κράτος**, ὄφρ' ἂν Ἀχαιοὶ
> υἱὸν ἐμὸν τείσωσιν ὀφέλλωσίν τέ ἑ τιμῇ.
> (I 508-10)

> 'But you can make him pay for this, profound
> mind of Olympus! Lend the Trojans **power**,

[279] I remind the unfamiliar reader of Ancient Greek that *kratos* and *kartos* are the same word.

until the Achaeans recompense my son
and heap new honour upon him!'

Thetis begs Zeus to allow the Trojans to overpower the Achaeans – to be victorious, until they recompense her son, Achilles. Clearly *kratos* can easily be translated as 'power' or 'might' here – as Fitzgerald has done, but this exemplifies the overlap in meaning between the concepts. When Thetis asks Zeus to give might to the Trojans she is not just asking that they fight with more power than they have done previously, but that they fight with more power than their Achaean opponents; she is asking that they temporarily be granted victory in battle until the wrongs against her son are corrected.

This idea is borne out by ancient definitions and etymologies of *kratos*: In the 11th century CE *Etymologicum Gudianum* we find 'νῖκος, ἰσχὺς, κράτος' (*nikos, ischus, kratos*) – that is 'victory, strength, force' – given for the definition of *kartos* (Kappa, p. 301: 34).[280] *Kratos* itself is given as the word from which κρείσσων derives, a comparative adjective meaning 'stronger', 'mightier', thus implying superiority (Kappa, p. 345: 5) – an etymology also found in the slightly earlier (late 9th century CE) *Epimerismi Homerici* (80, a1). *Kratos* is also given as the word from which κρείων (*kreiōn*) – ruler, king – derives (*Et. Gud.* Kappa, p. 345: 5-24). These notions of superiority intrinsically tie in to the idea of victory and leadership. This connection is further enforced by the fact that the verb form of *kratos,* κρατέω, (*krateō*), and the participle formed from it, can not only be used to mean 'to rule', but can also be used to mean the same thing as the verb form of *nikē*: 'to conquer'. We see a clear example of this with a participle form in the words of Klytemnestra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*:

καὶ τῶν ἁλόντων καὶ **κρατησάντων** δίχα
φθογγὰς ἀκούειν ἔστι, συμφορᾶς διπλῆς·
(324-25)

the voices of the vanquished and **those who have conquered**
are heard as separately as their fortunes are distinct.

However, in most instances of the verb form, the two meanings of 'to rule' and 'to

[280] Νῖκος is a late form of νίκη.

conquer' are interchangeable, further enforcing the connection between the two ideas.

To complete the triad, contemporary etymologies of *biē* connect it, too, to victory. Frisk and Chantraine relate *bia*[281] to the Sanskrit *j(i)yā*, which they take to mean 'excessive force' ('*Übergewalt*'), or 'predominance, domination' ('*prédominance*, *domination*') respectively.[282] Manfred Mayrhofer dismisses this connection, arguing a different root for *JYA*; but Mayrhofer also takes *JYA* to mean 'robbery' and Beekes tentatively follows suit.[283] The Sanskrit word which Mayrhofer *does* connect to *bia* is *JAY/jáyati*, from the root *ji-* 'to win, to conquer' deriving both from **gwei-* and again, Beekes follows this.[284] Despite the differences in opinion over the meanings and etymologies of the Sanskrit words, all of these scholars connect *biē* to a word with the meaning of 'to conquer'.

Thus, the various etymologies demonstrate a conceptual overlap between *kratos*, *biē*, and *nikē*, which is strengthened by the shared meaning of 'ruling' in the verb forms. The connection is present too in contemporary etymologies that relate *biē* to the ideas of victory and conquering. We also see the connection between *biē* and *kratos* in terms of 'strength' in ancient etymologies. The earliest etymology for *bia*, is given by Orion (5th century CE), who derives the word from ἴς (*is*), meaning 'strength' or 'force' (Beta, p.33: 6-7), which is itself a word related to the *ischus* given by the *Etymologicum Gudianum*, and repeated by many later ancient etymologists, as a meaning of *kratos*.

The children of Styx represent a tight cluster of interrelated ideas, their qualities blurring together. Although no etymological connection can be made between these three children and Zelos, the conceptual overlap and intrinsic interrelatedness is demonstrated in Hesiod's poems, as we shall see as we investigate *kratos* further.

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[281] *Biē* and *bia* are different dialectical forms of the same word.
[282] Frisk (1960: 235); Chantraine (1999: 175).
[283] Beekes (2010: 213). The differences between what they take as the meaning of the word are caused by the fact that it is not well attested.
[284] Mayrhofer (1986: 573-74); Beekes (2010: 213). Mayrhofer appears to change opinion about the root *JYA* between the 1956 *Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen / A Concise Etymological Dictionary* (Band I) which gives *jyā́* as meaning 'force, violence, power' and relates it to the Greek *biē*, and the 1986 *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen* (Band I) which dismisses a connection between *JYA* and *biē*, and gives the meaning of *JYA* as '*jemanden um etwas bringen, jemanden einer Sache berauben, ausrauben, Gewalt antun*': to deprive someone of something, to rob someone of a thing, to rob, to do violence (1986: 602).

Kratos

We now turn to examine *kratos* by itself. Let us observe some final points about the range of meanings represented by *kratos* before we move on to investigate its usage in the text. As with Zelos, Kratos is another child whose name translators and scholars vary in translating. Solmsen, Lattimore, and Athanassakis give 'Power';[285] Evelyn-White, West, Hine, and Nelson give 'Strength';[286] Frazer gives 'Sovereignty'; and Most gives 'Supremacy'.[287] 'Power' suggests ideas of having the capacity to achieve something, the ability to control people and events, and the idea of hierarchical authority. 'Strength' suggest a physical quality, and 'Sovereignty' suggests rulership.

The ideas of sovereignty and supremacy are also indicated, as we have already seen, in the verb form of *kratos*, *krateō*, and the conceptual link is supported by ancient etymologies. In the *Etymologicum Gudianum* we find *kratos* given as the source from which κράτα (*krata*), meaning 'head', is derived, because the head is the ruling part (ἀπὸ τοῦ κράτος ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τυγχάνοντος [Kappa, P. 343: 12-17]). We also find the same reasoning applied to the etymology of καρδία (*kardia*, 'heart'), which the text also derives from *kratos* based on the same reasoning that the heart is the part of the body that rules (Kappa p. 299: 15). *Kratos* is the metaphorical 'head' of a group, the ruler. The internal sovereignty, whereby *kratos* can mentally be held in, or experienced in, the strongest (the most powerful, the leading) part of the body, (whether that be the head or the heart), mirrors the external sovereignty that the use of *kratos* creates.

The internal, mental element of *kratos* is also seen in the contemporary etymology of the word. Chantraine connects it to the Sanskrit *kratu-*, meaning 'force, intelligence, will', and the Avestan *xratu*, meaning 'intelligence, will'.[288] Beekes gives the same comparison, but notes that it is not an exact correspondence.[289] Frisk notes that others have expressed concern over this association, because of the mental component of

[285] Solmsen (1949: 32); Lattimore (1976: 145); Athanassakis (1983: 46).
[286] Evelyn-White (1914: 107); West (1988: 14); Hine (2005: 67); Nelson (2009: 37).
[287] Frazer (1983: 52); Most (2007a: 35).
[288] Chantraine (1999: 578-79)
[289] Beekes (2010: 773).

xratu, but dismisses this because the same overlap in meaning is present in the Anglo-Saxon *cræft*.[290] Indeed, within the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* we find two *kratos*-related adjectives, κρατερόφρων (*kraterophrōn,* 'strong-willed') and καρτερόθυμον (*kraterothumon*, 'strong-spirited'),[291] which suggests that the connection is a valid one for Hesiod.

Thus, like *zēlos*, *kratos* can be experienced as a mental thing. But *kratos* is not *just* a mental experience; its full range of meaning includes 'to be strong, to be powerful', giving us a physical presentation as well. The ancient etymologies provided by the *Etymologicum Gudianum* enforce a connection with rulership: *kratos* is given as the word from which κρείσσων (*kreissōn*), 'ruler, king', derives, and κρατῶ (*kratō* – a verb form of *kratos*) as the word from which κρείων (*kreiōn*), 'ruler, master', derives (Kappa, p. 345: 5-24). This is further enforced by derivations of *krata* ('head' [Kappa, p. 343: 12-17]) and *kardia* ('heart' [Kappa p. 299: 15]) from *kratos*, which identify *kratos* with the 'leading parts' of the body. Further, as we have already mentioned, the verb form of *kratos* can be used to mean 'conquering', giving us the sense of action, and of something intrinsic to the action. *Kratos* is pervasive throughout the body and psyche, manifests itself in action, and maintains status. This cluster of meanings also reinforces the interrelatedness of the idea of physical strength with rulership and victory.

Kratos* in the *Theogony

We turn now to examine the usage of *kratos* and related words in the works of Hesiod. The frequency of *kratos* makes it the most commonly featured concept personified by a child of Styx. It appears 33 times in the *Theogony*, and once in the *Works and Days*. The figures to whom *kratos* is applied, or who demonstrate *kratos* can be divided into six categories, the first five of which are: Zeus and his allies, Zeus' opponents, the Titanomachy, monstrous figures, and ambiguous figures. The sixth category we will defer discussing until later, in connection with our discussion of *biē*. Despite the division, the groups are interlinked by the fact that some figures

[290] Frisk (1970: 10).
[291] Note that there is no easy way to translate the '*thumos*' of *kraterothumon* or the '*phrēn*' of *krateophrōn* into English. Each can cover a similar range of meanings of 'heart', 'mind', 'soul', 'spirit', etc. For a discussion of the complexity of these terms, see Padel (1994).

appear in more than one category. We must also bear in mind the various different and interlinking meanings of *kratos*, and ascertain its meaning in each occurrence, further developing our understanding of each meaning by its relation to the different groups of figures. This will also further develop our understanding of the relationships between *zēlos*, *nikē*, *kratos*, and *biē*.

The nature of this material is intrinsically complex. My discussion will address each group in turn and examine both the significance of the grouping and its related meanings, and then how that impacts our understanding of the nature of the relationship between *zēlos*, *nikē*, *kratos*, and *biē*, thus evolving our understanding of *kratos* as each new group is discussed and new interlinkings revealed. Having developed the meaning of *kratos* through understanding the complex web of interrelations, we will then be in a position to investigate the relationship between *kratos* and hatred.

The first group we will examine is that of Zeus and his allies. The first instance of the noun *kratos* is in verse 49. It is part of the hymn to the Muses to describe how Zeus is 'greatest [μέγιστος, *megistos*] in power [κάρτεί, *kartei*]' (ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν **κάρτεί** τε **μέγιστος**). Here, once again, the sense of *kratos* as 'power' and 'might' blur closely with the idea of 'rulership': it is being greatest in power – both physical and mental, that grants him victory and makes him a ruler.

It is also used in verse 437 to describe Hekate's criteria for distributing victory:

> ἐσθλὴ δ' αὖθ' ὁπότ' ἄνδρες ἀεθλεύωσ' ἐν ἀγῶνι,
> ἔνθα θεὰ καὶ τοῖς παραγίνεται ἠδ' ὀνίνησιν,
> **νικήσας** δὲ **βίῃ** καὶ **κάρτεϊ** καλὸν ἄεθλον
> ῥεῖα φέρει χαίρων τε, τοκεῦσι δὲ κῦδος ὀπάζει·
> (435-38)

> She is great, too,
> where men contend in athletics,
> and there the goddess stands by those
> whom she will, and assists them.
> When, **conquering** by **force** and **strength**,
> he has won a fine prize,
> he lightly and gladly carries it home,

and brings glory to his parents.[292]

We have already discussed these lines in detail in Chapter Two (p.121) where we argued that Hekate represents the will of Zeus, she grants the victory to whom he wills, and thus the criteria for awarding victory are also *his* criteria. Expressing *kratos* and *biē* presents the qualities necessary for attaining *nikē*, both for the athlete, and for Zeus himself.

Kratos is also used once to describe what Zeus seeks from the battle with the Titans – νίκης καὶ κράτεος – victory and *kratos* (647). And yet, *kratos* is also what he will have used in order to overcome Kronos and win victory in that same battle, as we are earlier told in verse 73:

ὃ δ᾽ οὐρανῷ ἐμβασιλεύει,
αὐτὸς ἔχων βροντὴν ἠδ᾽ αἰθαλόεντα κεραυνόν,
κάρτει νικήσας πατέρα Κρόνον·
(71-73)

to him
who is king in heaven,
who holds in his own hands the thunder
and the flamy lightning,
who conquered by **strength**
his father Kronos…[293]

Zeus prevails over his father with *kratos*. A demonstration of superiority must be displayed in order to gain rulership, and it is a requisite component of a stable rulership.

Verse 73 also underlines a very physical nature to this *kratos*. He reigns in heaven, having conquered his father by the use of *kratos*, in the battle. The nature of that *kratos* is made textually explicit: Zeus reigns, still holding the weapons he was given by the Cyclopes and which he used to defeat his father – the lightning and the burning thunderbolt are his *kratos*, a physical force of nature. This is a force, a power, a sovereignty, that is physical as well as intellectual, and backed by the silent threat of

[292] Adapted from Lattimore (who does not transpose any verses).
[293] Adapted from Lattimore in order to make clear the equivalence between the Greek and the English.

violence, just as Bie stands silent in the *Prometheus Bound* whilst Kratos orders Hephaistos on, demanding the physical and forceful binding of Prometheus (1-87). This *kratos*, manifest in the burning thunderbolt is, as was the case with *zēlos*, associated with heat: *kratos* is, as Lattimore has delightfully translated it, the 'flamy' (αἰθαλόεντα, *aithaloenta* [72]) lightning.

This association with heat seen here, combined with two adjective forms mentioned previously, *krateropḥrōn* ('strong-willed') and *kraterothumon*, ('strong-spirited'), connects the experience of *kratos* to a mental and bodily experience. It impacts the seats of mental activity located in the body. It is not just the physical strength one might display, but also something that is felt strongly within the body, as extreme sensations, just as burning hot *zēlos* is. As with *zēlos* this suggests the disruptive power of *kratos*, not just to the body, but also to the established order. Zeus needs *kratos* to disrupt the rule of his father, and to construct his own universe, but others possessing *kratos* present a threat to Zeus' rule and the ordering of his universe. But, just as with *zēlos*, *kratos* is not only destructive, but also constructive.

This simultaneously constructive and disruptive element highlights the ambiguous nature of *kratos* already indicated by the adjective *arideiketa* ('conspicuous'), as we discussed at the beginning of Chapter Two (p. 80).

The sense of 'rulership' apparent in verse 647, when Zeus explains what he seeks from the battle with the Titans, is the same sense in which *kratos* appears in verse 662, when the Hekatoncheires make explicit what it is they will help Zeus obtain in the battle against the Titans:

> "τῷ καὶ νῦν ἀτενεῖ τε νόῳ καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλῇ
> ῥυσόμεθα **κράτος ὑμὸν** ἐν αἰνῇ δηιοτῆτι,
> μαρνάμενοι Τιτῆσιν ἀνὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας."
> (661-63)

> "Therefore now, with stubborn spirit
> and resolute purpose
> we shall be defenders of **your power**
> in the grim encounter
> and fight against the Titans
> in the strong shock of battle."

By joining his side the Hekatoncheires agree that they will help Zeus attain the leadership, and will respect his position because he has freed them from their bonds. Note that this is different from Styx and others, who are chasing the reward of honours. The Hekatoncheires act not on expectation, but out of gratitude. They acknowledge Zeus as the **defender** of the deathless ones from chill ruin: **ἀλκτὴρ** δ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἀρῆς γένεο κρυεροῖο (657). In return, they will now protect (ῥυσόμεθα, *rusometha* [662]) his *kratos* against the Titans, just as they will continue to do so after the Titanomachy, when they take their positions as guardians at the gate of Tartaros, and become his φύλακες πιστοὶ, *phulakes pistoi* - his 'trustworthy guards' (734-35). This is *kratos* as the power of a position of authority, obtained and maintained.

Thus far all these instances of *kratos* have been in its noun form. There is one final instance of the noun, which is, of course, in verse 385 where it is Kratos himself. Kratos is immediately designated as both an ally of Zeus, and, along with his siblings, Zeus' permanent attendant. Here, *kratos* contains all its potential meanings. It is the leading part, the ruler; the highest position – enviable. It is, like *nikē*, both the ability to conquer, the victory itself, and the maintenance of that victory. It is, like *biē*, a method of gaining a position of power, and also (as we shall see with *biē* shortly), a method of *maintaining* that power.

The word also appears in verb form once, where it is applied to Zeus and his reign: αὐτὸς δὲ μέγα **κρατεῖ** ἠδὲ ἀνάσσει ('mightily he himself *kratei* and [ἀνάσσει, *anassei*] holds sway [403]).[294] Here *kratei* can be understood either as 'conquers', demonstrating his ability to maintain his sway; or as 'rules', mirroring *anassei* and thus emphasising the strength of his rule.

Each of the above occurrences reinforces the connections between *nikē* and *kratos*, and between victory, rulership, strength, superiority, and conquering. It is worth noting that this group contains all of the instances of *kratos* as a noun, as well as the sole instance of it as a verb: only Zeus and his allies so explicitly have power, and only Zeus so explicitly demonstrates its usage. His is the mightiest victory, the

[294] My translation.

mightiest reign.

The final instances of *kratos* in the category of Zeus and his allies are when the adjective κρατερός (*krateros*) is twice applied to the Hekatoncheires: first when they are first mentioned at their birth (153), and then in the battle line-up for the Titanomachy, after they have just agreed to lend Zeus their strength:

> Ὣς φάτ᾽· ἐπήνησαν δὲ θεοί, δωτῆρες ἐάων
> μῦθον ἀκούσαντες· πολέμου δ᾽ ἐλιλαίετο θυμὸς [665]
> μᾶλλον ἔτ᾽ ἢ τὸ πάροιθε· μάχην δ᾽ ἀμέγαρτον ἔγειραν
> πάντες θήλειαι τε καὶ ἄρσενες ἤματι κείνῳ
> [Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ καὶ ὅσοι Κρόνου ἐξεγένοντο]
> οὕς τε Ζεὺς Ἐρέβευσφι ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἦκε φόωσδε,
> δεινοί τε **κρατεροί** τε, **βίην** ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες. [670]
> (664-70)

> So he spoke, and the gods,
> the givers of blessings, assented
> and they heard what he said,
> and the spirit in them was insistent on battle
> more even than it had been,
> and they launched an unwelcome onset,
> all, the female and the male gods alike.
> on that day,
> and the Titan gods, and those
> of the generation of Kronos,
> and those whom Zeus had upraised
> from under the earth and Erebos
> back to the light, fierce gods and **mighty**,
> with **strength** overmastering.

Ouranos and Kronos imprisoned the Hekatoncheires because they are *krateroi*. Here they are free, opposing Ouranos and Kronos just as they feared they would. No longer constrained, the *kratos* of the Hekatoncheires is now enhanced by their *biē*. Here too, *kratos* is closely connected to victory and rulership through superior strength. But it is not the victory or rulership of the Hekatoncheires. Instead, they agree to defend Zeus' *kratos*. This is something far greater that simply agreeing to help him win: the Hekatoncheires extend their period of support beyond the end of the Titanomachy. The *kratos* and *biē* of the Hekatoncheires are perpetually in the service of Zeus, and are put to use by giving them the role of monitoring the imprisoned Titans as his 'trustworthy guards' (75). This also explains why the Hekatoncheires do not pose a

threat to Zeus as they did to Ouranos and Kronos: the Hekatoncheires use their *kratos* and *biē* to support Zeus, rather than oppose him. Rather than being a new and separate threat to Zeus, Zeus' freeing of the Hekatoncheires results in him obtaining their *kratos* and *biē* for himself – just as he does with Styx.

The Opponents of Zeus

We now turn to the second category of figures associated with *kratos*: the opponents of Zeus. Given that *kratos* can have a sense of 'rulership' it is unsurprising that *kratos* is applied to this group far more infrequently than it is to Zeus and his allies. There are only two instances of *kratos* directly being applied to an opponent of Zeus, and one further instance when it is metaphorically applied to an opponent. The first is when the adjective *krateros* is used of Kronos himself (465), although it is very notable here that it is in the context of describing Kronos' defeat at the hands of Zeus:

> πεύθετο γὰρ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
> οὕνεκά οἱ πέπρωτο ἐῷ ὑπὸ παιδὶ δαμῆναι
> καὶ **κρατερῷ** περ ἐόντι, Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς.
> (463-65)
>
> For he had heard, from Gaia
> and from starry Ouranos,
> that it had been ordained for him,
> to be beaten by his son,
> despite his **strength**,
> through the designs of great Zeus.[295]

This mention of Kronos' *kratos* is specifically in the context of its inferiority to Zeus': *although* Kronos is *krateros*, he will be defeated. This sense of Kronos' inferior *kratos* is compounded by the word being textually sandwiched between Gaia and Ouranos telling him that he will be defeated by his son, and the more specific fact that his defeat will come about through the design (βουλάς, *boulas*) of Zeus: Kronos is destined to be overcome (δαμῆναι, *damēnai*) by his child and, despite his strength (κρατερῷ, *kraterōi*), Zeus' *boulai* will be greater than his *kratos*. Kronos' *kratos* is not enough to secure him Kratos. This idea is compounded when, a few lines later, Gaia and Ouranos relate to Rhea what they have just told Kronos; they tell her everything that is destined for Kronos and his υἱέι καρτεροθύμῳ (*huiei karterothumō*)

[295] Adapted from Lattimore, who does not preserve the word order.

– his 'strong-willed son' (476): it is Zeus' *kratos* which is mentioned here, not Kronos'.

If we remember the contemporary etymologies which link *kratos* to the Sanskrit *kratu-*, ('force, intelligence, will'), and the Avestan *xratu*, ('intelligence, will'),[296] then it is worth noting that *boulai*, as well as meaning 'designs' can also mean simply, 'will, determination'. The contest of *kratos* between Zeus and Kronos is not just one of physical strength, but of mental determination – of the strength of their wills. Once again, we are presented with the idea of *kratos* as permeating both body and psyche.

The second usage of *krateros* in relation to one of Zeus' opponents is in verse 824, where Typhoeus is described as *kraterou theou* – 'mighty god'. This occurs at the beginning of a detailed physical description of the god (823-35), after which Zeus immediately begins to fight him, having perceived the threat he represents. Typhoeus reignites the contest of *kratos*: whose is greater? The answer is Zeus – he who now possesses Kratos himself. Indeed, *krateros,* in a superlative form, appears again in this description of the battle, as part of a series of metaphors describing Typhoeus' defeat:

> Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὖν κόρθυνεν ἑὸν μένος, εἵλετο δ᾽ ὅπλα,
> βροντήν τε στεροπήν τε καὶ αἰθαλόεντα κεραυνόν,
> πλῆξεν ἀπ᾽ Οὐλύμποιο ἐπάλμενος· ἀμφὶ δὲ πάσας [855]
> **ἔπρεσε** θεσπεσίας κεφαλὰς δεινοῖο πελώρου.
> αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δή μιν δάμασε πληγῇσιν ἰμάσσας,
> ἤριπε γυιωθείς, στενάχιζε δὲ γαῖα πελώρη.
> **φλὸξ** δὲ κεραυνωθέντος ἀπέσσυτο τοῖο ἄνακτος
> οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσιν ἀιδνῇς παιπαλοέσσῃς [860]
> πληγέντος· πολλὴ δὲ πελώρη **καίετο** γαῖα
> ἀτμῇ θεσπεσίῃ καὶ **ἐτήκετο** κασσίτερος ὡς
> τέχνῃ ὕπ᾽ αἰζηῶν ὑπό τ᾽ εὐτρήτου χοάνοιο
> **θαλφθείς**, ἠὲ σίδηρος, ὅ περ **κρατερώτατός** ἐστιν,
> οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσι δαμαζόμενος **πυρὶ κηλέῳ** [865]
> **τήκεται** ἐν χθονὶ δίῃ ὑφ᾽ Ἡφαίστου παλάμῃσιν·
> ὣς ἄρα **τήκετο** γαῖα σέλαι **πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο.**
>
> (853-67)

> But now, when Zeus had headed up
> his own strength, seizing
> his weapons, thunder, lightning,

[296] Chantraine (1999: 578-79).

and the glowering thunderbolt,
he made a leap from Olympos, and struck,
burning up
all those wonderful heads set about
on the dreaded monster.
Then, when Zeus had overpowered him
with his strokes, Typhoeus
crashed, crippled, and the gigantic earth
groaned beneath him,
and the **flame** from the great lord
so thunder-smitten ran out
along the darkening and steep forests
of the mountains
as he was struck, and a great part
of the gigantic earth was **burned**
by the awful steam,
and **melted**, just as tin,
worked by craftsmen in
the carefully grooved crucible,
is **softened by heat**, or as iron,
though that is the **strongest** of all,
is subdued by the **burning fire**
in the mountain forests
and **melts** under the handicraft
of Hephaistos inside the divine earth.
So earth **melted** in the flash
of the **blazing fire**…[297]

Zeus strikes, burning (ἔπρεσε, *eprese* [856]), Typhoeus' heads; he has overpowered (δάμασεν, *damasen* [857]) him, sending him 'thunder-stricken' (κεραυνωθέντος, *keraunōthentos* [859]), to the earth that had originally spawned him. This display of Zeus' *kratos*, in the form of his lightning bolt, sets fire to Typhoeus' heads, causes flames to shoot from them, which then scorch the earth and melt it when he lands – just as iron, 'mightiest' (κρατερώτατος, *kraterōtatos* [864]) of all things, is melted (τήκεται, *tēketai* [867]) by the divine fire of Hephaistos. Zeus' *kratos*, represented by the lightning-caused fire, is what allows him to defeat Typhoeus.

Some scholars have taken the whole Typhoeus episode, verses 820-80, to be a later interpolation. West provides a succinct summary of the arguments for and against its authenticity, and neatly answers the objections of those who argue to reject it.[298] One

[297] Adapted from Lattimore to more accurately reflect the range of words Hesiod uses to emphasise the fire and heat, and to better maintain the word order of the Greek.
[298] West (1968: 379-82).

of the arguments against it is that it simply repeats what we have already seen in the Titanomachy and adds nothing.[299] But this is not the case. Zeus' weapons are the fires of his lightning bolt. Zeus' control of fire is an advantage that the Titans lack. But unlike the Titans, Typhoeus also has his own fire:

ἐκ δέ οἱ ὄσσων
θεσπεσίῃς κεφαλῇσιν ὑπ᾽ ὀφρύσι **πῦρ** ἀμάρυσσεν·
πασέων δ᾽ ἐκ κεφαλέων **πῦρ καίετο** δερκομένοιο·
(826-28)

and from the eyes on
the inhuman heads **fire** glittered
from under the eyelids:
from all his heads **fire flared**
from his eyes' glancing

Typhoeus' destructive fire is seen in his eyes. Recall the violent dangers of the evil eye, and the hate-filled look of Zelos, and the close association between envy and victory. I have already suggested that Typhoeus' attack was the inevitable consequence of Zeus' victory over the Titans. Zeus has made himself a target of envy, and now Typhoeus has risen against him, with his destructive, envious, and burning gaze. His fiery eyes are not just where his envy is seen, but also where his *kratos* and *biē* emanate. His gaze is as destructive as the 'hateful look' of *stugerōpēs* Zelos. The Titanomachy was about Zeus gaining power and victory, the Typhonomachy is about proving that he is deserving of maintaining it.

But Typhoeus' *kratos* and *biē* – his own use of fire – is not enough. Instead, it simply highlights the significance of his defeat:

καῦμα δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων κάτεχεν ἰοειδέα πόντον
βροντῆς τε **στεροπῆς** τε, **πυρός** τ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῖο πελώρου,
πρηστήρων ἀνέμων τε **κεραυνοῦ** τε **φλεγέθοντος**.
ἔζεε δὲ χθὼν πᾶσα καὶ οὐρανὸς ἠδὲ θάλασσα:
θυῖε δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀμφ᾽ ἀκτὰς περί τ᾽ ἀμφί τε κύματα μακρὰ
ῥιπῇ ὕπ᾽ ἀθανάτων…
(844-49)

and the burning heat from both of them
was on the dark-faced sea,
from the **thunder and lightning** of Zeus

[299] E.g. Hamilton (1989: 23).

and from the **flames** of the monster,
from his **blazing bolts** and from
his hurricane winds,
and all the ground and the sky
and the sea boiled, and towering
waves were tossing and beating all up
and down the promontories
in the wind of these immortals [300]

Burning heat (καῦμα*, kauma*) takes hold of the sea, caused by Zeus' thunder (βροντῆς, *brontēs*) and his flashing lightning (στεροπῆς, *steropēs*), the fire (πυρός, *puros*) from Typhoeus' eyes and from Zeus' scorching (φλεγέθοντος, *phlegethontos*) thunderbolt (κεραυνοῦ*, keraunou*). Typhoeus' fire is textually encapsulated within Zeus' thunder and lightning, just as Kronos' *kratos* was textually encapsulated with the details of his defeat. Here again, Zeus' all-encompassing superiority, the *kratos* and *biē* he wields through the fiery, Cyclopes-forged weapons, is displayed.

Thus, despite applying to the opponents of Zeus, these instances notably occur in the context of Zeus conquering them. Kratos is not just connected with victory, but specifically with Zeus' victory.

The Titanomachy

The adjective *krateros* is used three times to modify ὑσμίνη (*husminē*, battle), where the battle in question is the Titanomachy (631, 663, 712) and once to describe the physical strength with which the rocks in the battle are hurled by each side (683). The conflict is the physical manifestation of the rivalry between the two sides, of the *zēlos* that results in displays of *kratos* which in turn leads to *nikē*, in order to obtain and deprive others of *zēlos*, *nikē*, *kratos*, *and biē*.

Only two verses above 712, verse 710 is used to describe the κάρτος ἔργων, *kartos ergōn*, 'power of the deeds' shown by both sides in the Titanomachy:

[300] Adapted from Lattimore to clarify quantity and location of fire-related words in the passage.

ὄτοβος δ᾽ ἄπλητος ὀρώρει
σμερδαλέης ἔριδος, **κάρτος** δ᾽ ἀνεφαίνετο ἔργων,
ἐκλίνθη δὲ μάχη·

(709-11)

and a horrible tumult
of grisly battle uprose
and both sides showed **power** in the fighting.
Then the battle turned…

The Titanomachy is a contest of *kratos* in order to determine who is worthy of possessing Kratos. *Kratos* must be displayed in order to be fully obtained; the battle must be one of *kratos* to allow Zeus to demonstrate his mastery.

Kratos, just as with *zēlos* and *nikē*, represents both overcoming, and having overcome. It is necessary in order to win the struggle for superiority, and it also represents being in that position of superiority. It is about gaining superiority (73, 710), and about keeping it (647).

The Monstrous Ones

One of the categories associated with *kratos* comprises figures who are nearly all 'monstrous'. This also includes the Hekatoncheires (153, 670). They do, after all, each have one hundred hands and fifty heads. This monstrous group is the most populous category in terms of *kratos*.

Krateros is used of Kerberos (312), Chimaira (320), and specifically Chimaira's dragon head (322). The adjective κρατερόφρων (*kraterophrōn*, 'strong-willed') is used to describe 'monstrous' figures: it is used of Echidna (297); and of her children, Orthos, the hound of Geryones; Kerberos; and the Lernaean Hydra (308).[301] It is also used of Atlas (509). I shall delay the discussion of Atlas until Chapter Four, where I will present a fuller discussion of the fate of all four of the sons of Iapetos.

[301] The grammar of verse 319 leaves it uncertain who exactly Chimaira's mother is, and there is no scholarly consensus on the issue. See Clay (2009: 159-161) for an interpretation of this as a feature, rather than a flaw, mirroring the disordered nature of the monsters themselves. For our purposes, the issue of Chimaira's parentage is not essential.

In this group we also find the sole instance of a *kratos*-related word appearing in the *Works and Days* (147): the violent men of the bronze age, who love violence and Ares, and have **κρατερόφρονα** θυμόν, ***krateropfrona*** *thumon*, strong-willed spirit. The monstrosity of these men is indicated by the similarity between the description of them, and that of the Hekatoncheires:

> Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
> χάλκειον ποίησ᾽, οὐκ ἀργυρέῳ οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον,
> ἐκ μελιᾶν, δεινόν τε καὶ ὄβριμον· οἷσιν Ἄρηος [145]
> ἔργ᾽ ἔμελεν στονόεντα καὶ ὕβριες: οὐδέ τι σῖτον
> ἤσθιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδάμαντος ἔχον **κρατερόφρονα** θυμόν.
> [**ἄπλαστοι**· μεγάλη δὲ βίη καὶ χεῖρες ἄαπτοι
> ἐξ ὤμων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσι.]
> (143-49)

> then Zeus the father created the third generation
> of mortals,
> the age of bronze. They were not like
> the generation of silver.
> They came from ash spears. They were terrible
> and strong, and the ghastly
> action of Ares was theirs, and violence.
> They ate no bread,
> but maintained a **strong-willed** and adamantine spirit.
> **None could come near them**; their strength was big,
> and from their shoulders
> the arms grew irresistible on their ponderous bodies.[302]

The description of the bronze men in verses 149 above mirrors both verse 152 and 671, which both form parts of the descriptions of the Hekatoncheires: ἐξ ὤμων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσιν (and from their shoulders // the arms grew irresistible [152; 671]).

Further similarities in the description reinforce the connection. The Hekatoncheires are ἄπλαστοι, *aplastoi* – 'unapproachable' (*Th.* 152). Here Lattimore translates it as 'none could come near them'. In *Works and Days* 148 it is used of the bronze men, where Lattimore translates it as 'irresistible'. Hofinger renders the word as '*inabordable*, *terrible*' ('inaccessible', 'terrible'), noting that this is the meaning given

[302] Adapted from Lattimore. I have changed his translation of *krateropfrona* in verse 147 to 'strong-willed' so that the reader relying on the translation can see clearly where the word falls in the English, since this is how I have translated it throughout.

by scholia on *Th*. 151, and *W&D* 148.[303] They are also all described using μέγας (*megas*, mighty). The Hekatoncheires are μεγάλῳ εἴδει, 'with mighty form' (*Th.* 153), and the bronze men have μεγάλη βίη – 'mighty *biē*'.

The association of *kratos* with this monstrous group reminds us of the danger of *kratos*. They are dangerous figures, and many are figures encountered, and killed (Geryones, Orthos, Lernaean Hydra) or defeated (Kerberos) by Herakles as part of his labours. The fact that they are nearly all figures defeated by Herakles tells us the precise nature of the threat they represent to Zeus: they have the potential to disrupt his ordering of the world of man, and thus Herakles, as the representative of Zeus in the world of man, must subdue them and maintain the order.

Orthos, Kerberos, and the Hydra are the children of Echidna by Typhoeus. Strauss Clay notes that 'their children embody features of both parents and share their epithets'. This includes being *krateros* and *kraterophrōn*, but Echidna and Kerberos are both also 'impossible' (ἀμήχανος, *amēchanos* [295, 310]), and also both eaters of raw flesh (ὠμηστής, *ōmēstēs* [300, 311]). The 'baneful minded' (λυγρὰ ἰδυῖαν, *lugra iduian*) Hydra resembles her 'baneful' (λυγρή, *lugrē*) mother Echidna.[304] Echidna's association with *kratos* is unsurprising given who her children and partner are. But just as Zeus defeats the child of Gaia and Tartaros, Herakles defeats the children of Echidna and Typhoeus. The defeating of Typhoeus' offspring by the offspring of Zeus mirrors Zeus' defeat of Typhoeus.

The mention of *krateros* in relation to Chimaira (320) and her dragon head (322) is directly before we are told she is defeated by Pegasos and another hero – Bellerophon. Earlier in the poem we have been told that Pegasos is the lightning-bearer of Zeus. He dwells with Zeus after leaving the earth – the mother of flocks – to reside in Zeus' halls, just as the children of Styx do (284-6). The mention of his presence at the defeat of Chimaira marks Bellerophon as an agent of Zeus' will, and a representative of Zeus' *kratos*.

The adjective *krateros* is also used of the race of Giants in verse 50. It is difficult to

[303] Hofinger (1975-78: 67). Cunliffe does not know the word.
[304] Clay (2009: 156).

know what to make of the presence of the Giants here, let alone why this adjective should be applied to them. They are only mentioned here, and in verse 185. They are, like the Erinyes, born from the spilling of Ouranos' blood onto Gaia. We do not know of any progeny or what deeds they might have committed, but we are told by Hesiod that they are born wearing gleaming armour and holding spears (185-6). Note that this is the same passage in which their sisters, the Erinyes, are described with the same adjective.

Neither Hesiod nor Homer make mention of the Gigantomachy, but Homer mentions the Giants in the *Odyssey*, where they are described as ὑπέρθυμοι (*huperthumoi*), 'overweening', and immediately destroyed, along with their ruler, Eurymedon (VII. 58-60). Later they are also compared to the Cyclopes, as king Alkinoos explains to Odysseus that his people, like the Cyclopes and the ἄγριοι (*agrioi,* 'wild, savage') Giants, are closely related to the gods. Finally, the Laistrygonians, who eat one of Odysseus' men and who hurl boulders at the ships from the cliffs of their island are compared to the Giants (X. 114-21). From these fragments of evidence we can reasonably suppose that Hesiod meant us to understand that they would in the future pose some sort of threat, but beyond this we cannot say anything.

What of the Hekatoncheires? Their similarity to other monstrous figures underlines the danger that their *kratos* could represent. The Hekatoncheires present a *kratos* that is both dangerous and useful to Zeus, and their *kratos* is useful to Zeus precisely because it is dangerous. What sets them apart is their willingness to wield their *kratos* in the service of Zeus, rather than themselves. It is this allegiance that spares them the fate of so many of the other *krateros* monsters.

As for the race of bronze described in the *Works and Days*, their *kratos* is dangerous not to Zeus, but to themselves. Unlike the race of silver, whom Zeus destroys, the race of bronze destroy themselves through their fighting (152-4):

> καὶ τοὶ μὲν χείρεσσιν ὕπο σφετέρῃσι δαμέντες
> βῆσαν ἐς εὐρώεντα δόμον κρυεροῦ Αίδαο,
> νώνυμνοι·
>
> Yet even these, destroyed beneath the hands

of each other,
went down into the mouldering domain of cold Hades;
nameless…

We shall have more to say about the race of bronze and the danger it represents when we turn to examine *biē*. For now, it is enough to note that they are monstrous, and represent a dangerous form of *kratos*.

The Ambiguous Category

We have already discussed the adjective καρτερόθυμος (*karterothumos*, 'strong-spirited'), in relation to Zeus and his destiny to defeat his father, but it is also used of Eris (225) and the winds Zephyrus, Boreas, and Notos (378), sons of Eos (Dawn), who are specifically hailed as good in verses 869-71. The race of Giants (50) and the Erinyes (185) are also both described with the adjective *krateros*.

This is a mixed bag of figures – Eris is ambiguous, though widely considered negative, the winds are positive aspects of Zeus' ordered universe, the Erinyes are dark creatures of vengeance, and the Giants are never mentioned again. The winds must have some degree of *kratos* because they must compete with the unruly winds that issue from Typhoeus (869-80), and despite their grim appearance, both Eris and the Erinyes are associated with Horkos – the oath that helps govern humans. Their *kratos* represents the authority of the oath in the human realm, just as Herakles' represents Zeus' *kratos* in the defeat of monsters. Further, Eris' essential role in the *Works and Days* indicates her prominent role governing the lives of men.

The frequent use of *kratos* emphasises its pervasiveness in Zeus' universe. This further underlines its potential danger as seen also in the monstrous group. But we also see *kratos* as something crucial. It is something that Zeus' enemies must possess in order for him to be able to demonstrate his own *kratos*. The fact that the winds, Eris, and the Erinyes are *karterothumoi* indicates that it is *essential* to that universe: as both mental and physical properties, and as a governing principle. The *kratos* of the winds, who are positioned in opposition to Typhoeus, mirrors the *kratos* of Zeus' own physical weapons and physical manifestations of power in his lightning and the fire it causes.

Let us remind ourselves what we have discovered thus far. We have seen the conceptual overlap between *nikē*, *kratos*, and *biē* indicated by their etymologies present also in Hesiod's poems. We have seen *kratos* represented as a bodily and mental force, as the act of conquering, as the act of ruling and the position of supremacy. And we have therefore also seen what it means for Zeus to be related to *kratos*. Kratos both sustains and threatens his ordered universe. It is a force which must be possessed, but the existence of which presents a threat. Once again, a quality associated with Styx is a force that Zeus must manage carefully, and it is because Zeus has earned the allegiance of Styx and her children that he alone has the ultimate *kratos*. Let us turn now to consider in more detail the nature of the relationship between Styx, hatred, and *kratos*.

Hatred and *Kratos*

We have already discussed the relationship between 'victory' (*nikē*) and hatred. The same points hold true when it is *kratos* being used to mean 'conquering': hatred is essential to conquering (hence Zeus' possession of both Nike and Kratos) as indicated by the fact that he requires Styx as an ally to procure them both. Hatred is also essential to the procurement of rulership, of *kratos*. Further, being conquered, and thus being placed in a position of inferiority, provokes *zēlos*, and hatred is a strong (*kratos*) incentive to the victory *zēlos* seeks. Hatred provides both a mental fortitude and the physical strength necessary to obtain *kratos*.

The idea that the conquered hate the conqueror must be investigated further. It raises a problem for the situation in which *kratos* means 'ruler'. The conquered hate the ruler because the ruler has deprived them of something, and because the ruler now possesses something they both want for themselves, and want to deprive the ruler of: the conquered hate the ruler because of their *zēlos* of his *kratos* – of his will, of his strength, and thus of his rulership. Such a situation leads to conflict, and the possibility of Zeus' universe being overturned. Zeus must thus develop a way to control these forces; *kratos* is essential to this. It is Zeus' ability, as ruler, the possessor of *kratos*, to regulate Styx, to control hate, which allows him to shift hatred towards him elsewhere. When Zeus makes Styx the oath of the gods he transposes

that hatred for the ruler onto hatred for the perjurer. Zeus swears to be just, and as long as he is, as long as he does not perjure himself, he will not be the target of the hatred of his subordinates. In making an oath to grant other gods their due honours, Zeus relegates their hatred to the situation in which he breaks his oath.

In turn, this reveals more of the nature of the relationship of Styx to Zeus – specifically in this case to his *dikē*, his justice. Giving others their due honours is part of the *dikē,* the justice, of Zeus' universe. Zeus' justice has a fundamental role in controlling hatred – and hatred has a fundamental role in controlling his justice. His position as ruler is guaranteed through successfully controlling who will be the target of hatred. The rainbow Iris' trip to fetch the oath of the gods is Zeus' promise that the conditions of the old world will not occur again. He will never be the figure they hate. Controlling hatred is requisite to the ruler, and Zeus' justice has been designed to achieve this. Zeus' creation and enaction of justice is a Machiavellian decision designed to keep him in power. Zeus cares about *dikē* because of its necessity in containing the forces of Hate and her children.

Bie

We turn now to the final child of Styx: Bie. There is much to be said about *biē* in Hesiod's poems, which is unsurprising, perhaps, given that Bie is the last child in the list of Styx's children – the same space Styx herself occupies in the list of Okeanos' daughters, and which indicates her importance. Once again we shall begin our investigation by examining the potential meanings of the word, and the different qualities associated with it. This will reveal a morally ambiguous figure, as we have seen thus far with Styx and her other children.

Whilst the nature of *biē* in Hesiod as a morally 'bad' thing (or of being unjust, or having morally 'bad' motivations, or dysfunctional and destructive consequences) will be clear, the argument for it being morally 'good' and functional, and thus overall representing an ambiguous quality, requires more explanation. Having examined the potential of *biē* to be just, or useful, I shall then turn to examine whether the *Theogony*'s depiction of violence contains elements where it functions as such a morally 'positive' tool.

Having established that violence can indeed be a morally good/functional tool, we will then examine the precise nature of the morality in which *biē* operates. The contemporary models of Alan Fiske and Tage Rai will be useful here in illuminating the morally good uses of violence in maintaining a social group, and thus its importance to the maintenance of Zeus' universe.

I will then turn to discuss the *Works and Days*, which contains a much-discussed passage on the nature and morality of violence, to investigate the implications this passage, and the *Works and Days* as a whole, may have for our understanding of violence, and whether this impacts how we interpret *biē* in the *Theogony*. After establishing the exact nature of *biē* as revealed through the fable, we will then be able to examine the rest of the poem to see what else it can tell us about *biē*.

A final feature of *biē* we must understand is its relationship to necessity. This discussion will be the final comment on *biē* in this chapter. Its relationship to hatred will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Meaning of *Biē*

We have already mentioned the etymologies of *bia* in relation to the overlap in meaning with *kratos*, but let us briefly remind ourselves of the details: Orion's 5th century CE etymology for *bia* is the oldest we possess, and he derives the word from ἴς (*is*), meaning 'strength' or 'force' (Beta, p. 33: 6-7). This is the only etymology we find in the ancient sources. Contemporary etymologies of *biē* connect it to victory, conquering, and excessive force.

Cunliffe's Homeric lexicon lists seven different meanings for *biē*; the first three connect it to idea of strength and power, and the action of using them. The fourth connects it to 'courage, spirit', the fifth to the idea of a person's 'might'. The sixth connects it to 'wrongful exercise of strength or power, violence', and 'violent manifestations of force'. The final meaning relates it to 'might, power, authority,

influence.'[305] Hofinger's Hesiodic lexicon gives '*force, vigueur, usage de la force; violence, usage illégitime de la force*' ('force, strength, use of force; violence, illegitimate use of force).[306] Similarly, for the verb form of *biē*, βιάζω (*biazō*), Cunliffe gives 'To bring one's might to bear upon, bear hard upon, press', and 'use violence against'.[307] Hofinger gives '*user de violence*' – 'the use of violence'.[308] The same ideas of 'force' and (improper) 'violence' also run throughout their entries for adjectival and adverbial forms of *biē*. Hofinger, then, seems to have found the connection between 'force' and 'violence' in Hesiod's poems obvious. So too, with the idea of violence (and *biē*) as an immoral, unjust, or dysfunctional thing – it is an illegitimate use of violence. Equally, Cunliffe connects it to positive ideas such as courage and authority. Even within these definitions, we see the presence of a moral ambiguity in *biē*.

When it comes to translations of Bie's name, nearly all of the translators we have examined agree on 'Force';[309] the exceptions are Frazer, who gives 'power',[310] and Solmsen and West, who give 'Strength'.[311] Throughout the whole of the *Theogony*, only one translator – Lattimore – ever translates *biē* as 'violence'. But although the word is most frequently translated as 'force', the association of violence clearly lurks behind it, as we shall see below. The translational decision by so many to avoid translating *biē* as 'violence' is indicative of the scholarly concerns with reconciling Zeus as a morally positive figure with his use of *biē* to maintain his rule.

Biē as 'force' is still the physical 'force' used to overpower someone. Bie is thus the hardest to account for among those scholars who read Hesiod as unambiguously praising Zeus and attributing to him a positive morality, whilst simultaneously attributing a negative morality to the violence represented by *biē*. Indeed, Zeus' universe, on their reading, is dependent on him behaving justly (i.e. non-violently) and honouring the other gods. Zeus must be lawful good, not lawful evil, and thus

[305] Cunliffe (2012: 70-71).
[306] Hofinger (1975-78: 111).
[307] Cunliffe (2012: 70).
[308] Hofinger (1975-8: 110).
[309] Evelyn-White (1914: 107); Lattimore (1976: 145); Athanassakis (1983: 46); Hine (2005: 67); Most (2007a: 35).
[310] Frazer (1986: 52).
[311] Solmsen (1949: 32); West (1988: 14). The translations of Frazer, Solmsen, and West match how others have translated *kratos*, highlighting the semantic overlap of the words.

interpretations have focused on presenting *biē* as morally acceptable because it is not violence, or because it can only be used in specific circumstances. However, there is no justifiable reason to assume that the positive morality represented by Zeus' justice is identical to that of contemporary, Western, justice (indeed, it is very obviously not the same). Nor is there a reason to assume that *biē* must be either wholly good, or wholly bad. We must eschew these assumptions and instead first examine what the poems tell us about the morality of *biē*. Then we can turn to examine its relationship to justice. This knowledge will be crucial to fully understanding the nature of hatred.

The Functionality/Morality of Violence

Discussing Zeus' rulership style, Christopher Ulf comments that Zeus 'forgoes the violence upon which Uranus and Cronus had relied', and 'in contrast to the older gods, *he refrains from violence so long as he is not forced to use it*' (my emphasis).[312] The modern reader may be uncomfortable with this apology – it is, after all, the defence of tyrants and abusers, and it reminds us that violence is still considered justifiable, given the right circumstances, even in contemporary Western societies. But it is also a questionable defence when placed next to what the *Theogony* itself presents us with, as is the claim that Zeus forgoes the violence of his father and grandfather. Kronos castrates his father in order to free himself and some of his siblings (leaving the Cyclopes and the Hekatoncheires entombed). He then begins his reign and swallows his own children in order to stop them overthrowing him. Similarly, Zeus, with the help of Rhea, somehow forces Kronos to vomit up the offspring he has swallowed, through both *biē* and τέχνη (*technē*, 'craft, art') – i.e. through his craft and his violence. He then leads his siblings in a ten-year war so terrible in its final moments that it shakes heaven and Mount Olympos to its foundations, and even reaches down to Tartaros (678-83). After this he engages in violent struggle again with Typhoeus, and also binds his foe Prometheus in chains, leaving him to be partially eaten alive in a daily cycle of pain. From there he proceeds to swallow his wife Metis (rather than her offspring), having been warned that her offspring would overthrow him, just as Kronos before him was warned, and who similarly attempted to avoid that fate by swallowing family members. *Biē* is clearly

[312] Ulf (2009: 93, 95).

violent, and Zeus does not forgo it. In fact, he uses it in a very similar way to his own father, and ultimately surpasses him by coming to possess the personification of Bie. Zeus' use of violence is not any different to, or more restrained than, that of his father.

The violence of Zeus, and the equally violent nature of the thunderbolt is most obviously seen in verse 689 in the culmination of the Titanomachy:

> Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτι Ζεὺς ἴσχεν ἐὸν μένος, ἀλλά νυ τοῦ γε
> εἶθαρ μὲν μένεος πλῆντο φρένες, ἐκ δέ τε πᾶσαν
> φαῖνε **βίην**· ἄμυδις δ' ἄρ' ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἠδ' ἀπ' Ὀλύμπου
> ἀστράπτων ἔστειχε συνωχαδόν, οἱ δὲ κεραυνοὶ [690]
> ἴκταρ ἅμα βροντῇ τε καὶ ἀστεροπῇ ποτέοντο
> χειρὸς ἄπο στιβαρῆς, ἱερὴν **φλόγα** εἰλυφόωντες
> ταρφέες. ἀμφὶ δὲ γαῖα φερέσβιος ἐσμαράγιζε
> **καιομένη**, λάκε δ' ἀμφὶ **πυρὶ** μεγάλ' ἄσπετος ὕλη·
> **ἕζεε** δὲ χθὼν πᾶσα καὶ Ὠκεανοῖο ῥέεθρα [695]
> πόντος τ' ἀτρύγετος· τοὺς δ' ἄμφεπε **θερμὸς ἀυτμὴ**
> Τιτῆνας χθονίους, **φλὸξ** δ' ἠέρα δῖαν ἵκανεν
> ἄσπετος, ὅσσε δ' ἄμερδε καὶ ἰφθίμων περ ἐόντων
> αὐγὴ μαρμαίρουσα κεραυνοῦ τε στεροπῆς τε.
> **καῦμα** δὲ θεσπέσιον κάτεχεν Χάος·
>
> (687-99)

> Now Zeus no longer held in his strength,
> but here his heart filled
> deep with strength, and now he showed
> his **violence** entire
> and indiscriminately. Out of the sky
> and off Olympos
> he moved hurling his lightning incessantly,
> and the thunderbolts,
> the crashing of them and the **blaze**
> together came flying, one after
> another, from his ponderous hand,
> and spinning whirls of inhuman
> **flame**, and with it the earth,
> the giver of life, cried out
> aloud as she **burned**, and the vast forests
> in the **fire** screamed.
> All earth was **boiling** with it,
> and the courses of the Ocean
> and the barren sea, and the **hot**
> **steam** of it was engulfing
> the Titans of the earth, while the **flames**
> went up to the bright sky
> unquenchably, and the glaring

flash of thunder and lightning
blinded the eyes of the Titan gods,
for all they were mighty.
The awful burning heat gripped Chaos…[313]

The *biē* he demonstrates is the hurling of his weapon, the lightning bolt – a violent, damage-inflicting, action. Zeus' use of *biē* here allows him to triumph over the Titans. Much of the description of the damage caused by Zeus' lightning we have seen already in relation to the Typhonomachy (which comes narratively and chronologically after the Titanomachy). Just as we saw with *kratos*, *biē* is strongly associated with the thunderbolt. Here, as with *kratos*, the lightning is explicitly associated with heat and fire. Not only does the thunderbolt of Zeus burn the earth and forests, boil the sea, and send flames up to the sky, but it is also described as 'spinning whirls of inhuman // **flame**' (ἱερὴν **φλόγα** εἰλυφόωντες [692]). Just as with *zēlos* and *kratos*, we see an association with burning, as something which disrupts the body, and as manifesting as destructive heat.

Biē is violent and it is essential to his victory; it is useful, and allows him to establish justice. But we also see the incredibly destructive power of both *biē* and *kratos* (and therefore also *zēlos*): they boil the earth and sea; they burn forests. They destroy the ordered universe.

Given the fact that Zeus' forefathers' use of violence (especially that of Kronos) is easily seen as morally bad, or dysfunctional (because it threatens Zeus and his siblings), and the fact that Zeus himself uses that same violence, the idea that Zeus' *biē* is acceptable because it is not violence, or is only used as a last resort, is unfeasible. We cannot understand *biē* as something other than violence, and we cannot understand Zeus' *biē* as different to the violence of Kronos and Ouranos. Thus, we must conclude that either Zeus' use of violence is also unjust, or dysfunctional, or that violence *can* be just and functional.

[313] Adapted from Lattimore, who translates the μένεος of verse 688 as 'fury'. I have instead given 'strength' because μένος is the same word as in the verse above, which Lattimore has translated there as 'strength'. It has the same range of meanings as *biē* and *kratos* can – it is associated with spiritedness and intention. I have also made changes so that the position and quantity of words relating to fire and heat more closely match that of the Greek.

For the sake of thoroughly outlining all the problems with the idea of *biē* as intrinsically immoral, or of not being violent, and with the idea of *biē* not being associated with Zeus, it is worth making note of the other figures in the *Theogony* to whom *biē* is applied. The above mention of *biē* in relation to Zeus' lightning draws our attention back to the narratological first mention of *biē* in the *Theogony*. In verse 146 it is used to describe the Cyclopes' works and creations – they who made the very thunderbolts Zeus now hurls in the Titanomachy: ἰσχὺς τ᾽ ἠδὲ βίη καὶ μηχαναὶ ἦσαν ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις (*ischus*, *biē*, and μηχαναὶ, *mēchanai*, are in their works). The violence of the Cyclopes *is* the *biē* of the thunderbolts they create for Zeus.

The Hekatoncheires are also frequently associated with *biē* (649, 670, 677), meaning that the three sets of Zeus' allies in his violent battle – the Hekatoncheires, the Cyclopes, and, of course, Styx and her children – all possess or use *biē*. The fact that the violence of all these figures is necessary for Zeus' victory again suggests a beneficial violence – a violence with positive outcomes.

As we have already noted in Chapter Two, the figure most frequently associated with *biē* is Herakles, who is described four times as possessing *biē* (289, 315, 332, 943). And, as we have also already noted, there is a significant overlap between Herakles' possession of *biē* and his violent acts of killing monsters – acts that are certainly of benefit to men, and which mirror the actions of his father. He manifests Zeus' *biē* in the mortal sphere.

Biē is also associated with Zeus in several other verses. In verses 490-91 it is one of the tools by which Zeus will overcome Kronos: ὅ μιν τάχ᾽ ἔμελλε **βίῃ** καὶ χερσὶ δαμάσσας (who soon by **force** // and his hands defeated him). Here, *biē* represents a violent action, and an action necessary for Zeus to conquer his father. Mere verses later *biē* is used again, in this same description of his victory over his father, again as one of the tools with which Zeus has now overcome his father: νικηθεὶς τέχνῃσι **βίηφί** τε παιδὸς ἑοῖο ('conquered by the craft and **violence** of his son' [496]).

It is also, as we have already seen, one of the qualities shown by those to whom Hekate, by the will of Zeus, grants victory in games (437). The same associations with Zeus, and with a morally positive force, and one necessary for victory, all appear

again here.

Finally, in verse 882, *biē* is used to describe the force by which the Olympians collectively have won the Titanomachy. Once again: victory and violence are interlinked, and violence serves a functional/moral purpose. The above instances represent all of the mentions of *biē* in the *Theogony*, and they are all in relation to Zeus or his allies. This demonstrates that, contrary to being more associated with Zeus' forebears than with Zeus himself, *biē*, as violence, is more closely associated with Zeus than with his forebears. What's more, if the actions of Zeus' father and grandfather are violent, it is because they are similar to the actions of Zeus himself.

The fact that *biē* is only associated with Zeus and his faction underlines its potential, as violence, to be considered functional/morally good. It is not justifiable, then, to argue either that Zeus' use of violence is really any different to, or more restrained than, that of his father; or that violence is intrinsically morally bad. Given this, we must question what it means for violence to be functional/morally good, the details of its functionality/moral goodness, and its relationship to justice.

This fact, coupled with the fact that Herakles' use of *biē* to overcome monsters frequently described using *krateros* or some related word, adds credence to the idea that Bie might be the most important of Styx' children.

Virtuous Violence

A model that helps illuminate Hesiod's presentation of violence is the idea of the 'virtuous violence' expounded by Fiske and Rai. Building on the Relational Model Theory proposed by Fiske's 1991 work, *Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relationships*, their theory of virtuous violence explores how violence can be used to maintain, end, and initiate social relationships based on the four relationship models: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP).[314] Of primary interest to our current enquiry is the model of AR – how violence can be used to create, sustain, and

[314] Fiske & Rai (2015).

end the social relationships that constitute a hierarchy, but I shall outline briefly all the models, as the others will also be relevant, albeit to a lesser extent.

First, however, we must establish whether Fiske and Rai's work is applicable to our investigation; in order for their work to be relevant it must be the case that the definition of 'violence' they use overlaps meaningfully with that of Hesiod's *biē*. The definition of violence within which Fiske and Rai work is that consisting 'of action in which the perpetrator regards inflicting pain, suffering, fear, distress, injury, maiming, disfigurement, or death as the intrinsic, necessary, or desirable means to the intended ends'.[315] This definition matches well with the range of actions which *biē* is used to describe in the *Theogony*: the infliction of pain and suffering (Zeus' punishment of Prometheus [521-5]), fear (which prevents the other children of Gaia from rebelling against their father [167-9]), injury (the Titanomachy), and disfigurement and death (the monstrous opponents of Herakles). As the examples show, the types of violence expressed by Fiske and Rai are present in Hesiod's poems.

Fiske and Rai suggest not only that violence can be perceived as moral, but that it is usually perceived as having moral motivation – that 'most violence is the exercise of moral rights and obligations'.[316] Further, they argue that people conceive of violence as a moral *necessity* for maintaining many social relationships.[317] If this conception is true of Hesiod, then the exercise of *biē* becomes an intrinsic part of Zeus' ability to sustain his ordered universe. Before we look at how the virtuous violence model enhances our understanding of Hesiod, we must first know what Fiske and Rai's different models of violence are. I shall briefly outline these now.

In the model of Communal Sharing (CS) the guiding principle is one of unity, which 'is directed toward caring for and supporting the integrity of in-groups through a sense of collective responsibility and common fate.' The needs of one are the needs of all, the guilt of one is the guilt of all, and harm against one is harm against all, and requires a collective response.[318] We see this model in the Greek notions of *miasma*,

[315] Fiske & Rai (2015: 3). This excludes incidents in which the inflicting of pain, suffering or distress is accidental, or when it is incidental (e.g. the unavoidable consequence of a surgery to save someone's life).
[316] Fiske & Rai (2015: 1).
[317] Fiske & Rai (2015: 2).
[318] Fiske & Rai (2015: 18).

where the pollutions of the actions of one person is shared by a family unit, or even a whole city. The *miasma* created by the actions of Atreus and Tantalos infect the next two generations of their family. The *miasma* of the man who breaks his oath is shared by his family and his city, and the victory and glory of the athlete can be shared by his family. Kronos' violence against Zeus' siblings requires a response from Zeus. Violence within CS can also be used as a means of initiation. A violent initiation process bonds the group through a shared experience – they have all completed this rite of passage.

In the case of Equality Matching (EM), the model strives for equality. Participants attempt to balance their relationship so that they maintain equality. This model 'provides the moral motivation for maintaining favor-for-favor forms of reciprocity and pursuing eye-for-an-eye forms of revenge.'[319] The idea of reciprocity is highly prevalent in ancient Greece, and, in its positive sense, is seen most easily in the idea of *xenia.* We see this negative reciprocity at work in the fact that, when Zeus defeats Kronos, who had imprisoned Zeus's siblings, Zeus imprisons Kronos instead. Their positions are directly reversed.

The Market Pricing model (MP) is similar to EM, but shifts from an-eye-for-an-eye to an-eye-for-something-equivalent-to-an-eye. The motive underpinning this model is 'proportionality'.[320] This model allows justice to manifest in the idea of a punishment being proportional to the crime. Fiske and Rai state that 'the primary violation of proportionality is cheating, which we strictly define as referring to instances in which individuals attempt to gain benefits that, according to cultural standards, are not proportional to what they deserve'.[321] To break an oath is an attempt to cheat, to gain unlawfully, and is met with a proportionally awful punishment. To attempt to gain what one has not earned is a form of envy. This model also has a utilitarian aspect – violence is not only moral when it is a proportional punishment, but also when, in a cost-benefit analysis, the potential positive result outweighs to potential harm.

Finally, in the model of Authority Ranking (AR) violence is used to maintain the

[319] Fiske & Rai (2015: 20).
[320] Fiske & Rai (2015: 21).
[321] Fiske & Rai (2015: 21).

social and power hierarchies. Violence is perceived by members of the society as moral when used by a superior against a subordinate, but not when used by a subordinate against a superior. Fiske and Rai's model does not conceive of the AR relationship as intrinsically immoral and they argue that people within the relationship – on both ends of the violence – do not perceive it that way either. AR is not simply the exercise of power by one individual for their own ends alone: the maintenance of the AR relationship also requires leaders to 'lead, guide, direct, and protect' their subordinates. It is a mutually beneficial model and is perceived by all participants as 'natural, good, legitimate, and even necessary'.[322] Indeed, within the relationship the failure to properly implement violence can be perceived as actively *immoral* – a failure to maintain the relationship which all have entered into and expect to benefit from.[323] Violence is intrinsic to the maintenance of a hierarchical society.

Indeed, Fiske and Rai themselves demonstrate the presence of both the CS and AR models in the *Iliad*, noting elements such as the communal punishment of the Greeks by Apollo when Agamemnon refuses to give Chryseis back to her father, and Paris' breach of *xenia* by taking Menelaos' wife.[324]

Theogony

Let us turn now to examine the presence of these models in the *Theogony*. The poem contains several examples of authority ranking societies. The first is that established by Ouranos, then that of Kronos, and finally that of Zeus. Two of these hierarchies fail; only the final one succeeds. AR allows us to understand part of why this should be.

Ouranos becomes head of the hierarchy by imprisoning his children. But it is this very act that dooms him: to establish a successful framework for the use of violence, the leader must also provide their underlings with benefits. Ouranos offers none. Likewise with Kronos: in attempting to maintain his position as leader by swallowing his children as they are born, he seals his fate. Because he offers no benefits to his

[322] Fiske & Rai (2015: 19-20).
[323] Fiske & Rai (2015: 19-20, 46).
[324] Fiske & Rai (2015: 86).

children, their act of rebellion and violence against their leader is not immoral.

Only Zeus offers his subordinates appropriate compensation for supporting his position as leader. In swearing to maintain the honours of those who support him, and grant honours to those who lacked them, Zeus makes an oath to correct the mistakes of his paternal lineage. Zeus' oath, and thus Styx, is essential in order for Zeus' violence to be moral. Zeus' society is founded upon the idea that the members of it will gain honours – that there will be some recompense for their lower position in the hierarchy.

We have already discussed how oath functions in an MP model – the punishment is proportional to the crime, and cheating (or oath-breaking) is the greatest violation of this model. Oath and its violent punishment is also at work in the CS model. As we have already seen in Chapter One, Hesiod describes Horkos as 'he who most ruins men on earth when anyone intentionally swears falsely' (*Th.* 231-2), and also describes Styx as being a misery to all the gods (792). Hesiod emphasises this in the *Works and Days*, describing the destruction of men:

> αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν·
> τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἑλκομένης, ᾗ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσι [220]
> δωροφάγοι, σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς κρίνωσι θέμιστας·
> ἣ δ' ἕπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἤθεα λαῶν,
> ἠέρα ἑσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα,
> οἵ τε μιν ἐξελάσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν.
> (219-24)
>
> The spirit of Oath is one who runs
> beside crooked judgments.
> There is an outcry when Justice is dragged perforce,
> when bribe-eating
> men pull her about, and judge their cases
> with crooked decisions.
> She follows perforce, weeping, to the city
> and gatherings of people.
> She puts a dark mist upon her and brings a curse
> upon all those
> who drive her out, who deal in her
> and twist her in dealing.

Horkos accompanies justice to the city of the one who has wronged them, visiting all the people within, not just the perjurer. It is stated even more clearly a few verses

later:

οἷς δ᾽ ὕβρις τε μέμηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,
τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς.
πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα, [240]
ὅστις ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται.
τοῖσιν δ᾽ οὐρανόθεν μέγ᾽ ἐπήγαγε πῆμα Κρονίων,
λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν, ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί·
(238-43)

But when men like harsh violence
and cruel acts, Zeus
of the wide brows, the son of Kronos,
ordains their punishment.
Often a whole city is paid punishment
for one bad man
who commits crimes and plans reckless action.
On this man's people
the son of Kronos out of the sky
inflicts great suffering.
Famine and plague together, and the people die
and diminish.

The whole society is punished for the breach of conduct by one of its members. CS gives all participants a motivation to help to police its order – it is self-maintaining. A shared punishment for the actions of one member gives all the incentive to ensure the other members do not violate the laws of the society. The gods' communal hatred of oath, therefore, is because, even if they do not break an oath themselves, they will all suffer if any other member breaks their oath. They will suffer in particular, if one specific member – the authority in charge – breaks their oath. Should Zeus break his oath, he would no longer be fulfilling his position as leader by providing benefits to his subordinates. They will all lose their honours as Zeus' society crumbles and a new one rises to take its place. The violent punishment for breaking the oath is necessary in order to guarantee it is kept, and the group-wide punishment explains their group-wide hatred of oath. Equally, the benefit of Zeus keeping his oath is shared by all. Again, a positive morality lies behind the violence used to prevent perjury.

An element of CS also appears in the communal violence of the rebellion against Kronos and the Titans. Fiske and Rai state that one of the things which can create a society based on Communal Sharing is a process of initiation. They give the example of a violent initiation into a gang wherein the initiate is beaten by existing

members.[325] But the violence of the initiation need not be directed internally. An initiation into a group can also involve an act of violence to someone outside the group – a rival, or a perceived threat to the social group. When Kronos defeats his father, it is he and he alone who acts. It does not establish a community. But when Zeus moves against Kronos in the Titanomachy, others join in. The shared participation in the violence creates a newly shared bond and communal identity amongst the Olympians. Through the communal sharing in acts of violence, a new AR social group is formed, with Zeus at its head – it is an initiation ritual in which they have all partaken, and can thus belong to his social group.

Having established his new social group, Zeus also uses violence to protect that group from outside threats such as Typhoeus – just as one would expect from the dominant member of an AR relationship. His violence protects the benefits of the members within the group, and is thus moral.

From the above we see that Zeus' violence is not only a necessary force for establishing and maintaining his universe, but that his use of violence within the society can be morally good as long as he also maintains the other duties of the head of the hierarchy. Having seen what the *Theogony* can tell us about *biē*, we shall now turn to see how we can further refine our idea through an examination of the *Works and Days*.

The *Works and Days: Biē* and *Hubris*

Within the *Works and Days* is a frequently discussed passage that may pose problems for the AR model demonstrated in the *Theogony* and thus to the idea of a moral *biē*. It is the fable of the hawk and the nightingale:

> Νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς·
> ὣδ' ἴρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον
> ὕψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς·
> ἣ δ' ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσι, [205]
> μύρετο· τὴν ὅ γ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·
> "δαιμονίη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·

[325] Fiske and Rai (2015: 19).

τῇ δ᾽ εἶς, ἣ σ᾽ ἂν ἐγώ περ ἄγω καὶ ἀοιδὸν ἐοῦσαν·
δεῖπνον δ᾽, αἴ κ᾽ ἐθέλω, ποιήσομαι ἠὲ μεθήσω.
ἄφρων δ᾽, ὅς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν· [210]
νίκης τε στέρεται πρός τ᾽ αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει.”
ὣς ἔφατ᾽ ὠκυπέτης ἴρηξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.

(202-12)

Now I will tell you a fable for the kings;
they understand it.
This is what the hawk said when he had caught
a nightingale
with spangled neck in his claws and carried her
high among the clouds.
She, spitted on the clawhooks, was wailing pitifully,
but the hawk, in his masterful manner,
gave her an answer:
“What is the matter with you? Why scream?
Your master has you.
You shall go wherever I take you,
for all your singing.
If I like, I can let you go. If I like,
I can eat you for dinner.
He is a fool who tries to match his strength
with the stronger.
He will lose his battle, and with the shame
will be hurt also.”
So spoke the hawk, the bird who flies so fast
on his long wings.[326]

The narrative of the fable is simple: a hawk catches a nightingale in his talons, and tells her the harsh reality that, sing though she may, the hawk is ‘mightier’ (ἀρείων, *areiōn* [207]) and he will do with her as he pleases. The moral, then, appears to be that it is foolish to try and fight against one who is stronger (κρείσσων, *kreissōn* [210]), and doing so leads only to pain (ἄλγος, *algos*) and shame (αἶσχος, *aischos*).

But who do these birds represent? The most obvious interpretation of the identity of the characters in this fable is that Hesiod himself is the nightingale, and the hawk as either the βασιλῆς (*basilēs*, ‘kings’) or Perses.[327] But the parallel between Hesiod and the nightingale is obvious: the nightingale is, after all, a songbird and Hesiod a rhapsode. The two are explicitly associated in Greek literature.

[326] Adapted from Lattimore, who translates βασιλεῦσιν as ‘barons’, which is unjustifiably anachronistic. I have made this change in all subsequent quotations.
[327] This is the position of Pucci (1977: 62-64); Rowe (1978: 131); and Mordine (2006: 366).

If Hesiod is the nightingale then whom is the hawk? Before he begins the fable, Hesiod states that it is directed towards the *basilēs*, who 'understand it'; immediately after the fable, Hesiod directs his advice towards Perses. Later, he turns back to the *basilēs* (248-41) before again returning to his brother (274-75). The fact that the fable is sandwiched between the *basilēs* and Perses, and that he refers to both again later suggests that both the *basilēs* and Perses are intended to understand themselves as the hawk, and we should understand the identity of the hawk in relation to who Hesiod is addressing at the time.

This being the case, it would be odd indeed to understand Hesiod as advocating for the violence he clearly thinks he unjustly suffers from. But this identification might prove problematic for a number of other reasons. First, in identifying himself with the nightingale, Hesiod, equates his own words to the useless song of the nightingale: she can sing all she wants, she will not change the mind of the hawk. This would mean that all of Hesiod's exhortations to Perses to behave better would be useless, just as the nightingale's singing is.

Another immediate problem raised by this interpretation is that Hesiod appears to be claiming that the violent actions of the hawk are, in fact, just and morally right. This would mean that violence can be considered morally right even when there is no benefit offered in exchange, and no misdeed to punish. The hawk provides no benefit to the nightingale. This would mean that Perses' violence is morally just, even if he provides no benefit to Hesiod for enduring his violence, and even though he should be Perses' equal.

Finally, this moral would diametrically oppose Hesiod's two exhortations to Perses, the first of which is addressed to Perses, and immediately follows the fable:

> ἯΩ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης μηδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε·
> ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῷ βροτῷ,
> (213-14)

> But as for you, Perses, listen to justice;
> do not try to practise
> violence; violence is bad for the weak man…

The second instance comes later, immediately preceding a reference to animals, and drawing our attention back to the fable. Animals lack justice, we are told, but men were granted justice by Zeus. Because of this, Hesiod advises his brother once again to avoid violence:

> Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσι βάλλεο σῇσι
> καὶ νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ᾽ ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν.
> (274-75)

> You, Perses, should store away in your mind all
> that I tell you,
> and listen to justice, and put away
> all notions of violence.

If we take the fable at face value, then it would appear that Hesiod has gravely misunderstood the meaning of his own fable. In answer to these problems, the most common reinterpretation of the "fable" has been to take it as not functioning as a fable at all, but simply a story of two animals behaving as animals are wont to do.[328] Nelson has suggested that the intent was that we should reinterpret the fable by revising our understanding of who the hawk and the nightingale represent, and take the hawk to represent Zeus and the nightingale the kings and Perses.[329] Both Nelson and Michael Mordine suggest that the true meaning reveals Hesiod's belief that what constitutes justice and appropriate use of violence is different for animals, men, and gods. Nelson thinks that the violence of the hawk and Zeus are the same, and follow the same moral structure – just like the hawk, Zeus and the gods are not beholden to justice. Mordine, on the other hand, thinks that the violence between all three of them differs.[330]

Mordine argues that the punishment of Prometheus in the *Theogony* 'articulates a "Theogonic" use of power appropriate to the gods and to Zeus in particular'.[331] But, for Hesiod, this 'Theogonic' use of power is *not* appropriate to the human realm: kings should not act like Zeus. Instead, kings should follow an 'ethical system

[328] Daly (1961), Heath (1985: 249-50), Lamberton (1988: 120-24).
[329] Nelson (1998: 77-81).
[330] Nelson (1998: 247), Mordine (2006).
[331] Mordine (2006: 364).

appropriate for humans'.[332] The model appropriate for humans is one governed by *dikē*, which, Hesiod tells us, was given to men by Zeus:

> τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,
> ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς
> ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοῖς·
> ἀνθρώποισι δ᾽ ἔδωκε **δίκην**, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη
> γίγνεται·
>
> (276-80)

> Here is the law, as Zeus established it
> for human beings;
> as for fish, and wild animals, and the flying birds,
> they feed on each other, since there is no idea
> of justice among them;
> but to men he gave **justice**, and she in the end
> is proved the best thing
> they have.

The meaning here is clear: violence (*biē*) is for animals; humans should use *dikē* instead. The logic of such a reading, if used to revise our understanding of the fable, is obvious: if animals do not have *dikē* then the neither the words nor actions of the hawk can be taken as a statement on the nature of justice insofar as humans are concerned. Equally, the nightingale's words are useless because they do not have the power, as Hesiod's words do, to speak the will of Zeus, justice, and the truth of things. The nightingale's world lacks justice, and thus their song lacks the power to invoke it. The moral(s) we must supply for the original fable would then be that the *basilēs* and Perses are acting as animals do – without justice and *with* violence. For Mordine, the lesson is that they must correct their behaviour and act in a way appropriate to humans; they must 'follow the dictates of justice of *arbitrary* power' (my emphasis).[333]

The question then becomes whether Hesiod is saying that that *all* violence should be avoided, or whether it must be regulated by *dikē* (and that this is requires men to follow different rules than those of the gods). If Hesiod is presenting *biē* and *dikē* as mutually exclusive, the claim becomes an opposition of justice – violence is *always* unjust, and thus always wrong. If this were to be the case, such a total eschewing of

[332] Mordine (2006: 364).
[333] Mordine (2006: 371).

violence would contradict Fiske and Rai's model of virtuous violence, and would indeed suggest that Hesiod conceives of violence as inherently morally wrong. We would then have to examine what impact this had on the applicability of the idea of virtuous violence. Before we can commence such an examination, we must, of course, inspect more closely the advice Hesiod gives in order to establish the exact nature of *biē* in the *Works and Days*.

The first instance of Hesiod advising Perses to abandon violence is in verse 213, which comes immediately after the end of the fable:

> Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης, μηδ' **ὕβριν** ὄφελλε·
> **ὕβρις** γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῷ βροτῷ…
> (213-14)

> But as for you, Perses, listen to justice;
> do not try to practise
> violence; violence is bad for the weak man;

The word here for 'violence' is not *biē*, but ὕβρις (*hubris*)*, Hubris* has connotations of unrestrained, excessive or inappropriate violence, of an arrogant pride that assumes superiority when there is none. It is this that Mordine takes to be 'arbitrary power'.[334] *Hubris* is closely related to, but not identical with, *biē*. However, just as was the case with *zēlos* and *phthonos*, investigating the meaning of this other word will enhance our understanding of *biē*.

If we examine the appearance of *hubris* and related forms in the whole of the *Works and Days*, and in the *Theogony*, we find it used solely in a negative context. In the *Works and Days* it is used to describe one of the factors that leads to the mutual self-destruction of the silver race of men:

> ἀλλ' ὅτ' ἄρ' ἡβήσαι τε καὶ ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοιτο,
> παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε' ἔχοντες
> ἀφραδίῃς· **ὕβριν** γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο
> ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, οὐδ' ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν [135]
> ἤθελον οὐδ' ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς,
> ᾗ θέμις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα. τοὺς μὲν ἔπειτα
> Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε χολούμενος, οὕνεκα τιμὰς

[334] Mordine (2006: 371).

οὐκ ἔδιδον μακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν.
(132-39)

But when it came time for them to grow up
and gain full measure,
they lived for only a poor short time;
by their own foolishness
they had troubles, for they were not able
to keep away from
reckless **violence** against each other,
nor would they worship
the gods, nor do sacrifice on the sacred altars
of the blessed ones,
which is the right thing among the customs of men,
and therefore
Zeus, son of Kronos, in anger engulfed them,
for they paid no due
honours to the blessed gods who live on Olympos.[335]

The men of this age cannot refrain from violence towards each other, but each man is attempting to use a violence that exceeds their rank. They are equals fighting equals: neither has the moral right to rule the other and therefore violence cannot be used among them to successfully establish a social relationship. As a group of equals, violence must be directed towards outsiders who present a threat to the group in order to be virtuous. Their second crime, of not worshipping or honouring the gods, also fits within the hierarchical model established by Zeus in the *Theogony*, in which order is maintained because the gods are given their due honours. Mordine points to the fact that one clear understanding of *hubris* is 'when a human tries to act like a god.'[336] Thus, then men of the silver age break the rules for relationships of virtuous violence in two ways. Firstly, in their actions towards each other they are appropriating a type of violence from a higher rank in the hierarchy than is rightfully theirs. Secondly, the fact that the men of the silver age do not worship the gods puts them at odds with what their superiors should expect from them based on their respective places in the hierarchy. Thus, Zeus removes them from it.

Hubris is also used of the bronze race of men, who love Ares, and destroy each other by their own hand, and who, we recall, also possess *krateroprhona thumon* (strong-

[335] Adapted from Lattimore, who here translates ὕβριν, *hubrin*, as 'crime'.
[336] Mordine (2006: 372).

willed spirit):

> Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
> χάλκειον ποίησ᾽, οὐκ ἀργυρέῳ οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον,
> ἐκ μελιᾶν, δεινόν τε καὶ ὄβριμον· οἷσιν Ἄρηος
> ἔργ᾽ ἔμελε στονόεντα καὶ **ὕβριες**, οὐδέ τι σῖτον
> ἤσθιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδάμαντος ἔχον κρατερόφρονα θυμόν.
> [ἄπλαστοι· μεγάλη δὲ **βίη** καὶ χεῖρες ἄαπτοι
> ἐξ ὤμων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσι.]
> (143-49)

> then Zeus the father created the third generation
> of mortals,
> the age of bronze. They were not like
> the generation of silver.
> They came from ash spears. They were terrible
> and strong, and the ghastly
> action of Ares was theirs, and **violence**.
> They ate no bread,
> but maintained a strong-willed and adamantine spirit.
> None could come near them; their **strength** was big,
> and from their shoulders
> the arms grew irresistible on their ponderous bodies.[337]

Note that both *hubris* and *biē* (which Lattimore has here translated as 'strength') appear in these verses. *Hubris* relates to the actions of these men – to their violence towards one another. *Biē* relates to their bodies. Their bodies possess the potential to be dangerous because of their *biē* but it is the actual demonstration of violence that is *hubris*.

Thus far, this is compatible with the idea of how violence should and should not be used within an AR model: *hubris* is a negative violence, the incorrect use of violence. When *bie* is associated with *hubris*, it too, can represent the incorrect use of violence.

Hubris is also used three times within Hesiod's address to his brother after the fable of the hawk and the nightingale in a way that positions it as a negative quality. First, as we have seen, Hesiod tells Perses to avoid it (213). He then he states that even the good man cannot bear it easily (214-7). The end result of the good man trying to use

[337] Adapted from Lattimore. I have changed his translation of *krateropfrona* in verse 147 to 'strong-willed' so that the reader relying on the translation can see clearly where the word falls in the English.

hubris will be, when he encounters ἄτη (*atē*, 'bewilderment', 'ruin', 'folly'), corruption. He will start to make crooked judgements, breaking oaths and abandoning justice. This would result in the failure of the AR relationship: the good man's violence cannot here be moral, because he is no longer supplying the benefits necessary to legitimise his rank and violence.

The third mention of *hubris* in this passage is in the claim that Dike restrains (ἴσχει, *ischei*) Hubris. Dike holds the τέλος (*telos*) – the greater authority; it is the most supreme power (217-18): Dike will beat Hubris in the end. The positioning of these two as foes again suggests the idea that *hubris* cannot have a role in a just universe: *hubris* is never just. This would certainly be a problem for our AR model if *hubris* were to be identical to *biē*.

The penultimate mention of *hubris* in the *Works and Days* is in verse 191, describing the awful end of the current age of man:

> οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου
> οὐδ' ἀγαθοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ **ὕβριν**
> ἀνέρα τιμήσουσι· δίκη δ' ἐν χερσί· καὶ αἰδὼς
> οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα
> μύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὀμεῖται.
> (190-4)

> There will be no favour for the man
> who keeps his oath, for the righteous
> and the good man, rather evil men shall give their praise
> to **violence**
> and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm.
> Shame will
> not be. The vile man will crowd his better out,
> and attack him
> with twisted accusations and swear an oath
> to his story.

They will not keep their oaths; men will instead praise the violence of him whose deeds are evil. Note that this sets *hubris* up against the role of Styx herself. It is a violence that destabilises the AR social group through perjury, rather than maintaining it by keeping oaths. It is wholly unsurprising, then, that in verses 238-9 Hesiod tells us that Zeus will punish those who use *hubris*:

οἷς δ᾽ **ὕβρις** τε μέμηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,
τοῖς δὲ **δίκην** Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς.

But when men like harsh **violence**
and cruel acts, Zeus
of the wide brow, the son of Kronos
ordains their **punishment**.

The 'punishment' is the correct ordination of judgement – of punishment. This is Zeus' Justice. It is inseparable from the violence of punishment. The incorrect usage of violence is controlled by the correct application of punishment. The violent nature of Zeus' punishment is virtuous, because it is in pursuit of maintaining his ordered universe and hierarchy.

Turning to the *Theogony*, we find *hubris* used two times: in verse 307 it is used to describe Typhoeus, who will become Zeus' final opponent; in verse 514 it is used of Menoetius, whom Zeus punishes for his *hubris*. We are given no details of what exactly his *hubris* was, but he is, like Atlas, a brother of Prometheus, and thus we shall put off until later discussing him in more detail.

Every use, then, of *hubris* in both poems is wholly negative. This is hardly surprising, given the meaning of the word, but in each instance the word is used in a way that is in line with what we would expect to be shunned by a model of virtuous violence. Or, to put it another way, there is no instance in which the *hubris* described in the poems is something which would be seen as virtuous. Thus, Zeus punishing those who use *hubris* (*Works and Days* 238) and Hesiod's exhortation to his brother to avoid it (213) provide no problem for the use of the AR model in relation to *biē* as a virtuous violence.

Having examined the usage of *hubris* and its difference from *biē,* we are left with only one instance in which Hesiod appears to show *biē* in a seemingly intrinsically morally bad way:

Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι
καὶ νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, **βίης** δ᾽ ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν. [275]
τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,

ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοῖς·
ἀνθρώποισι δ᾽ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη
γίνεται· εἰ γάρ τίς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι᾽ ἀγορεῦσαι [280]
γινώσκων, τῷ μέν τ᾽ ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·
ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσας
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,
τοῦ δέ τ᾽ ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·
ἀνδρὸς δ᾽ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων. [285]
(274-85)

You, Perses, should store away in your mind all
that I tell you,
and listen to justice, and put away
all notions of **violence**.
Here is the law, as Zeus established it
for human beings;
as for fish, and wild animals, and the flying birds,
they feed on each other, since there is no idea
of justice among them;
but to men he gave justice, and she in the end
is proved the best thing
they have. If a man sees what is right
and is willing to argue it,
Zeus of the wide brows grants him prosperity.
But when one, knowingly tells lies and swears
an oath on it,
when he is so wild as to do incurable damage
against justice,
this man is left a diminished generation hereafter,
but the generation of the true-sworn man
grows stronger.

It is indeed *biē* that Hesiod advises Perses to abstain from altogether, rather than the *hubris* he had told him to avoid previously in verse 213. 'Be attentive to justice!' (**δίκης** ἐπάκουε [275]), he demands. 'Forget violence entirely' (**βίης** δ᾽ ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν [275]). But why should Perses forget violence entirely? Zeus ordained a law for men requiring them to adhere to justice. He ordained no such thing for the animals. They eat each other, because justice is not within them. Zeus ordained a law that man should act with justice. The violence (*biē*), which Zeus ordained for animals, is what Perses should forget entirely – stop acting like an animal. Stop acting like a hawk. Stop using a violence that is not regulated by *dikē*.[338]

[338] The idea that Hesiod's ultimate message is that humans must use violence regulated by *dikē* rather

In ordaining *biē* without *dikē* for animals, Zeus is placing them outside a hierarchy to which the AR model can be applied. *Hubris* represents the improper use of violence within a hierarchy or social group, but *biē* can represent both its legitimate use within a hierarchy or social group, and a violence that exists outside such frameworks, and which has the potential to disrupt or establish a hierarchy.

This ordination to avoid *biē* and follow *dikē* is specifically for Perses – *not* for gods. Indeed, it cannot be applicable to gods given that Zeus possesses both Bie *and* Dike. Because Zeus possesses both of these figures, we must understand his possession of them as internally cohesive. Just as what is appropriate to the animals is not appropriate to man, what is appropriate to Perses is not appropriate to Zeus.

Note that it is specifically Perses, not man in general, that Hesiod is exhorting to abstain from *biē*. The clue as to why this should be the case is given at the beginning of the *Works and Days*:

> ἀλλ᾽ αὖθι διακρινώμεθα νεῖκος
> ἰθείῃσι δίκῃς, αἵ τ᾽ ἐκ Διός εἰσιν ἄρισται.
> ἤδη μὲν γὰρ κλῆρον ἐδασσάμεθ᾽, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ
> ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις μέγα κυδαίνων βασιλῆας
> δωροφάγους, οἳ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δίκασσαι.
> (35-40)

> No, come, let us finally settle
> our quarrel
> with straight decisions, which are from Zeus,
> and are the fairest.
> Now once before we divided our inheritance,
> but you seized
> the greater part and made off with it,
> gratifying those kings
> who eat bribes, who are willing
> to give out such a decision.

Perses has perverted justice. He has cheated, and thus broken the social contract which should exist among equals. Hesiod is part of Perses' social (and familial) group, and should not have been a target of Perses' cheating. Indeed, when Hesiod

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than abstain from violence altogether is also the conclusion reached by Nelson

exhorts Perses to abstain from *biē* and to follow *dikē*, *biē* is equated with swearing false and breaking oaths (282-83). Perses' violence works against justice, not alongside it. Keeping one's oath is required in order to use *biē* in line with *dikē*, and indeed, defines all violence necessary to keep one's oath as moral. The same is also true of the *basilēs,* if we take Hesiod's advice to them to indicate that they have not been behaving as they ought:

> Ὦ βασιλῆς, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ
> τήνδε δίκην· ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες
> ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν
> ἀλλήλους τρίβουσι θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.
> (248-50)

> You kings, also, cannot even you
> understand for yourselves
> how justice works? For the immortals
> are close to us, they mingle
> with men, and are aware of those who
> by crooked decisions
> break other men, and care nothing
> for what the gods think of it. [339]

This question to the *basilēs* suggests that, contrary to Hesiod's prior statement, they do not understand the fable. They are also failing to follow *dikē*. Their position of authority *should* grant them the same access to truth as Hesiod, and yet either it does not, or they are choosing to ignore it. Hesiod must not only explain the moral, he must encourage them to follow it. As a rhapsode, he can reveal the nature of Zeus' justice: it is the keeping of oaths.

For Hesiod, it is oaths that underpin the AR model, ensuring that if followed, violence will be 'virtuous' – it will be just. Zeus' use of *biē* is moral because it acts alongside justice – he keeps his oath. But Perses has shown that he cannot act justly, nor keep an oath, and thus he is unequipped to use *biē* – he is incapable of using it in a morally permissible way, and thus must abstain altogether. The exhortation to avoid *biē* is specific to Perses alone, not to mankind as a whole. It does not reflect an intrinsically immoral *biē*. Instead, it explains why Perses himself cannot use *biē* in an acceptable way. Here we see a direct connection between violence and oath: keeping an oath is

[339] Adapted from Lattimore, once again to substitute 'kings' for 'barons'.

the guarantor of justice, and that justice does not involve abstaining from either *biē* or hatred, but using them in the appropriate way.

Biē and the *Works and Days*

Now that we understand the meaning of Hesiod's advice to Perses to refrain from using *biē*, we can now investigate what else we can discover from the poem about the nature of *biē*.

Having told his brother to abstain from *biē*, Hesiod then begins to explain the true nature of *biē* – when it is, and when it isn't, appropriate. In verses 320-26, he explains one of the ways in which *biē* should *not* be used:

> χρήματα δ᾽ οὐχ ἁρπακτά, θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω· [320]
> εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ **βίῃ** μέγαν ὄλβον ἕληται,
> ἢ ὅ γ᾽ ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήισσεται, οἷά τε πολλὰ
> γίνεται, εὖτ᾽ ἂν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσῃ
> ἀνθρώπων, αἰδῶ δέ τ᾽ ἀναιδείη κατοπάζῃ,
> ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον [325]
> ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ᾽ ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.
>
> Goods are not to be grabbed; much better if God
> lets you have them.
> If any man by **force** of hands wins him
> a great fortune,
> or steals it by the cleverness of his tongue,
> as so often
> happens among people when the intelligence
> is blinded
> by greed, a man's shameless spirit tramples
> his sense of honour;
> lightly the gods wipe out that man, and diminish
> the household
> of such a one, and his wealth stays with him
> for only a short time.

Man should not use *biē* to try to obtain profit – violence is not appropriate to this purpose, nor to man's place in the universal hierarchy. Bie here represents the actions of the man of *zēlos*, who gains for himself by taking from others – who follows the bad Eris, rather than the good Eris. An improper use of *zēlos* goes hand-in-hand with

an improper use of *biē*. To use attempt to use *biē* against one's fellow man would be hubristic.

If Perses instead works himself, happiness will be granted him by the gods. This is in line with the idea that the violence of gods towards men can be moral, because they are figures higher up in the hierarchy, who can, and do, also dispense privileges to lower ranking members, as required by their position. Their permit to use violence is accompanied by an obligation to look after those who behave appropriately. The use of violence by a man to obtain goods for himself provides no benefit to others within the society, either communally or in recompense to subordinates – it is not virtuous.

Hesiod also gives a specific list of the people and advises against specific types of violence towards them. His advice falls exactly in line with what we would expect to see from a model of virtuous violence:

> ἶσον δ' ὅς θ' ἱκέτην ὅς τε ξεῖνον κακὸν ἔρξει,
> ὅς τε κασιγνήτοιο ἑοῦ ἀνὰ δέμνια βαίνῃ
> [κρυπταδίῃς εὐνῆς ἀλόχου, παρακαίρια ῥέζων],
> ὅς τέ τευ ἀφραδίῃς ἀλιταίνητ' ὀρφανὰ τέκνα, [330]
> ὅς τε γονῆα γέροντα κακῷ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ
> νεικείῃ χαλεποῖσι καθαπτόμενος ἐπέεσσι·
> τῷ δ' ἦ τοι Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀγαίεται, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν
> ἔργων ἀντ' ἀδίκων χαλεπὴν ἐπέθηκεν ἀμοιβήν.
> (327-34)

> It is the same when one does evil to guest
> or suppliant,
> or goes up into the bed of his brother, to lie
> in secret
> love with his brother's wife, doing acts
> that are against nature;
> or who unfeelingly abuses fatherless children,
> or speaks roughly with intemperate words
> to his failing
> father who stands upon the evil doorstep
> of old age;
> with all these Zeus in person is indignant,
> and in the end
> he makes them pay a bitter price
> for their unrighteous dealings.[340]

[340] Adapted from Lattimore. Lattimore gives 'the hateful doorstep of old age' for verse 231, but the

These are the targets to whom a superior owes a duty of care, and the violence Hesiod advises against is specifically that which would breach that duty of care: the men of the family unit, the orphaned children of their family, and the suppliants and guests protected under the code of *xenia*. Further, within the broader cosmic model, humans as a whole represent a single tier within Zeus' hierarchy. On this cosmic level they are inappropriate targets for each other's violence, which should be directed towards targets outside the group, not within it. Just as with the *hubris* of the men of the silver and bronze ages, any attempt by Perses to use *biē* in this way would instead result in *hubris*. His violence, like that of the men of the silver and bronze ages, *should* be a model of Communal Sharing, a violence directed outwards, not inwards to the group.

The textual evidence in both the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, then, strongly supports the use of an AR model to understand Hesiod's conception of *biē* and its functions. Ouranos and Kronos' misuses of violence are acts of *hubris* and cause the downfall of their respective social groups; Zeus' use of violence forms and maintains both his social group of divine figures and also the hierarchy of mortals he oversees, and the use of violence by humans is inappropriate to their place in Zeus' cosmic hierarchy. Typhoeus' behaviour is hubristic, and he is overthrown by the *biē* of Zeus' lightning. Once again, Hesiod has represented a force as both good and bad, both dangerous and useful. Just as *zēlos*, *nikē* and *kratos* are all both things to be avoided as harmful, and things to be prized as a source of productivity and power, so too does *biē* support a social order, and sometimes overthrow it. If used incorrectly, it manifests as *hubris*. Even a just use of *biē* manifests a terrifyingly destructive power – Zeus' use of his thunderbolts reveals the power of *biē* to destroy the ordered universe – as it would do if he broke his oath. It is keeping his oath that allows him to wield *biē*, rather than *hubris*.

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word is κακῷ (*kakōi*, 'evil, worthless'), which is not related to the words for hatred that we are examining. He also gives 'is angry' for ἀγαίεται (*agaietai*). The more accurate meaning is 'is indignant'. See Chapter Four for a further discussion of this word.

Necessity

The final element of *biē* that we must note, which interlinks with *kratos*, is that both are connected in the *Theogony* to a sense of necessity and constraint. We have already seen the necessity of *kratos* indicated both by its pervasiveness in Zeus' universe, and by the fact that it is essential to Zeus' victory. We have also seen the necessity of *biē* for establishing and maintaining Zeus' hierarchy. But Hesiod links the ideas even more explicitly than that. It is finally time to address the final two instances of *kratos*. The adjective *krateros* is used twice within the *Theogony* to describe the strength of bonds or constraints. It is used in verse 618 to describe the strength of the bond (δεσμός, *desmos*) with which Kronos bound the Hekatoncheires: δῆσε **κρατερῷ** ἐνὶ δεσμῷ (bound them in a **strong** bond).

The noun *desmos* is again used to describe the bonds (plural, this time) of the Hekatoncheires in verse 501 and in verse 659 when they talk of their past confinement. It is applied again to the binding of the Titans by the Hekatoncheires (718). Finally, it is used of the binding of Prometheus twice – in verse 522, and verse 616:

> οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰαπετιονίδης ἀκάκητα Προμηθεὺς
> τοῖό γ' ὑπεξήλυξε βαρὺν χόλον, ἀλλ' ὑπ' **ἀνάγκης**
> καὶ πολύιδριν ἐόντα μέγας κατὰ **δεσμὸς** ἐρύκει.
> (614-16)

> for not even the son of Iapetos,
> the gentle Prometheus,
> was able to elude that heavy anger,
> but, for all his
> numerous shifts, **necessity**
> and the mighty **chain** confine him.[341]

Another word which appears here, and which emphasises the idea of constraint, is ἀνάγκη (*anagkē*) meaning 'constraint, necessity'. *Anagkē* makes clear the interlinking of binding forces and necessity. It is also the other word to which *krateros* is applied in relation to binding and constraint: in verse 517 it is used to describe the constraint under which Atlas holds up the heavens: Ἄτλας δ' οὐρανὸν… ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ'

[341]Adapted from Lattimore to render *anagkēs* as 'necessity' rather than Lattimore's 'force'.

ἀνάγκης, 'Atlas holds up the heavens through *krateros* constraint'. Atlas is confined to a single location, forced by his predicament to remain in that position. His bonds are not the chains of Prometheus, but he is just as constrained.

Atlas is a brother of Prometheus, along with Menoitios and Epimetheus. All four brothers are punished by Zeus. Menoitios is one of the figures described as ὕβριστος, *hubristos* (514). He has a violence exceeding what is appropriate for him and Zeus punishes him by striking him down to Erebos (not Tartaros), with his ψολόεντι κεραυνῷ (*psoloenti keraunōi*), his 'sooty thunderbolt' (515) – i.e. his *kratos* and *biē*.

Only Epimetheus, who poses no threat to Zeus, is punished in a way that does not include constraint or violence. After a lengthy digression into the crimes of Prometheus, Hesiod finally returns to Epimetheus. For Prometheus' sins, Zeus fashions a white elephant for Epimetheus: Pandora. Through Pandora evils will be released on the world of men. Prometheus' punishment will be shared communally by men, just as his gifts were – yet another example of violence in a communal sharing model. We shall have more to say about the sons of Iapetos in Chapter Four, but there is more to be said first regarding the connections between necessity and constraint, and *kratos* and *biē*.

If we return briefly to the etymology of the words, we find Orion (5th century CE) giving *bia* and *anagkē* as the sources of the word *bios* ('life'), on the cheery grounds that life is toil and hardship (Beta, p. 31: 1-2). The occurrence of *anagkē* alongside *biē* is unsurprising, given that βιάζω (*biazō* – or *biaō* in its epic form), a verb closely related to *biē*, also has the sense of 'constrain'. Similarly, *anagkē* can also have the sense of 'violence'. In Herodotus (5th century BCE) we find it used to indicate something done under threat of violence (1.116.4-5) and later by Polybius (3rd – 2nd century BCE) to describe instruments of torture (15.28.1-2).[342]

The verb *biazō* appears once within the poems. It is in the *Theogony*, where it is used in a negated sense in relation to Hekate: 'οὐδέ τί μιν Κρονίδης **ἐβιήσατο**…' – 'nor

[342] Pausanias (2.4.6) notes that Anagke and Bie have a sanctuary on mount Akrokorinthos (Ἀνάγκης καὶ Βίας ἐστὶν ἱερόν). Interestingly, he also notes that it is customary that no one enters this sanctuary (ἐσιέναι δὲ ἐς αὐτὸ οὐ νομίζουσιν).

did the son of Kronos **constrain** her…' (423). To constrain Hekate would be to break his oath, and, given that she represents his will, it would be to constrain his own will.

The idea of the connection between both *kratos* and *biē*, and constraint and necessity, is also strengthened by the appearance and role of Kratos and Bie in the *Prometheus Bound*. They arrive with Hephaistos to make sure that he binds Prometheus properly in his chains, and *anagkē* is used to refer to the binding of Prometheus (16, 72, 108), and the indestructible force of those constraints (105, 515).

The idea of 'constraining', then, inextricably interlinks the idea of *kratos* and *biē* with qualities of Styx. As oath, Styx both constrains the actions of gods and men, and physically constrains those who break their oaths. As river, Styx constrains the ordered and disordered realms of Zeus' universe, fencing them off from each other yet binding them together. Hatred keeps both the outgroup and the ingroup in their proper places. Once again we see the children of Styx matching the qualities of their mother.

Conclusion

At this point we usually turn to examine the relationship between *biē* and hatred, but given that we have now inspected all four children, it will be more efficient to discuss the relationship between *biē* and hatred when discussing the interrelatedness of the whole family. Before doing so, let us remind ourselves about what we have learned of both *kratos* and *biē* so far.

We have seen the interrelatedness of *kratos*, *biē*, and *nikē*. And just as with *nikē*, both *kratos* and *biē* have both positive and negative connotations. The most obvious element that both *kratos* and *biē* add to our understanding of hatred and hate scripts is the enacting of violence and imprisonment. Dealing as he is with largely immortal opponents, Zeus' predominant use of *kratos* and *biē* is to defeat, constrain, and imprison, though when directed against mortals they can be used to kill.

The association between hatred and violence is unsurprising, but Hesiod does more than associate the two. He provides information about how violence *should* be used,

and in doing so also provides information about how hatred should be used. Fisk and Rai's model of virtuous violence allows us to understand when violence is and is not dysfunctional/immoral. Violence is dysfunctional/immoral when it threatens to upset a legitimate social group by destabilising the social group internally, such as when it is used by equal members of a social group against each other. The same is true when a superior uses violence without providing an equivalent benefit. Thus, the violence of Ouranos and Kronos is immoral, because they provide no benefit to their subordinates.

Violence is morally good when used by a superior against a subordinate, to maintain the rules of a society which benefits all. It is morally positive when directed towards figures outside a group of equals, and who threaten its stability. Violence can also be moral when it is used to overthrow an unstable or dysfunctional social group which uses violence incorrectly. Zeus' use of violence is moral because it functions as part of the justice of the society and is in line with its rules: Zeus provides the benefit of honours, and cements the stability of his hierarchy by introducing oath as a governing principle. Oaths are used to negate the threat presented to a social group by cheating and crooked judgements by providing an appropriate punishment for these breaches of the laws of the society. If one cannot obey justice, then one cannot use violence in a constructive way. The ambiguity of *biē* is reaffirmed: it is not intrinsically moral or immoral, dysfunctional or functional, but situationally so, depending on whether it abides by the laws of the social group.

Hateful violence should not be wanton acts committed out of a desire only to destroy – the desire to destroy, or imprison, should be related to the desire to establish and preserve. Zeus' use of violence and hatred establishes and preserves his new, just, order. It is a violence that protects. This is the script for correct use of hatred that Hesiod prescribes.

Chapter 4. Hatred in Hesiod

Introduction

Having investigated the qualities represented by the children of Styx and how they interact with hatred, we are now in a position to examine hatred as a whole within the poems of Hesiod. Some of these instances are identifiable because they explicitly use a word for hatred. But there will also be other potential scenes where, despite hatred not being explicitly mentioned, we might expect to see hatred based on the script we have developed over the preceding chapters.

We will investigate each poem in turn, beginning with the *Theogony*, and with figures that are explicitly mentioned as either hating or being hated. The figures that are explicitly mentioned as either hating or hated can be divided into two groups. The first group of such figures is the patrilineal line of Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus. A second group contains figures that relate to the laws underpinning Zeus' universe. After these two groups we can look at who else in the *Theogony* might be hated. This discussion will include Prometheus. Based on the explicit description of Zeus' attitude towards Prometheus, this will lead us to investigate anger in Hesiod, and thus the relationship between anger and hatred in Hesiod.

Following the investigation of the *Theogony* we will move on to discuss the *Works and Days*, following the same format as for the *Theogony*. First we will examine the instances in which words for hatred are explicitly mentioned and then turn to instances in which, whilst a word for hatred is absent, the emotional script for hatred appears to be in operation.

This chapter will therefore serve to interweave all the knowledge we have accumulated over the course of the previous chapters, constructing the final tapestry of the interrelated meanings and importance of Styx and her children.

***Theogony* I: Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus**

The (narratological) first figure is one who is hating another – it is Kronos who 'hated his engorged father', Ouranos (θαλερὸν δ' **ἤχθηρε** τοκῆα. [138]). Detienne and Vernant suggest that Kronos' hatred stems from the fact that his father is θαλερός (*thaleros*) – he is 'vigorous, full of vitality, full of sap'. He is sexually hyperactive. In practice, this means that 'the nature of Ouranos, who is "avid for love" prevents the children he has engendered from occupying the place in the sun which is their due'.[343] Kronos hates his father because his father is depriving him of something. This is a hatred directed towards the incorrect use of violence in a hierarchical model – a violence which lacks any compensation. It is also a violence directed towards inherently unacceptable targets: family members.

Detienne and Vernant extend Kronos' hatred to all the children of Gaia and Ouranos, which seems reasonable, given that the situation is one shared by all. But is there textual justification for this? Why would Hesiod mention the hatred of Kronos alone if it is a sentiment shared by all? When Gaia asks for a volunteer to help stop Ouranos, the rest, we are told, are seized with fear (δέος, *deos*), and remain silent (167-8). Their fear prevents action. The fearful subject desires to stay away from the source of its fear, not to attack or harm it. Kronos alone – the hating one – is able to act. But, we may note, although his hatred extends as far as an extreme act of violence against his father, it does not lead to ostracisation. Ouranos retreats from his union with Gaia, but retreats only so far as his proper place in the heavens. Note that this is the only instance in Hesiod's poems where a word that undeniably means 'fear' appears. The fear of the other children, and their inability to act, is contrasted sharply with Kronos' hatred of his father and his ability to act violently against him. If we recall one of the studies conducted by Halperin, fear was associated with a judgement that one's ability to control a situation was low.[344] In this instance, the fear of the other children of Ouranos becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in relation to their ability to handle a situation: their fear prevents them from even trying to control it. Their fear trumps any hatred they might have, and prevents access to the tools of hatred which would allow them to act.

[343] Detienne & Vernant (1991: 63).
[344] Halperin (2008: 723-24).

This instance of hatred reveals two things: first, that hatred can be a motivator to violent action if it is the dominant emotion, and secondly, that hatred is not governed only by one's circumstances, but also by an individual's character: despite their shared circumstances, hatred is not the emotion experienced by all of the children. Their lack of hatred allows them to be dominated by other emotions that prevent action. Their inability to act – to hate as Kronos does – reveals that they do not have the necessary strength of character to express *biē* or *kratos*, to conquer their opponent, and establish and maintain their rule. Kronos' hatred is what allows him to act: to rebel, to overcome, to be victorious, and to rule.

This is an idea we see addressed far more explicitly in the *Works and Days*, where Hesiod makes clear the association between character, emotions, and the ability to act correctly or justly. The man who loves work, toil, and the good Eris behaves justly and appropriately; the men at the end of the final age are governed by an envy and a hatred which they do not know how to control, and thus act unjustly. The envious rivalries described between craftsmen at the start of the *Works and Days* is expressed in a way that demonstrates their good character through their ability to act appropriately and productively upon on emotion. Those overwhelmed by *hubris* display a bad character and act unjustly. And the man of bad character will more quickly succumb to *hubris* than the man of good character.

The chronological first mention of hatred is that of Ouranos himself, who hates some (or all) of his offspring from the start:

Ἄλλοι δ' αὖ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο
τρεῖς παῖδες μεγάλοι <τε> καὶ ὄβριμοι, οὐκ ὀνομαστοί,
Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς τε Γύγης θ', ὑπερήφανα τέκνα.
τῶν ἑκατὸν μὲν χεῖρες ἀπ' ὤμων ἀίσσοντο, [150]
ἄπλαστοι, κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πεντήκοντα
ἐξ ὤμων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσιν,
ἰσχὺς τ' ἄπλητος κρατερὴ μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ εἴδει.
Ὅσσοι γὰρ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο,
δεινότατοι παίδων, σφετέρῳ δ' **ἤχθοντο** τοκῆι [155]
ἐξ ἀρχῆς·

(147-56)

And still other children were born
to Gaia and Ouranos,

three sons, big and powerful, so great
  they could never be told of,
Kottos, Briareos, and Gyes,
  overmastering children.
Each had a hundred intolerably strong arms
  bursting
out of his shoulders,
  and on the shoulders of each grew fifty
heads, above their massive bodies;
  irresistible
and staunch strength matched the appearance
  of their big bodies,
and of all children ever born
  to Gaia and Ouranos
these were the most terrible,
  and they were **hated** by their father
from the beginning, … [345]

This passage presents another ambiguity: what is the range of children to whom the ἤχθοντο (*ēchthonto* [155]) applies? It could be the Hekatoncheires alone, or the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes, or all the children of Gaia and Ouranos. Frazer and West opt for this last possibility, as do Detienne and Vernant, Hine, and Nelson.[346] Mair, Evelyn-White, and Lattimore opt for the first.[347] Most applies it to the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes.[348] None explain their logic.

Later in the poem we are given a more detailed explanation of Ouranos' hatred towards his children, and in this instance it is inarguably just the Hekatoncheires he hates. Their imprisonment is recapped when Zeus frees them and asks for their support:

Βριάρεῳ δ᾽ ὡς πρῶτα πατὴρ **ὠδύσσατο** θυμῷ
Κόττῳ τ᾽ ἠδὲ Γύγῃ, δῆσε κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ,
ἠνορέην ὑπέροπλον ἀγώμενος ἠδὲ καὶ εἶδος
καὶ μέγεθος, κατένασσε δ᾽ ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης.
(617-20)

[345] I have adapted the translation of the last two verses here, because Lattimore chose to translate σφετέρῳ δ᾽ ἤχθοντο τοκῆι | ἐξ ἀρχῆς as meaning that the Hekatoncheires hated their father Ouranos, evidently taking ἤχθοντο as a middle verb. But in Homer this verb (ἔχθομαι, *echthomai*) is always passive in meaning, construed with the dative of the person by whom the subject is hated.
[346] Frazer (1983: 34); West (1988: 7); Detienne & Vernant (1991: 62-63); Hine (2005: 59); Nelson (2009: 28).
[347] Mair (1908: 36); Evelyn-White (1914: 91); Lattimore (1959: 132).
[348] Most (2007a:15).

Now, when Ouranos their father
bore a **hating** spirit against Obriareos
and Kottos and Gyes (because he was so struck
by their towering
vigor, and their stature and beauty),
therefore he bound them
in strong bonds, and settled them
under the wide-wayed earth.[349]

In this instance we are reminded that they are 'hated' (ὠδύσσατο, *ōdussato* [617])[350] from the first, which might suggest that we should interpret the earlier verses as telling us that Ouranos hates only the Hekatoncheires. However, the fact that Kronos keeps both the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes constrained despite his victory, suggests that, regardless of whom the *ēchthonto* of verse 155 applies to, the Cyclopes are hated figures by both Ouranos and Kronos. Imprisoning is a script we have already seen associated with an action-provoking hatred – Styx imprisons the hated oath-breaker within her waters. Given that Ouranos hates the Hekatoncheires and confines them, we can take this to be indicative of his hatred for all the children. The fact that Kronos later maintains their confinement suggests that he hates them too.

Note that Ouranos does not just *hate* the Hekatoncheires in verses 617-20: he is also envious, or jealous, of them. The ἀγώμενος (*agōmenos*) of verse 619 is a participle form of ἀγάομαι, an epic form of ἄγαμαι (*agamai*). This word shares a similar range of meanings to that which we see in *zēlos*. Ouranos is jealous, envious, or admiring of the Hekatoncheires. We are also told the cause of Ouranos' hatred and envy towards them: it is their 'presumptuous manhood' (ἠνορέην ὑπέροπλον, *ēnoreēn huperoplon* [619]); their 'physique', or 'comeliness' (εἶδος, *eidos*); and their 'greatness', or 'great size' (μέγεθος, *megethos*). These are the qualities that represent the physically embodied *kratos* and *biē* of the Hekatoncheires, which we have already discussed in depth in Chapter Three. Ouranos' hatred is compounded by envy, which, by its very nature, suggests at least a concern that the other may in fact be superior. He may hate all of his children, but he especially hates the Hekatoncheires.

[349] Adapted from Lattimore, who gives 'bitter at heart' for ὠδύσσατο θυμῷ (*ōdussato thumōi*). My adaptation is inarguably clumsy, but preserves the meaning of 'hated' for *ōdussato*, and 'spirit' matches how I have translated *thumos* throughout.
[350] This is the only occurrence of the word in Hesiod.

Another element of the hate script we have seen in Styx is hatred in response to a threat – Styx acts against those who threaten the stability of the universe by breaking their oaths. If Ouranos imprisons all of his children, it is because he sees them all as a threat. Singling out the Hekatoncheires to be explicitly described as hated suggests that Ouranos is acutely aware of the threat they specifically represent. And yet, Ouranos is evidently mistaken in his perception of threat levels. Given that the Hekatoncheires do not manage to conquer for themselves, or to rule, then we must conclude that the Hekatoncheires lack the hatred necessary to utilise their strength and violence, and thus also lack the ability to conquer and rule. But because hatred, as we have seen, can be an individual character trait, Ouranos cannot know whether they have the capacity to manifest their *kratos* and *biē*. They represent a threat not because they *can* manifest hatred, but because, as far as Ouranos knows, they *might be able to*.

Ouranos also fails to understand that Kronos' qualities represent the greatest threat: he is cunning (ἀγκυλομήτης, *agkulomētēs* [137, 168]), and most terrible of the children (δεινότατος παίδων, *deinotatos paidōn* [138]); he has the right type of character to express his hatred toward his father. The primary factor, then, for being able to successfully rebel against a jailer, is hatred. It is hatred that allows action – without it, the other qualities that one might possess are irrelevant. In being unable to correctly identify who possesses the level of hate necessary to act against him, Ouranos proves he lacks the capacity to master hatred. In being unable to master hatred he proves himself incapable of maintaining his rule.

But Ouranos also demonstrates his failure to master hatred in another way: any child of Ouranos and Gaia is an incorrect target for violence. They are members of his familial unit. They belong to his group, and, as head of that group, he owes them a duty of care. If functioning correctly, hatred should, in this instance, be expressed as violence towards outsiders who threaten the group, or, in a hierarchy, be paired with a compensatory benefit. Ouranos' hatred and violence neither protects the group nor provides any other sort of compensatory benefit. In an irony typical of Greek myth, it is Ouranos' incorrect usage of hatred in attempting to avert his fate that provokes the situation he wished to avoid: his violence towards his children is what sparks the hatred in Kronos that allows him to utilise violent cunning to conquer his father and rule in his place.

In using violence to overcome Ouranos' immoral society, Kronos demonstrates some ability to use hatred correctly. He is better than his father, but ultimately still gets it wrong in key ways: firstly, by continuing the imprisonment of the Cyclopes and the Hekatoncheires – his own siblings, who should be part of his ingroup – and secondly by perpetuating the cycle of violence against his own children. He falls into the same error that ultimately toppled Ouranos, and like Ouranos, his attempts to avoid his fate are what will ensure it. In swallowing his children he follows the same imprisonment hate-script as his father. And like *his* father, Zeus reacts in the same way – he overcomes his father with his own cunning and violence.

But Zeus himself is never actually imprisoned by his father – he alone escapes this fate. The fact that he still acts against his father shows part of his ability to use hatred correctly. Zeus as an individual might not be imprisoned, but his siblings – the members of his ingroup – *are*. Not only does he direct his hatred towards the correct target, he also strengthens his connection to the ingroup – his hatred and violence free them and protect them. Further, Kronos' continued confinement of the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes also allows Zeus to gain their support by freeing them. He uses his hatred to their benefit, and in response they will use their *kratos* and *biē* in his service. In freeing both his siblings and the Hekatoncheires and Cyclopes, Zeus demonstrates his mastery over hatred and thus proves worthy of those qualities represented by the children of Styx.

Although he is not directly mentioned as hating his father, Zeus' hatred is the most explicit of all: Styx is physically present on the side of Zeus. He hates all who oppose him. He hates Kronos and his allies because his ingroup suffered injustice from Kronos, and he hates Typhoeus because he represents a threat. Just as Kronos' hatred proved he had the strength and violence necessary to conquer his own father and rule, Zeus has an even greater hatred, which not only allows him to overthrow Kronos, but also allows him to maintain his position of sovereignty. Zeus' hatred is functional – it first spurs the overthrowing of a dysfunctional society, and then protects and maintains a functional society from an outside threat.

In the above instances, then, hatred is associated with action: those who do not hate

do not act and do not commit the type of violence that leads to victory. Ouranos hates all of his children and acts against them; most of his children do not hate him and thus do not act against him. The child who does hate him, Kronos, is the one to act against him. In turn, Zeus possesses Styx, and ultimately defeats all who oppose him. What we see here, is violence motivated by a threat and violence motivated by the suffering of injustice – of being cheated or betrayed by one who should consider you part of their ingroup or society. It is a violence that disrupts dysfunctional groups, and a violence that reacts to disruptions of the group. It is a hatred that duplicates the scripts we have seen demonstrated by Styx herself – violence against a (perceived) threat, resulting in imprisonment.

But just as his forefathers did, Zeus punishes those whom he considers a threat with imprisonment. In the case of Typhoeus, this is clearly functional, because he represents an outside threat to a social group. But what of the others Zeus imprisons, such as Metis?:

Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς πρώτην ἄλοχον θέτο Μῆτιν,
πλεῖστα θεῶν εἰδυῖαν ἰδὲ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ ῥ᾽ ἔμελλε θεὰν γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην
τέξεσθαι, τότ᾽ ἔπειτα δόλῳ φρένας ἐξαπατήσας
αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισιν ἐὴν ἐσκάτθετο νηδὺν, [890]
Γαίης φραδμοσύνῃσι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος·
τὼς γάρ οἱ φρασάτην, ἵνα μὴ βασιληίδα τιμὴν
ἄλλος ἔχοι Διὸς ἀντὶ θεῶν αἰειγενετάων·
ἐκ γὰρ τῆς εἵμαρτο περίφρονα τέκνα γενέσθαι,
πρώτην μὲν κούρην γλαυκώπιδα Τριτογένειαν [895]
ἶσον ἔχουσαν πατρὶ **μένος** καὶ **ἐπίφρονα βουλήν**,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ᾽ ἄρα παῖδα θεῶν βασιλῆα καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἤμελλεν τέξεσθαι, **ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ** ἔχοντα.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα μιν Ζεὺς πρόσθεν ἐὴν ἐσκάθετο νηδύν,
ὡς οἱ συμφράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε. [900]
(886-900)

Zeus, as King of the gods,
took as his first wife Metis,
and she knew more than all the gods
or mortal people.
But when she was about to be delivered
of the goddess, gray-eyed
Athene, then Zeus, deceiving her perception
by treachery
and by slippery speeches,

put her away inside his own belly.
This was by the advices of Gaia,
and starry Ouranos,
for so they counseled,
in order that no other everlasting
god, beside Zeus, should even be given
the kingly position.
For it had been arranged that, from her,
children surpassing in wisdom
should be born, first the gray-eyed girl,
the Tritogeneia
Athene; and she is the equal of her father
in **strength**
and **wise counsel**; but then a son to be King
over gods and mortals
was to be born to her, and he
would have **overwhelming passion**:
but before this Zeus put her away
inside his own belly
so that the goddess should think for him,
for good and for evil.[351]

Just as with Styx, Metis' generative power threatens to create a figure capable of conquering him. Metis' first child, Athena, already matches her father in 'wise counsel' (ἐπίφρονα βουλήν*, epiphrona boulēn*) and strength (μένος*, menos*). The son who would come after would exceed Zeus, and not only be 'surpassing in wisdom', but also be ὑπέρβιος (*huperbios*). This word is a compound of the preposition ὑπέρ (*huper*) and *bia* – violence. The meaning is one familiar to us from our discussion of *hubris* – overwhelming violence. *Huperbios* appears twice in the *Theogony*, and once in the *Works and Days*. In the *Works and Days* it is a distinctly negative thing:

μηδ' ἐν νηυσὶν ἅπαντα βίον κοΐλῃσι τίθεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ πλέω λείπειν, τὰ δὲ μείονα φορτίζεσθαι·
δεινὸν γὰρ πόντου μετὰ κύμασι πήματι κύρσαι·
δεινὸν δ' εἴ κ' ἐπ' ἄμαξαν **ὑπέρβιον** ἄχθος ἀείρας
ἄξονα καυάξαις καὶ φορτία μαυρωθείη.
(689-93)

Do not adventure your entire livelihood
in hollow ships.
Leave the greater part ashore and make

[351] Adapted from Lattimore, who transposes 'strength' and 'wise counsel'. Lattimore also translates ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ (*huperbion ētor*) in such a way as to split the two words. I have changed these not only to bring the two words back together, but also to make the translation of *huperbion* match that which Lattimore uses elsewhere.

the lesser part cargo.
For it is awful to run on disaster in the waves
of the open
water, and awful to put an **overwhelming** load
on your wagon
and break the axle, and have all the freight
go to nothing.

Hesiod advises his brother not to put a *huperbios* load on the cart, for doing so will break the cart. Something that is *huperbios* very literally breaks things. Here, it breaks the cart and undermines the industry towards which Hesiod urges his brother. In the case of Metis' second child, it is Zeus' society that he threatens to break.

The other usage of *huperbios* in the *Theogony* is with reference to the Cyclopes:

Γείνατο δ' αὖ Κύκλωπας **ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ** ἔχοντας,
Βρόντην τε Στερόπην τε καὶ Ἄργην ὀβριμόθυμον,
οἳ Ζηνὶ βροντήν τε δόσαν τεῦξάν τε κεραυνόν.
(139-41)

She brought forth also the Cyclopes,
who have **overwhelming passion**.
Brontes and Steropes, and Arges
of the violent spirit,
who made the thunder and gave it to Zeus,
and fashioned the lightning.[352]

The Cyclopes have an 'overwhelming passion' (ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ, *huperbion ētor*); the phrase is the same as that used in relation the prophesied child of Metis. The threat that Metis' future son would pose to Zeus is the same threat that the Cyclopes posed to Ouranos and Kronos – or rather, the same threat that Ouranos and Kronos *thought* the Cyclopes posed. As we have already discussed, Ouranos and Kronos both failed to recognise whether the Cyclopes and the Hekatoncheires actually possessed the capacity to use the threatening qualities they represented. Even though the Cyclopes have an 'overwhelming passion', the weapons they create when they are freed are imbued with *biē*, not ὑπερβίη (*huperbiē*). They do not engage in battle themselves – they do not possess the ability to use their *huperbiē* in such a way. Zeus understands

[352] Adapted from Lattimore in order to maintain the translation of *huperbios* as 'overwhelming', and to maintain the transliteration of Cyclopes (Lattimore uses Kyklopes). The word that Lattimore has translated as 'violent spirit' is ὀβριμόθυμον (*obrimothumon*).

this; Kronos and Ouranos do not. Zeus' mastery of hatred allows him to access the violence of the Cyclopes as *biē*, rather than being overwhelmed by their *huperbiē*. Kronos treats the Cyclopes (and the Hekatoncheires) as if they are a threat – but they are not the threat he was warned about. They are not, in fact, a threat at all, as demonstrated by the fact that they, like Kronos' other siblings, were seized with fear when Gaia approached them for help against Ouranos.

Zeus, on the other hand, has explicitly been told that his future son would overthrow him. This son *will* have the ability to utilise that overwhelming passion. This is the threat that Zeus seeks to avoid – the *huperbios* aspect of his future son. Zeus then responds to this by swallowing Metis. But this behaviour matches the actions of Kronos. Surely, then, this is a dysfunctional use of violence and hatred? However, in swallowing Metis he differs from his father. Firstly, Zeus swallows the mother, not just the offspring, and in doing so ensures that the maternal figure is not around to help her children overthrow him. Secondly, Zeus swallows Metis just as she is about to bring forth (τέξεσθαι, *texesthai*) Athena. Zeus does not wait for his son to be born so that he can then imprison him. In fact, he does not even wait for him to be conceived. Zeus does not have to imprison his son because his son will never exist. Zeus strikes pre-emptively, not reactively.

And Zeus, again different from Kronos, also does not imprison his daughter. Although Metis is *about* to give birth to her, it is Zeus that actually does so:

> Αὐτὸς δ' ἐκ κεφαλῆς γλαυκώπιδα **γείνατ**' Ἀθήνην,
> δεινὴν ἐγρεκύδοιμον ἀγέστρατον ἀτρυτώνην
> πότνιαν, ᾗ κέλαδοί τε ἄδον πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε·
> (924-6)

> Then from his head, by himself,
> he produced Athene of the gray eyes,
> great goddess, weariless,
> waker of battle noise, leader of armies,
> a goddess queen who delights in war cries,
> onslaughts, and battles.

Zeus appropriates for himself the generative power of Metis (as we have already

discussed in Chapter Two).[353] But he does more than appropriate the generative nature of Metis for himself; he gains the ability to generate, but also the ability to prevent generation. In doing so he also makes himself the conduit for her expression into his universe, rather than that which kept her from her rightful place in it. The fact that Zeus gains Metis' powers – generative and intellectual – for himself indicates her deeper incorporation into Zeus' universe, rather than her expulsion. Just as being forever in his presence is an honour to the children of Styx, Zeus' swallowing of Metis, making them inseparable, is a form of honouring her, rather than enacting a hate-script by imprisoning her.

Theogony II: The Inevitable Ones

The second group of figures described as hated contains Moros (211), Eris (226), and Styx (775). They are all described as being hateful (*stugeros*). Thanatos too, is hated (*echthros* [766]). Finally, the gods hate (*stugeō*) a specific place:

> Ἔνθα δὲ γῆς δνοφερῆς καὶ Ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος
> πόντου τ᾽ ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
> ἐξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ᾽ ἔασιν,
> ἀργαλέ᾽ εὐρώεντα, τά τε **στυγέουσι** θεοί περ·
>
> (736-39 & 767-70)

> And there, for the gloomy earth,
> and for Tartaros of the mists,
> and for the barren great sea
> and the starry heaven,
> for all these, the springs
> and the sources stand there, all in order;
> an unpleasant, moldy place,
> and even the gods **loathe** it.

This place is conceived of as being within Tartaros, but it is not the whole of Tartaros – it is only the place within Tartaros where Tartaros *begins*. Here too are the beginnings of earth (*gē* - i.e. *gaia*), the sea (*pontos*), and the heavens (*ouranos*). The above verses appear twice, framing Hesiod's description of the underworld. This framing device, fencing in the description of Tartaros, mirrors the hated place that forms the fence at which *Tartaros*, *gaia*, *pontos*, and *ouranos* all meet. We have

[353] Arthur (1982: 77).

already seen in Chapter One that this place at the edge of Tartaros, where earth, sea, and heaven all meet is where we find Styx. Styx is there, at the boundary of these geographic planes, preventing their expansion and limiting them by encircling them in her river. She is a force that constrains them.

When coupled with the hatred the gods have for Styx, Moros (Fate or Doom),[354] and Thanatos, the picture that emerges is that the gods hate all things that limit them, represent limits, or are inevitable. Thanatos may not be a limitation or inevitability for the gods, but it is an inevitability and limitation for their mortal playthings and offspring.

The implication of this list is that Eris is also considered as either a limiting, inevitable, or necessary force. Clay interprets the existence of Eris as a necessary opposition to Eros. Both are necessary (and yet also dangerous) to the functioning of the Universe.[355] One without the other is destructive or infertile. Clay points out that, whilst Eros and Eris both come into existence *before* Ouranos (and therefore before his imprisonment of his children), Hesiod does not actually name Eris until after the castration of Ouranos. Eris is a child of Night, but when Hesiod begins to name the children of Night, he only gets as far as Aether and Himera before interrupting himself to progress along the genealogy that leads into the story of Ouranos' actions. He pushes the rest of the list of the children of Night – including Eris – back until narratologically after the castration of Ouranos. Eros brought Gaia and Ouranos together; it is Eris that pushes them apart.[356] Zeus' stable universe would not be possible without Eris to balance out Eros. The necessity of Eris is emphasised in the *Works and Days*, where men must, through necessity (*anagkē*), worship her even though no man loves her (15-6).

It also indicates that, given Styx is hated, both oath and hatred itself are seen as inevitable. Indeed, after the passage describing Styx which starts with the fact that she is hated (775), Styx's waters are also described as ἄφθιτον (*aphthiton*, 'unperishing')

[354] Hesiod mentions Moros, Ker, and Thanatos, a trio with overlapping functions – Moros can be Fate or Doom, Ker can be Doom and Death, and Thanatos is Death. Much later, the Moirai are introduced as the children of Zeus and Themis (904). There is little textual evidence to aid in understanding how Hesiod might have conceived of all these beings as separate entities.
[355] Clay (2009: 20).
[356] Clay (2009: 20).

and ὠγύγιον (*ōgugion*, 'primeval, primal'). These descriptors give the idea of Styx as something that has always been there, and as something which will always be there: she is inevitable.

But the hatred against these figures is one devoid of accompanying violence. Given the nature of the hated figures this is unsurprising. They do not represent threats that can be avoided. They are inevitable, and violence against the inevitable would be wholly ineffectual: by their very nature they cannot be conquered. The hatred that is directed towards them is that of the hated towards the ones who constrain them.

Further, although Styx and the others like her present constraints, these limitations form part of the ordering of Zeus' universe. The constraining violence of Styx is moral because it is ultimately controlled by Zeus, who also grants the gods compensatory benefits. Thus, to act upon the hatred threat would here be immoral, because, once again, it would cause a destabilisation of the society. The stability of Zeus' society is reaffirmed by the fact that its participants refrain from immoral displays of hatred.

This gives us some interesting points about Hesiod's ideas of the nature of hatred: in the case of threats, they always lead to hatred and that hatred can, but *does not always*, manifest in violence. Ouranos imprisons his children, but the gods do not act against Styx. Whether the hatred is functional or dysfunctional, just or unjust, is determined by whether and how its violence manifests. There is nothing dysfunctional about the gods' hatred of Styx, because it is devoid of violence. On the other hand, Ouranos' response to the threat represented by his children is to violently constrain them. But this treatment is unjust: it offers no benefit and thus breaches the code of the society. Because of this, it creates a reciprocal feeling of hatred in the oppressed – Ouranos' unjust violence causes Kronos to hate him strongly enough to act upon that hatred.

This hatred felt by Kronos towards the oppressing figure of Ouranos is functional in nature because it destroys a corrupt society in order to establish a new one. This specific use of hatred generates no further reciprocal hatred: Hesiod makes no mention of the former oppressor feeling hatred towards those who overthrew them.

There is no mention of the Titans hating Zeus after he has confined them to Tartaros, nor of Prometheus hating Zeus after Zeus has punished him. Indeed, even if they do hate him, they do not experience that hatred strongly enough to be able to act upon it – Zeus' hatred in keeping them confined is stronger. Thus, acting upon hatred inappropriately is ultimately self-destructive – it causes further hatred in figures strong enough to act upon it. Acting on hatred appropriately is the opposite – it preserves a society because it does not generate further acts of violence. The morality of hatred is determined not by whether one experiences it or not, but whether one acts upon it appropriately or not. And being able to express hatred in a moral manner depends upon an understanding of the role hatred has to play in maintaining an ordered society, in a stable, just, universe.

To summarise: if the violence of hatred breaks the laws of a society (by offering no compensatory benefit, or as an act of cheating), then it is destructive and immoral. If the violence of hatred destroys an immoral community in order to replace it with another community, then it is moral. When the violence is used to protect a moral society from a threat that would destroy it, that expression of hatred too, is moral. But violence of hatred against threats that are accepted as part of the lawful function of a successful hierarchy would be immoral.

The consequence of this is that we must accept that for Hesiod, hatred could be felt towards virtuous actions and figures, because even though there are compensatory benefits to accepting the threat they represent, they still have the potential to cause harm. Further, the authority to rule is proven by the ability to master hatred, to use it in a way which benefits rather than harms, and to know when it should and should not be acted upon. Hatred can still exist inside a system, as long as it is not acted upon inappropriately, and this is true for all members of the social group: both the superior and the inferiors. The stability of a society is based on the ability of its participants to understand how to appropriately use hatred.

Ouranos fails completely to use hatred appropriately, and is thus deposed. Kronos displays the ability to use hatred appropriately, but does not always do so in practice and, as a result, he is also overthrown. Only Zeus gets it right. Zeus masters hatred through possession of her children. In having the children, he controls the ways and

circumstances in which hatred can manifest in a stable society. Zeus' justice is, in part, based on the ability to judge whether the enaction of hatred would be moral or immoral.

Zeus and Anger

Based on the elements of hatred we have seen so far it would be reasonable to think of Prometheus, and Zeus' treatment of him, when looking for other examples of hatred in the *Theogony*. There *is* an emotion that is mentioned repeatedly in relation to Prometheus, but it is not hatred. It is anger. The primary word in question is χόλος (*cholos*), though there is also one instance of ὀχθέω (*ochtheō*). Another word that can mean 'anger' is *thumos*, but it is never used in this sense in Hesiod.[357] Harris claims that the gods in Hesiod are 'scarcely less irascible than Homer's',[358] citing multiple verses as examples.[359] Some of the examples Harris cites are instances in which the word used is not *cholos*, but *koteō*, νέμεσις (*nemesis*), or ἀγαίομαι (*agaiomai*). Let us briefly examine these three words before turning to *cholos*.

Koteō is a word we have already encountered – it appears alongside *phthonos* in the early verses of the *Works and Days* when Hesiod describes the healthy competition between workers caused by the good Eris:

> καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ **κοτέει** καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
> καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ **φθονέει** καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.
> (25-26)

> Then potter **bears grudge** against potter,
> and craftsman against craftsman,
> tramp **is jealous** of tramp,
> and singer of singer.

The noun form of *koteō*, κότος (*kotos*) means 'grudge' or 'ill-will' (a phrase that came up repeatedly in the definitions of English words associated with hatred (see p. 24). Given that Hesiod is talking about long-term sentiments which encourage men to work, 'grudge' or 'ill-will' seem much better contextual fits than 'anger'.

[357] Cairns notes that the same is true of Homer (2003: 21).
[358] Harris (2001: 137).
[359] Harris (2001: 136, 148).

What of *nemesis*? The example Harris gives of *nemesis* as meaning 'anger' is verse 303 of the *Works and Days*, where the word is νεμεσῶσι (*nemesōsi*): a verb form of *nemesis*. Unlike any other word we might take to mean 'anger', Nemesis *is* personified by Hesiod. It is not my intention to discuss the exact nature of Nemesis in Hesiod's works, though such an analysis would certainly be interesting. Instead, I shall discuss her only insofar as is necessary to establish that her character is not one of anger.

Let us briefly examine more closely the verse that Harris cites:

> τῷ δὲ θεοὶ **νεμεσῶσι** καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς
> ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν,
> οἵ τε μελισσάων κάματον τρύχουσιν ἀεργοὶ
> ἔσθοντες·
>
> Gods and men alike **resent** that man who, without work
> himself, lives the life of the stingless drones,
> who without working eats away the substance
> of the honeybees'
> hard work;
>
> (303-6)

Nemesis here is a reaction to the idle man who does not work – the man whom we have seen is closely associated with *zēlos*. It is indignation directed at the man who, through envy, takes from the enviable worker. Indeed, it is only a few lines later that *zēlos* is mentioned in regards to the unworking man, whose constant companion is Famine – Famine who hates the working man. The man who does not work but instead takes what he wants is the man acting in the way Hesiod predicts men will act at the end of the final age, when Zelos, with his hateful eyes, runs rampant, and men sack each other's cities. And in this final age of man, Nemesis will abandon mortals:

> καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
> λευκοῖσιν φάρεσσι καλυψαμένα χρόα καλὸν
> ἀθανάτων μετὰ φῦλον ἴτον προλιπόντ' ἀνθρώπους
> Αἰδὼς καὶ **Νέμεσις**· τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ
> θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι· κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή.
>
> (197-201)

And at last Aidos and Nemesis,
shrouding
their bright forms in pale mantles, shall go
from the wide-wayed
earth back on their way to Olympos,
forsaking the whole race
of mortal men, and all that will be left by them
to mankind
will be wretched pain. And there shall be no defense
against evil.[360]

When Nemesis and Aidos (Respect, Shame) leave, all hell breaks loose. Nemesis is a daughter of Nyx, who bore her to bring misery to mortal men (πῆμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι [*Th.* 223]). Based on her parentage and the 'negative' nature of her siblings, Konstan suggests that 'it is plausible to suppose that Nemesis here bears the negative sense of "resentment" or even "hatred" rather than "righteous indignation"'.[361] There are two points to note here – first, that one of Nemesis' siblings is Φιλότης (Philotes) – Love/Friendship. Her siblings are not wholly 'negative'. Secondly, that if she *were* wholly negative, this could not be used as an argument to assume the emotion represented is closer to hatred, given that, as I have demonstrated already, Styx is not intrinsically negative. For Nemesis to align with Styx, she too, must be a nuanced figure.

The word used to describe the 'misery' that Nemesis brings to mortals is *pēma*, which, as we have already seen in Chapter One, is closely associated with oath. Indeed, it is only seven verses later when we are told that Horkos, last child of Eris (daughter of Night) brings misery to mortal men. But as we have seen in the case of Horkos, *pēma* does not preclude Nemesis from having a positive and necessary function. If anything, it assumes that there *is* a positive function, by drawing attention to the negative effects that it might also have. Like Oath, she brings misery, but is also necessary for a structured and moral society.

Discussing Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Konstan notes that *phthonos* and *to nemesan* have 'a great deal in common',[362] and indeed, Aristotle notes that some people consider them

[360] Adapted from Lattimore, who expanded the first verse to include translations of Aidos and Nemesis as 'Decency' and 'Respect'.
[361] Konstan (2006a: 119).
[362] Konstan (2006a: 111).

the same thing (2.9, 1386[b]16-17). When the final days of the fifth age arrive in the *Works and Days*, Nemesis leaves as Envy (Zelos), with his hateful eyes, arrives, and oaths are broken. Based on this, it is fair to say that Hesiod's Nemesis is conceptually associated with envy, rather than anger.

Harris also claims that in the *Works and Days*, Zeus is angry towards those who abuse their family (327-34).[363] The word in question there is ἀγαίομαι (*agaiomai*), and is more commonly translated (like *to nemesan*) as 'to be indignant'. Despite translating it as 'anger', Harris is forced to admit that the word 'and its cognates are rare words of somewhat unclear meaning, but Zeus' reaction is obviously negative.'[364] But a clearly negative meaning is not strong enough grounds to assert that it is anger, and there is no strong argument to take it as such.

There are two other words in the *Theogony* which *may* mean 'anger': *koteousa*, and *acheuō*. Each word appears once. *Koteousa* appears when describing Hera's sentiment towards Herakles as she nurtures the Lernaean Hydra to bring him trouble (313-5). This is a participle form of a word we have already encountered in the *Works and Days*: *koteō*. There, it was taken by all to mean 'grudge', and was associated with *phthonos* (and thus with hatred).

In verse 868 *acheuō* appears in relation to the Typhonomachy, as Zeus hurls Typhoeus down to Tartaros (ῥῖψε δέ μιν θυμῷ **ἀκαχὼν** ἐς Τάρταρον εὐρύν).[365] The primary meaning of this word, however, is 'grief', rather than 'anger'. In the *Works and Days* Hesiod warns his brother that if he does not work, he will be forced, in 'grieving spirit' (θυμὸν ἀχεύων, *thumon acheuōn*), to beg from his neighbours for food (397-400). This phrase matches the θυμῷ ἀκαχών (*thumōi akachōn*) of verse 868 in the *Theogony*. Cairns claims that *achos* (the noun form of *acheuō*) 'represents the mental distress which is part of anger *and other emotions*' (my emphasis).[366] If Hesiod had here wished to display pure anger on the part of Zeus, he had other words at his disposal. Certainly Zeus hates Typhoeus, as we have already discussed, but it seems to be that the other emotion Zeus experiences here is far more complex and

[363] Harris (2002: 289).
[364] Harris (2002: 289 n. 13).
[365] ἀκαχὼν (*akachōn*) is a participle aorist form of *acheuō*. The aorist verb is ἤκαχον (*ēkachon*).
[366] Cairns (2003: 21).

nebulous than the pure anger displayed elsewhere.

Let us return now to the words in Hesiod that can undisputedly be taken to mean 'anger'. Between the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* there are eleven instances of *cholos* or related forms – eight in the *Theogony*, three in the *Works and Days*. Of the eight mentions in the *Theogony*, seven of them are in relation to Prometheus. The single instance of *ochtheō* is also in relation to Prometheus. In verse 533 *cholos* appears twice in relation to the end of Zeus' anger when Herakles frees Prometheus from his bonds (*desmoi* [522]):

> τὸν μὲν ἄρ' Ἀλκμήνης καλλισφύρου ἄλκιμος υἱὸς
> Ἡρακλέης ἔκτεινε, κακὴν δ' ἀπὸ νοῦσον ἄλαλκεν
> Ἰαπετιονίδῃ καὶ ἐλύσατο δυσφροσυνάων,
> οὐκ ἀέκητι Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ὑψιμέδοντος, [530]
> ὄφρ' Ἡρακλῆος Θηβαγενέος κλέος εἴη
> πλεῖον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν ἐπὶ χθόνα πουλυβότειραν.
> ταῦτ' ἄρα ἀζόμενος τίμα ἀριδείκετον υἱόν·
> καί περ **χωόμενος** παύθη **χόλου** ὃν πρὶν ἔχεσκεν,
> οὕνεκ' ἐρίζετο βουλὰς ὑπερμενέι Κρονίωνι.
> (526-34)

> But Herakles, the powerful son
> of light-footed Alkmene,
> killed the eagle
> and drove that pestilential affliction
> from Iapetos' son, and set him free
> from all his unhappiness,
> not without the will of high-minded Zeus
> of Olympos
> in order that the reputation
> of Thebes-born Herakles
> might be greater even than it had been
> on the earth that feeds many.
> With such thoughts in mind he honoured his son
> and made him glorious,
> and **angry** as he had been before,
> he gave up his **anger**;
> for Prometheus once had matched wits
> against the great son of Kronos.

Zeus gives up his anger not because Prometheus has done anything to appease his anger, but because he has a greater desire to increase the reputation of his son.

The fact that *cholos* appears twice in a single verse (533) suggests an intensity that is

only confirmed by verses 553-61, where *cholos* again appears twice, along with *ochtheō*:

χερσὶ δ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἀμφοτέρῃσιν ἀνείλετο λευκὸν ἄλειφαρ·
χώσατο δὲ φρένας ἀμφί, **χόλος** δέ μιν ἵκετο θυμόν,
ὡς ἴδεν ὀστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίῃ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ. [555]
ἐκ τοῦ δ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων
καίουσ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ θυηέντων ἐπὶ βωμῶν.
τὸν δὲ μέγ᾽ **ὀχθήσας** προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς·
"Ἰαπετιονίδη, πάντων πέρι μήδεα εἰδώς,
ὦ πέπον, οὐκ ἄρα πω δολίης ἐπιλήθεο τέχνης." [560]
ὣς φάτο **χωόμενος** Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς.
(553-61)

In both his hands he took up the portion
of the white fat.
And he **was angry** at heart
and the **anger** mounted in his spirit
when he saw the white bones of the ox
in deceptive arrangement.

Ever since that time the races of mortal men
on earth have burned
the white bones to the immortals
on the smoky altars.

Then Zeus the cloud-gatherer
being angered greatly said to him:
"Son of Iapetos, versed in planning
beyond all others,
old friend, so after all you did not forget
your treachery."

So spoke angry Zeus,
who knows imperishable counsels.[367]

Even within this passage alone, the repetition of the word demonstrates the intensity of Zeus' feelings towards Prometheus.

The final mention of *cholos* in relation to Prometheus is in verse 615, where Hesiod compares the inescapable evils woman represents to as comparable to Zeus' inescapable anger against Prometheus:

[367] Adapted from Lattimore primarily with regard to formatting, but also to change the translation of *cholos* in verse 554 to 'anger', rather than 'spite', and to maintain the grammatical forms of the word in question in the translation.

Ὣς οὐκ ἔστι Διὸς κλέψαι νόον οὐδὲ παρελθεῖν·
οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰαπετιονίδης ἀκάκητα Προμηθεὺς
τοῖό γ᾽ ὑπεξήλυξε βαρὺν **χόλον**, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγκης**
καὶ πολύιδριν ἐόντα μέγας κατὰ **δεσμὸς** ἐρύκει.
(613-16)

So it is not possible to hide
from the mind of Zeus, nor escape it;
for not even the son of Iapetos,
the gentle Prometheus,
was able to elude that heavy anger,
but, for all his
numerous shifts, necessity
and the mighty chain confine him.

The preceding verses (590-612) comprise Hesiod's intense diatribe against women. No man can escape the evils of women (brought about by Zeus), just as Prometheus could not escape the anger of Zeus. Pandora, and women, are the punishment received by men for Prometheus' deceitful actions. The creation of Pandora is caused by Zeus' anger against Prometheus, and the intensity of Hesiod's negative portrayal of women matches the intensity of Zeus' anger towards Prometheus.[368]

In the *Works and Days* two of the uses of *cholos* are again in the context of the punishment Zeus directs towards men because of Prometheus' actions. First we are told that the labour men must undergo to produce food from the earth is part of the punishment for the crimes of Prometheus. Then we are reminded twice (47, 53) of Zeus' anger at Prometheus. This is immediately followed by the description of the creation of Pandora – man's other punishment.

The final mention in the *Works and Days* is Zeus' anger toward the silver race of men, whom he hides under the earth because they would not honour the gods:

οὐδ᾽ ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν
ἤθελον οὐδ᾽ ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς,
ἣ θέμις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα. τοὺς μὲν ἔπειτα

[368] See Lardinos (2003) for an interpretation of the whole of the *Works and Days* as an angry speech akin to the angry speeches in Homer.

Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε **χολούμενος**, οὕνεκα τιμὰς
οὐκ ἔδιδον μακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν.
(135-39)

nor would they worship
the gods, nor do sacrifice on the sacred altars
of the blessed ones,
which is the right thing among the customs of men,
and therefore
Zeus, son of Kronos, **being angry** engulfed them,
for they paid no due
honours to the blessed gods who live on Olympos.[369]

Here we are explicitly told that Zeus' anger towards them is caused by the fact that they will not honour the gods: a form of contempt. In relation to the different groups of gods failing to show the honours due to each other, the dominant emotion, as we have seen, is hatred rather than anger. Why, then, should it be anger here? I suggest that the explanation is that in this instance, it is mortals failing to honour the gods: anger is an emotion directed by the gods towards mortals. Equally, though Prometheus may be a Titan, he has aligned himself with mortals and is acting on their behalf, and mortals share Prometheus' punishment.

In the *Theogony* there is one instance of *cholos* unrelated to Prometheus. It is in relation to the Fates (221), whose anger in pursuit of vengeance against gods and men is endless until they inflict their punishment:

καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο νηλεοποίνους,
[Κλωθώ τε Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον, αἵ τε βροτοῖσι
γεινομένοισι διδοῦσιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε,]
αἵ τ᾽ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε παραιβασίας ἐφέπουσιν,
οὐδέ ποτε λήγουσι θεαὶ δεινοῖο **χόλοιο**
πρίν γ᾽ ἀπὸ τῷ δώωσι κακὴν ὄπιν ὅς τις ἁμάρτῃ.
(217-22)

and she bore the destinies, the Moirai,
and the cruelly never-forgetful
Fates, Klotho, Lachesis, and Atropos,
who at their birth
bestow upon mortals their portion
of good and evil,

[369] Adapted from Lattimore and to maintain the grammatical form of the word in question in the translation.

and these control the transgressions
of both men and divinities,
and these goddesses never remit
their dreaded **anger**
until whoever has done wrong
gives them satisfaction.

The goddesses pursue their anger against both mortals and gods until the sinner has been punished. It is undeniable that their anger may be directed against a god, but the presence of mortals makes their sentiment appropriate. In contrast to Zeus' anger at Prometheus, though, the anger of the Fates ends when they have succeeded in punishing the offending target.

Hesiod's concept of anger seems far narrower than that of hatred: anger is associated exclusively with punishment, or those who are about to be punished. The punishment, like hatred, predominantly takes the form of imprisonment (we are not told the exact punishment that the Fates inflict). Like hatred, anger can be of a long duration, but can also be ended, just as the punishment for breaking the Styx oath does eventually end. Perhaps the only difference is that the repetition of *cholos* in relation to Prometheus suggests an explicit intensity.

There are several differences between Hesiod's portrayal of anger and that provided by Aristotle. Firstly, Hesiod's hatred cannot be construed as a disinterested desire for harm to come to the hated target, regardless of whether one is involved in bringing it about, or is even aware of it. Hesiod's haters either actively strive to obtain revenge and to punish, or understand that harm *cannot* come to those targets. For Hesiod, hatred in an even stronger motivator for revenge than anger is. Secondly, Aristotle claims that anger can only be directed towards individuals (*Rhetoric* 2.4, $1382^{a}5$-6; whilst this is the predominant usage of anger in Hesiod, Zeus is also angry at the whole race of Silver in the *Works and Days*.

Further, in Aristotle's account, anger ceases when revenge has been achieved (*Nichomachean Ethics* 1126^{a}). This is certainly true of the Fates, but Zeus' anger at Prometheus continues long after his punishments have been administered. He sets aside his anger not because his revenge has been achieved, but because he has a greater desire to see Herakles achieve further honour through the defeat of the eagle

that torments Prometheus. We might question whether his anger would ever have ceased had not the glory of his son been a factor. The anger of the Fates, however, *does* end when they have administered their due punishment to the offending party – just as Styx's hatred ends after she has punished the perjurer. On the other hand, Styx as river, oath, and boundary, must exist in perpetuity. The Aristotelian differences between anger and hatred relating to their duration and whether they end or not do not align with Hesiod's conception of anger and hate.

Does Zeus' anger preclude hatred? There is no reason to think so. Nothing in Hesiod suggests that Hesiod conceived of people being able to experience only one emotion at a time. Indeed, what we know of the sons of Iapetos, and Zeus' actions toward them, fits many of the elements we have seen in our hate script. We are not told the specifics of the actions of Menoitios or Atlas. It is possible Hesiod's audience would have assumed they took part in the Titanomachy, but while the Titans are confined in Tartaros, Menoitios is confined to Erebos, and Atlas is instead forced to hold up the heavens.

Menoitios is *hubristos* – excessively violent. Atlas' *kratos* is great enough that he can hold up the heavens, indicating that he is also capable of interfering with, and destroying, the physical order of Zeus' universe. The individual mention of their qualities singles them out as threats, and thus their punishment and constraint must also be specifically mentioned. Prometheus' qualities, too, single him out as a threat: he is cunning, and his attempt to best Zeus in cunning places him in direct individual rivalry with him.

Zeus' constraining of these three can therefore be seen as being caused by hating them due to the threat they present. Equally, Epimetheus' lack of *kratos* or *biē*, and his abidance with the laws and will of Zeus suggest both that he is not a threat (as befits his name, 'afterthought'), and that Zeus does *not* hate him. Consequently, he is not imprisoned. It is true that Zeus does harm Epimetheus by giving him Pandora as a bride, but his aim here is not to punish Epimetheus, but to introduce women to the world of men – it is part of the punishment of Prometheus. Even if it *is* thought of as a punishment, it is not a violent one. In fact, it is instead one that reinforces Zeus' control – Epimetheus becomes another delivery mechanism for his will.

So far, then, we have seen that violence and hatred are directed towards threatening figures, and manifested in the form of constraining. We have also seen it directed towards figures that are causing harm to the hater, or limiting them in some way. But it is not always the case that the target of injustice are able to act upon their hatred. They must have the type of character that allows them to feel hatred strongly enough; they must have *kratos* and *biē*. If they do, both those who experience hatred due to a threat, and those who experience hatred due to the injustice of another's actions, will be motivated to act upon it. Further, in cases where the subject is hated because they represent a limitation, hatred ought not to be acted upon. To be just is to be able to distinguish when hatred should or should not be acted upon.

Works and Days

We now turn to investigate the *Works and Days* and examine the occurrences of hatred in this poem. Doing so will allow us to further understand the full nature of hatred by refining what we have already learned from the *Theogony*.

The first occurrence of a word relating to hatred in this poem is in verse 196:

> [ἕτερος δ' ἑτέρου πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξει·]
> οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου
> οὔδ' ἀγαθοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν
> ἀνέρα τιμήσουσι· δίκη δ' ἐν χερσί· καὶ αἰδὼς
> οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα
> μύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὀμεῖται.
> **Ζῆλος** δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀιζυροῖσιν ἅπασι
> δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁμαρτήσει, **στυγερώπης**.
> (189-96)

> Strong of hand, one man shall seek
> the city of another.
> There will be no favour for the man
> who keeps his oath, for the righteous
> and the good man, rather men shall give their praise
> to hubris
> and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm.
> Shame will
> not be. The vile man will crowd his better out,
> and attack him
> with twisted accusations and swear an oath
> to his story.

The spirit of **Envy**, with **hateful look**
  and screaming voice, who delights
in evil, will be the constant companion
  of wretched humanity.[370]

We have already discussed this passage in relation to the 'hateful look' of *zēlos*. Here, hatred is a necessary ingredient to act on envy. And this action results in the breaking of oaths and the swearing of false oaths. Here, as in the case of Ouranos, the envious violence is immoral – the hateful envy causes a violence that is directed towards incorrect targets: internal and equal ranking members of a social group. The result of this expression of hatred and envy is, once again, self-destructive: it is part of the inevitable downfall of the current age of man.

This destructive and violent envy that Hesiod predicts for the future is at odds with the model of behaviour Hesiod provided at the beginning of the poem:

εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν
οἶκόν τ᾽ εὖ θέσθαι· **ζηλοῖ** δέ τε γείτονα γείτων
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ᾽· ἀγαθὴ δ᾽ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ **φθονέει** καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.
(21-26)

A man looks at his neighbour who is rich:
  then he too
wants to work; for the rich man presses on with
  his ploughing and planting
and the ordering of his state.
  So the neighbour **envies** the neighbour
who presses on toward wealth. Such strife
  is a good friend to mortals.
Then potter bears grudge against potter,
  and craftsman against craftsman;
tramp **is jealous** of tramp,
  and singer of singer.[371]

Envious hatred is acted upon here, but not in a destructive way: it is not directed violently towards the rival, but towards one's own effort. It is self-creative rather than

[370] Adapted from Lattimore to preserve the meaning of στυγερώπης as 'hateful look'.
[371] Adapted from Lattimore. Lattimore translates κοτέει as 'enemy' and 'rival', but the word is not associated with any of the words we have examined as meaning either 'enemy' or 'rival', I have therefore changed it to 'bears grudge against' so as not to confuse the reader of the translation.

self-destructive. Zeus has ordered his universe such as to allow *zēlos*, and thus hatred, to be channelled productively by specifying where it can be targeted in order to be superior, enviable, and to obtain a just victory. If used correctly, then, *zēlos* allows hatred to be channelled away from the actual target of hatred when it would be immoral to act against that target, and instead motivates action to remove oneself from hateful position of inferiority or unproductivity. It is directed toward an exchange of the unenviable inferior position and the enviable superior position which, devoid of violence, provides a stable, cyclical exchange of roles. Part of mastering hatred, then, is the ability to master *zēlos*. Expressed incorrectly it feeds the immoral manifestation of violence, expressed correctly it channels the expression of hatred to a constructive end. Hatred is still present in non-violent *zēlos*, and still the motivator for action. It is only the manifestation of that hatred which has changed. Thus, being able to master *zēlos* is an essential component of being able to use hatred positively, and provides another way for hatred to lead to a just victory.

The next instance of a word related to hatred is in verse 300:

> ἐργάζευ, Πέρση, δῖον γένος, ὄφρα σε **Λιμὸς**
> **ἐχθαίρῃ**, φιλέῃ δέ σ᾽ ἐυστέφανος Δημήτηρ
> αἰδοίη, βιότου δὲ τεὴν πιμπλῇσι καλιήν·
> Λιμὸς γάρ τοι πάμπαν ἀεργῷ σύμφορος ἀνδρί·
> (299-302)

> Work, O Perses, illustrious-born, work on,
> so that **Famine**
> will **avoid** you, and august and garlanded Demeter
> will be your friend, and fill your barn
> with substance of living;
> Famine is the unworking man's most constant
> companion.

We have already discussed these verses in Chapter Two (p. 94), and noted both that Famine stays away from the target of hatred, and that he instead lives with the idle man who envies the industrious man. This behaviour matches that which we have seen in relation to the gods and the inevitable forces of the universe. It is not the case that the industrious man represents a comparable inevitable force, but he does represent the correct functioning of Zeus' universe. Nelson argues that the true

function of the section of the *Works and Days* generally known as the 'farmer's almanac' is not to give genuine farming advice, but to vividly place the listener (or reader) in the position of the farmer, where the farm is presented as 'a microcosm of the order of Zeus'.[372] On this model, we can understand Hesiod's advice on farming as combining the practical justice of farming with the cosmic ordering of Zeus' universe.[373] Laura Slatkin underlines the connection with the observation that Dike is one of the Horai ('Seasons') (*Th.* 901-2): Justice is not just intrinsically related to the work of men, but to 'the cyclic order of the seasons, which defines time itself'.[374] To engage with Zeus' world is, by its very nature, to engage with justice. Any violence, then, toward the industrious man would undermine the moral stability of the universe, just as breaking oaths does; it would be an incorrect use of hatred.

Finally, in verse 342 ἐχθρόν (*echthron*) is used by Hesiod in his advice to his brother: τὸν φιλέοντ᾽ ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ᾽ **ἐχθρὸν** ἐᾶσαι ('call your friend to a feast but leave your **enemy** alone'). This advice appears at first little more vague – it tells us to leave an enemy alone, but provides no immediate clue as to why we might consider someone an enemy. However, these verses appear in a long, direct address to Perses. It is specifically Perses that he is advising to leave his enemy alone. We know already what kind of man Perses is, and what qualities he possesses. Perses' enemies are those whom he envies, those whom he will seek to cheat, those whom he will injure through false and broken oaths. His enemy is his brother, a member of his familial unit, an equal. Perses' enemy is not an appropriate target to manifest hatred against. What Perses should be doing is, as Hesiod advises, leaving his enemy alone.

Ultimately, then, all but one instance of hatred in the *Works and Days* is about leaving the target of hatred alone when acting towards that target would be immoral. Though a man be an enemy, if attacking him would be disruptive to the social group, then he is not an appropriate target for violence. Whether the manifestation of hate in envy and violence is moral or not is governed by whether it would be creative or destructive. The only instance in which hatred is used to directly harm its target is in the final age of man. Here, the use of hatred directly contributes to the destruction of

[372] Nelson (1998: 51).
[373] Nelson (1998: 47-58). Clay (2009: 78-79) also comments on the relationship between agrarian work and justice in the *Works and Days*.
[374] Slatkin (2003: 47).

society, and thus represents the consequences of acting upon hatred inappropriately. Just as Hesiod counsels Perses to avoid *biē* because he does not know how to use it properly, he also counsels his brother not to act upon hatred, because Perses has demonstrated that he cannot use it correctly. Perses cannot use hatred to obtain a just victory, and thus should simply attempt to stick to not causing harm nor provoking reciprocal (and morally just) hatred.

In terms of instances of hatred in the *Works and Days* in which words for hatred do not explicitly appear, but a script for hatred can be identified, there are several.

The departure of Nemesis and Aidos at the end of the final age of man can be read as an instance where a hate script is present. Just as Famine avoids and hates the working man, Nemesis and Aidos avoid and hate the humans at the end of the final age. This is not to suggest that the comings and goings of every god and mortal can be taken as examples of hatred: an apocalypse is a rather extreme event, but Aidos and Nemesis are explicitly mentioned. The fact that the departure of goddesses such as Nemesis and Aidos can be motivated by hatred underlines how fundamental hatred is as one of the forces which governs relationships fundamental to the stability of Zeus' universe. Of course, Nemesis and Aidos are not the only gods that appear in this scene. Zelos arrives with his hateful eyes, embodying the other hate script we have seen in Hesiod: the desire to punish and destroy. Nemesis and Aidos retreat as Zelos arrives, keeping their distance not just from humans, but from the son of Styx – just as the gods keep their distance from Styx herself.

The man who is granted victory by Zeus through Hekate is he who demonstrates the necessary *kratos* and *biē* to overcome his rivals. This is such a strong example that it almost appears odd that he is not explicitly described as hating. When men arm themselves for 'man-destroying war' (πόλεμον φθισήνορα*, polemon phthisēnora* [431]) the victorious side is that which has directed its hatred as violence towards the enemy; when men engage in athletics, no destructive violence is directed toward the opponent. The fact that the victorious man can act upon his *kratos* and *biē* in the appropriate ways for different rivalries demonstrates that he has mastered the correct use of hatred. His victory is tied to the fact that he understands how to act in a way which respects the ordering of Zeus' universe.

Another rather obvious example would be the punishment Zeus inflicts on the cities of kings who rule unjustly. Horkos accompanies those who make crooked judgements (219), and the idea of breaking an oath is closely associated with miscarriages of justice. Those cities in which men harm their fellow citizens by breaking oaths or perverting the course of justice (245-69) are unpityingly destroyed by Zeus. Zeus' actions here position him as bestowing the punishment for breaking an oath, just as Styx bestows the punishment on the gods; just as Styx's punishment is an act of hatred, so too is Zeus'. But might we also understand the just members of a society hating the perjurer and those who destabilise their society from within their own ranks? If so, would we expect to see them turning on those members within their own society that act in a hateful way? Among the gods the expression of hatred toward those who act unjustly by breaking their oaths is ostracisation. It is a long but ultimately temporary quarantine to prevent contamination of the rest of the group. Their hatred ends, and the perjurer can be reintegrated into society. For humans, however, the punishment is destruction, and it comes from Zeus, not fellow men. In fact, Hesiod does not give details of how people *should* react in the specific case of unjust oaths or corruption of kings within a society.

The *Theogony* portrays the upheaval of unjust cosmic hierarchies, in which hatred was acted upon destructively, to enable the establishment of a new, just, and stable order. Once the old societies have been overthrown and a new, just, universe established, the instances in which hatred can be legitimately acted upon are restricted to those times in which it is useful.

It is noticeable in this regard that there is only one instance of a *kratos*-related word in the *Works and Days*; it is in verse 147 and appears in the description of the *krateropfrona thumon*, the 'strong-willed spirit' of the bronze age of men (perhaps the absence of *kratos* is one of the reasons Hesiod particularly emphasises the importance of correct application of *biē*). The *kratos* that was necessary to justly enact hatred in a way that topples an unjust society is absent from the men of Hesiod's age.

The very fact that Hesiod depends on Zeus to enact justice against the kings suggests an understanding of the reality that individuals such as himself and Perses have little

power within the hierarchy of human society. Lacking the necessary *kratos* and *biē*, men such as they cannot overthrow an unjust society themselves; correction must come from higher up in the hierarchy. The role of the working man is not to rebel, but to tend the land in a way harmonious with Zeus' cosmological structure. This order involves understanding when acting upon hatred is appropriate for men, and what expression that hatred should have.

Hesiod is explicit that injustice on the part of the kings, which involves the breaking of oaths and the incorrect use of violence, will be lead to a punishment that includes the destruction of innocent people, as when descendants are punished for their ancestors' crimes (*W&D* 280-85, 325-26). This certainly seems harsh to a modern reader, and raises questions about the justice of Zeus' actions and the nature of hatred. Nelson argues that, as dubious as the justice of Zeus' actions might seem to a modern audience, it is not something that Hesiod would even consider as needing addressing or an explanation. A Christian understanding, in which Zeus both punishes the guilty *and* spares the innocent, is simply not applicable to Hesiod. Justice is subservient to Zeus. It is a condition for humans, not for the gods.[375] This argument, however, is at odds with the importance of the oath of the gods, which even Zeus has bound himself to follow.

But we can understand Zeus' justice, and use of hatred and violence to destroy whole societies in terms of cosmic justice. Zeus' duty is not to protect individuals within a human society, but to protect the functionality of the larger cosmic model; a microcosmic unjust society goes against the whole cosmic model. Zeus' role as maintainer of order includes destroying societies that threaten that order by failing to follow his divine law. If a whole human society must be destroyed in order to do that, then so be it.

Such an interpretation is in keeping with archaic Greek notions of miasma that tie the behaviours of kings especially to the fate of their communities.[376] For Robert Parker this particular idea of the miasma of a king causing the destruction of a whole society

[375] Nelson (1998: 81).
[376] Parker (1996: 257-80).

is 'in part at least, a kind of moral level for use by subjects against their ruler'.[377] The 'moral level', is, of course, the divine justice of Zeus – he who has the qualities of hatred necessary to enforce the justice of the ordered universe. For Hesiod, there is nothing unjust about destroying innocent people, because they are contaminated by their fellow societal members. This miasmic model is in keeping with the Communal Sharing model of virtuous violence, in which a group as a whole share the punishments (and rewards) of all.

Even within an unjust human society innocent men should not use destructive hatred. As part of the larger cosmic order men should focus on behaving in accordance with the justice that their rank affords them. They should behave as if the *did* live in a just society, because, on the largest scale, they still do: they live in Zeus' universe. Justice is a divine construct, and it is divine law they must abide by. Given this, Hesiod is not concerned with telling his brother how he should react to the injustice of kings, but focuses on how he should act justly with regard to their own position in a hierarchy. He tells him how he should occupy himself and how he should treat those who are either physically close (neighbours), or family members. The closest advice Hesiod gives on the matter is when he tells his brother to leave his enemy alone (342). Of course, if his brother truly understood how society should work, he would understand that his enemies are those members of society who are unjust.

It is unsurprising, then, that the dominant form of hatred we see in the *Works and Days* is to do with avoidance. Men lack (or have been deprived of) the full range of tools required for the full, just, range of hate-scripts because they are a small part of Zeus' universe. Man's role is to do his part to stabilise his society; it is only Zeus who can justly use hatred to overthrow an immoral society.

[377] Parker (1996: 265).

Conclusion

Much of the scholarly research which has investigated either a single figure or a small cluster of figures in Hesiod's works has thus far focused on figures other than Styx. Detienne and Vernant concentrate on the function of Metis in the *Theogony* as the most important force ensuring Zeus' continued reign. They make her more important even than Kratos and Bie.[378] Metis belongs to a different group of concepts: she represents cunning and skilful superiority. But this is not a *superior* group of concepts. Zeus' ability to unify the cosmos and bring stability is tied to his ability to bring together cunning, violence, and emotions in a mutually supportive way.

Other scholars have focused on Hekate, to whom Hesiod dedicates so many verses and honours. Marquardt points out the importance of Hekate in relation to both her involvement in human affairs, and to her character as one who *wills* things.[379] Boedeker highlights her role as a force unifying disparate groups – men and gods, Titans and Olympians, new and old.[380] Clay develops these idea further, by proposing that she functions as a conduit between humans and gods.[381] Marquardt and Clay work on the assumption that Hekate is herself the one whose will she is enacting, but as we have seen, it is ultimately Zeus' will she represents. It is this that gives her the ability to dispense those qualities (*kratos*, *biē*, and *nikē*) that belong to Zeus. The will of Zeus in these affairs is that which will support the stability of the universe. For the universe to continue in its stable state, then the only way Hekate can operate is in accordance with his will.

Rudhardt observes that Hekate's position makes her a figure who is able to harm as well as help.[382] She can grant fishermen a good haul, but just as easily take it away (*Th.* 442-43). Hekate represents a boundary between humans and gods, just as Styx represents a boundary around the world above, and that outside Zeus' order. Given

[378] Detienne & Vernant (1991: 90).
[379] Marquardt (1981).
[380] Boedeker (1983).
[381] Clay (1984).
[382] Rudhardt (1993: 213).

the parallels between her position and that of Styx, it is unsurprising that she should share the dual aspects of being both helpful and dangerous. Just as Metis represents cunning, and Styx and her children represent qualities tied to emotions, Hekate represents yet another quality – that of will.

Only a few scholars, such Blickman and as Lye, have written anything that focuses specifically on Styx.[383] Blickman provides some valuable insight between the nature of oath and the justice of Zeus, but misses both the importance of Styx as hatred and of her connection to her children. Lye highlights some of the geographical functions of Styx as a boundary and limiting force, and rightly relates this to her role as oath, but still does not comment on the relation of these two things with hatred or the children of Styx. A key contribution of this thesis is to fully explore Styx as oath, river, and emotion, and to demonstrate the interrelations between them.

What a close analysis of the text has revealed is that Styx and her children are both dangerous and of fundamental importance to Zeus' universe and his maintenance of his position as ruler. Styx and her children, who have hitherto been considered minor characters in Hesiod's work, are, in fact, fundamentally important to the functioning of the cosmos and of society; we have ignored them to our detriment.

Another long-running scholarly focus is on the nature of *dikē* in Hesiod's works. Despite dismissing any connection between Styx and her role as oath, Solmsen highlights the importance of *dikē* for mortals in the *Works and Days*,[384] asserting that Hesiod's unique treatment of Dike is a result of his dealings with his brother. But, Solmsen thinks, Hesiod understands justice as not in itself sufficient for success. Success also requires the hard work involved in tilling the land.[385] Much more recently Nelson and Clay have returned to this topic, revising our understanding of Dike by presenting it as part of, rather than separate from, the idea of manual labour.[386] Both explore its connection to farming, and how this demonstrates that *dikē* for humans involves aligning their actions with the ordering of the universe, but neither connect *dikē* to emotions. And whilst Arthur has noted the central cosmogonic

[383] Blickman (1987), Lye (2009).
[384] Solmsen (1949: 96).
[385] Solmsen (1949: 89).
[386] Nelson (1997, 1998), Clay (2003, 2009).

role of *Eros* and Aphrodite as 'love', the potential relationship of either these specific emotions – or emotions in general – to *dikē* has not been explored. But as the example of Styx demonstrates, Hesiod's idea of human justice as aligning with a cosmic ordering also involves being able to express emotions correctly.

Another strand of scholarship on *dikē* has focused on the fable of the hawk and the nightingale in the *Works and Days*, and how to interpret it. Many scholars have contributed to this discussion. Older scholarship suggested we take the fable not to be a fable at all.[387] More recently, Nelson has suggested Hesiod's intention was that the listener revise their understanding of the meaning of the fable as Hesiod's narrative progresses.[388] This leads to a conclusion shared by Mordine: that Hesiod meant us to revaluate our understanding of the moral as the poem continues, and that a complete reading reveals Hesiod's belief that what constitutes justice and appropriate use of violence is different for animals, men, and gods.[389] Mordine's approach focuses on investigating the full meanings of *ainos* in order to understand the fable. Nelson's argument takes the approach of investigating the nature of justice, which leads to the claim that the actions of the hawk (when taken to be Zeus) are just, because it is Zeus that decides what justice is.[390] But even if this is the case, Zeus has bound himself to justice as a fundamental pillar of his continued order.

The understanding of the rules surrounding appropriate and inappropriate emotions and behaviour in different societal models afforded to us by Fiske and Rai supports a reading along the lines of that of Mordine, in which we understand that the *biē* appropriate to Zeus is not the same as that which is appropriate to men. The types of justice available to different members within a hierarchy is dependent on their place within that hierarchy. Although Mordine touches on the nature of *hubris*, neither Mordine nor Nelson focus on understanding the nature of *biē*, or what types of violence are appropriate to man. A sociological approach such as that of virtuous violence furthers our understanding of the fable by allowing us to examine the details of the differences in the roles of violence for men and Zeus, and thus, the different functions of hatred for different members of a society.

[387] Daly (1961), Heath (1984), Lamberton (1988).
[388] Nelson (1998: 77-81).
[389] Nelson (1998: 77-81), Mordine (2006).
[390] Nelson (1998: 81).

This thesis, through the examination of the roles, functions, and manifestations of hatred, begins the task of exploring how emotions fit into Hesiod's universe on a cosmic, moral, and social level. The nature of Hesiod's texts and his primary concerns with the ordering of the universe, and the ordering of societies within that universe, is enhanced by an understanding of contemporary, sociological approaches to the nature and function of emotions, such as that of Fischer and Manstead, where even emotions that seek to distance one from others are necessary and appropriate, depending on the circumstances.[391] The work of Halperin and colleagues on the impact of hatred between communities provides a model in which we can assess hatred between different groups in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*.[392] Combined with the theories of Fiske and Rai, this framework allows us to investigate the nature of *dikē* from the perspective of emotions.

Such a sociological approach must be underpinned by culturally-specific knowledge of what 'hatred' means to Hesiod. To this end, another contemporary approach serves us well: prototype analysis. Without such an analysis, based on close textual evidence, we can only investigate whether our own contemporary conception of hatred is present in Hesiod, rather than the unique qualities of Hesiod's concept of hatred. The result of the application of this approach is an enhanced understanding of the qualities and nature of hatred in Hesiod's poems.

Hatred is something that causes destructive action, but also avoidance, and it is also, for Hesiod, something that has a positive function in the maintenance of an ordered universe. It is something that the qualities of *zēlos*, *nikē*, *kratos*, and *biē* are closely related to, and governed by. Only by understanding how hatred should be acted upon can these qualities be used correctly.

This thesis also contributes insight into the on going discussions surrounding Hekate and the fable of the hawk and the nightingale, furthering our understanding of the nature of Hekate, and the full details of the moral of the fable of the hawk and the nightingale. Further, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the nature of

[391] Fischer and Manstead (2016).
[392] Halperin (2008, 2011a, 2011b), Halperin et al. (2009, 2011, 2012).

justice in Zeus' universe by outlining its relationship to hatred.

Hatred, Styx, and Oath

As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, Styx is particularly suited to the role she plays as the oath of the gods. She embodies both his promise of a stable and just universe, and the downfall of that universe should he break his oath. While Zeus keeps his oath, the destructive envy that others might have held towards him based on his position of power, his possession of victory, and his use of violence, are mitigated by the fact that he has subjected himself to the same threat represented by Styx. Whilst he keeps his oath, any hatred that would have been felt by his subordinates towards Zeus as the victor is redirected towards Styx instead. And so long as Zeus keeps his oath, Styx is not just a threat to him, but a threat to all of them. All of them must follow Zeus' example and keep their oaths. Should Zeus break his oath the structure of his society would disintegrate. The other gods would themselves no longer be bound by oath, and their hatred instead would be redirected towards Zeus, who, in breaking his oath, has deprived them all of the benefits that made their lower positions in the hierarchy tolerable.

Styx holds a liminal place in the world of the Olympians, as far away from them as she can possibly be – they go near her, or allow her near them, only when they have need of her services. It is a hatred that manifests as avoidance because there is nothing that can be done about it – recall Halperin's suggestion that, in the absence of a desire to improve the target (which might result in anger instead), hatred is associated with 'despair of any potential change.'[393] In Halperin's human conflict, this despair is caused by understanding that there *could* be a potential change in the behaviour of the hated other, but that it will not happen. In Hesiod's universe, a change in behaviour of the hated other would be catastrophic. The gods' avoidance of hated figures such as Styx is not caused by the idea that they *will not* change, but by the understanding that, for order to be maintained, they *cannot* change. Whatever potential damage the hated target may inflict – whether by punishing the oath breaker, or depriving humans beloved of the gods of their lives – it is *necessary* that it happen in order to keep the

[393] Halperin (2008: 729).

universe in order. To go near the hated gods is to be confronted with one's limitations.[394] In Halperin's research, this despair was associated with hatred towards a member of the outgroup. In Hesiod, we see it directed at members (begrudgingly) acknowledged to be not only part of the ingroup, but essential to its continued survival.

Styx' punishment of the gods who break their oaths can also be seen as a manifestation of *her* hatred. But Styx's hatred lacks any element of despair of potential change, nor is it tied to the intrinsic quality of the target. Instead, her hatred is caused by a specific type of offence, and the punishment her hatred inflicts is predicated on the idea that after the punishment is over, the god will be integrated back into society. Of more use to us in understanding this particular manifestation of hatred is the research on hate mail conducted by Temkin and Yanay, which we discussed in the introduction. Expressions of intragroup hatred can, they claim, serve a dual function: of punishment *and* potential reintegration.

Styx's expression of hatred does not just serve a function of punishment, but is also an attempt to persuade the individual to reform. The hope of all is that the punishment, or even the threat of it, will lead an individual to change their ways, preventing any weakening of the identity of the ingroup at all if they change their ways before they are punished, or by restoring or refortifying the identity of the ingroup if they change their ways after the punishment. Recall that Styx's punishment can be seen as a metaphorical death and rebirth – of exclusion and re-inclusion. Temkin and Yanay discuss the idea that the targets of the hate mail were seen as behaving in accordance with values that undermined the moral basis and cohesion of the ingroup: precisely the behaviour which Styx is there to prevent and punish. Those who weaken the cohesion of the ingroup blur the boundary between ingroup and outgroup, weakening the communal identity. Styx, as the metaphorical boundary of oath and the literal boundary as river, prevents the blurring of the boundaries.

The letters studied by Temkin and Yanay drew on symbols of hate recognised by all

[394] Sternberg might characterise this type of hatred as 'seething hate', in which the hated target is potential seen not as 'subhuman', but as 'more than human.' But on Sternberg's model, this type of hatred should lead to violence against the target, rather than avoidance. (2003: 312).

within the community as reminders of the dangers of aggression and hatred from outside the community – symbols which are reminders of things that are a danger, and are feared.[395] In the same vein, the punishment of Styx reminds the gods of their previous state of being unhonoured and, in the case of Olympians, of being entombed within their father. The punishment of Styx is a fearful and grim reminder of what their lives were like before, of the external threats which face them should they not overcome the internal threats. Contra Aristotle then, Hesiod's hatred is not always endless. When directed towards individual who is a member of the ingroup it can end when due atonement has been made.

Fischer and Manstead suggested that even strongly negative emotions that predominantly serve a distancing function can still serve an affiliation function in strengthening the identity of an ingroup through a communally hated target.[396] The gods' communal hatred of Styx helps solidify their identity as part of Zeus' group, and their commitment to his laws and order. Styx' necessity represents a potential threat which they must guard against – but it is not a threat from outside the group, rather, it is a threat which arises from inside. The agreement of all to follow Zeus' laws or accept the punishment creates a constant awareness of the threat to their social group, but also a commitment to protect it by ostracising those whose actions threaten to destabilise it. She is a force that keeps them in check, so that all may continue to benefit from Zeus' reign. The superiority of her position may lead to envy of Styx, but it is an envy that must be engaged with by improving oneself – or, at the very least, by refraining from denigrating oneself by breaking oaths. Only if everyone behaves as they ought to can victory be obtained by all.

Hatred as punishment is associated with water and with frigid cold. But when involved in conflict, in the form of *kratos* and *biē*, it switches to the other extreme – fire, boiling, and burning. We might suppose that this difference aligns with the different actions of hatred we have seen in Hesiod, and the fact that he does not fully distinguish between anger and hatred: in all situations where anger is present, so too is a script for hatred. In the introduction we saw that many people associate hatred with coldness, and anger with heat. Mapping different kinds of hatred, Sternberg referred

[395] Temkin & Yanay (1988: 177).
[396] Fischer & Manstead (2016:431-32).

to the different types with varying metaphors of temperature – from 'cold hate' to 'boiling hate' and 'burning hate'. Sternberg characterises 'cold hate' as having a predominant component of contempt. It is characterised by the idea that the target is 'unworthy' somehow.[397] Sternberg's model of 'cold hate' does not map neatly on to Hesiod. The 'cold hate' of Sternberg's model emphasises indoctrination as a frequent component, and treats it predominantly as hatred towards a group. But we could perhaps see in Styx' hatred of oath breakers an element of contempt – the concept closest to contempt that we have seen in Hesiod is the depriving or denying of honours. One who breaks a Styx oath has proven themselves unworthy of their position, and is temporarily deprived of their honours.

Hesiod does not advocate for a world in which hatred is banished or somehow absent. It is there as a pervasive force – Styx's water is unperishing (ἄφθιτος, *aphthitos*) and primeval (ὠγύγιος, *ōgugios*) (805-6). She has always been, and always will be. She encircles the world, marking the boundary – not just as oath, but as hatred. On one side are the Olympians, governed by Zeus and bound under his laws and justice. On the other side are those defeated targets of Zeus' hatred: imprisoned in Tartaros, a hated place, and surrounded by the hated river.

Hatred, Styx, and her children

To rule, to possess *nikē*, Zeus must be enviable – he must be an object of envy to others, otherwise his victory and rulership is meaningless. But being an object of envy is intrinsically risky – when envy is present, it is a source of motivation to action. Whether envy motivates the subject to better themself or to attack the envied target, it still represents a potential threat. Regardless of how the victory is achieved, it always poses the possibility of the superior becoming inferior – of being outdone fairly, or violently overthrown. And regardless of how victory is sought, it is always motivated by an element of *zēlos* – and of hatred. One manifestation of Hesiod's hatred is a desire to destroy, but that includes outdoing the subject of hatred – destroying their position by making it one of inferiority rather than superiority. This is what Styx herself does when she inflicts her punishment for breaking an oath. Styx embodies

[397] Sternberg (2003: 311-12).

these two different aspects of *zēlos* – of making oneself superior through harming the other, and making oneself superior by performing one's appropriate role.

Hatred is also an essential component of victory. Zeus' victory, just as Kronos', is achieved by hatred-driven violence. But unlike Zeus, Kronos lacks the ability to maintain his position. He can conquer, but he cannot remain the conqueror. To gain and maintain power is to be able to wield hatred correctly. It is to understand how to direct one's own hatred, but also how to direct and control the hatred of others. Kronos' inability to correctly wield hatred is demonstrated by the fact that he keeps the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclopes – potent forces of *kratos* and *biē* – imprisoned. It is Zeus alone that understands how to correctly utilise these forces.

Styx's children Kratos and Bie find their fullest form in the burning forces of Zeus' thunderbolts, and Typhoeus' flaming eyes. This type of hatred is associated predominantly with threats that come from outside the group – with the Titan generation (to which even Prometheus belongs), and Typhoeus. In these instances a different hate script must be utilised in order to protect the ingroup. To fend off a threat from outside one must engage in conflict. Envy from outside may lead to other figures attempting destructive action against the ingroup – attempting to defeat the ingroup and claim victory for oneself. In these instances, victory must be actively maintained by showing one's superiority and right to rule through defeat in combat.

Zeus' possession of the children of Styx, and her allegiance to him – so long as he himself also keeps his oath – allows him to protect his ordered universe in two ways, warding off threats from both inside and outside the group. In either scenario, hatred is essential. In contemporary society, we attempt to regulate war and conflict. We argue over whether there is such a thing as 'moral violence', and expect that once a war is over, friendlier relationships should be attempted, and reparations made. Hesiod has no such idea. In Hesiod's world, perpetual imprisonment or exclusion of the outgroup is a correct and functional manifestation of hatred.

Hesiod's World

Hesiod's model of hatred, as something that has a fundamental place in a just world,

as something which can be *productive* instead of just *destructive*, is at odds with contemporary ideas of hatred. For Aristotle, *phthonos* was the only emotion that was wholly bad. For contemporary Western society, hatred, too, is on that list. Laws exist in many countries to curb 'hate speech'. We distinguish certain crimes as 'hate crimes'. For the archaic and ancient Greeks, the prevalent sentiment was that one should love one's friends and hate one's enemies. It is the sentiment by which the allies of the Greeks and Trojans are drawn into their war; it is expressed in Pindar (*Pythian* 2. 83-5), and later by the logographer Lysias (IX. 20). For Aristotle, part of the nature of friendship is that friends hate each other's enemies (*Rhet*. 1381a).

In the contemporary Western world, however, the on-going influence of Christianity advocates for loving one's enemies and helping them (*Matthew* 5. 44, *Luke* 6. 35). Only in some instances, where the specific aim is to kill or destroy, do some members of a society approach the idea that it is 'okay to hate the enemy', whether that be an enemy in physical war, or one who is perceived as destabilising a society: few object to expressing hatred for convicted paedophiles.

The research by Eran Halperin demonstrates a commitment to understanding the role that hatred has in conflict between societies, but the ultimate goal of the research is to try and understand how such situations might be non-violently defused. When an emotion would lead to a violent outcome, our focus should be on strategies to defuse or avoid the arousal of that emotion. To this extent, the difference between contemporary societies and Hesiod is not so much over whether hatred *can* be constructive or just, but what exactly constitutes 'constructive' or 'just' uses of hatred. Hesiod is committed to a world in which a single social hierarchy is the correct model. It is moral to destroy societies that do not conform to this model. In contrast, the contemporary Western world has a more complex relationship with the destruction of other societies. We accept that certain forms of society can co-exist and that different social groups do not intrinsically represent a threat to our own.

Certainly, there are certain times when we enact what for Hesiod would be an appropriate hate-script. When we dedicate ourselves to self-improvement in order to triumph over a rival and prove our superiority, we behave in a way that Hesiod sees not just as moral, but as driven by hatred as well: it is a *moral* expression of hatred.

But in contemporary Western society 'friendly rivalries' are considered more acceptable, whilst the actions of hated rivals are generally assumed, or perceived to be, destructive. Views that present hatred as intrinsically negative seek to remove hatred from the qualities of rivalry and victory. The question becomes whether hatred really is inevitable and intrinsic. When we seek to detach rivalry and victory from notions of hatred, are we simply denying that we feel hatred, re-defining hatred into a narrower emotion that than which Hesiod considered? Or are we actively seeking to suppress what both Hesiod and contemporary Western society understand as 'hatred'? And in doing so, are we proving that hatred is not essential for a stable society, or are we simply decreasing our own ability to maintain that society? Would society be better if we all accepted it was not just okay to hate Nazis, but that doing so was necessary and moral in maintaining an ordered and stable society? That punching Nazis is a correct expression of hatred?

But why do these differences between our own and Hesiod's conceptions of the morality of hatred exist at all? Hesiod's cosmogony and philosophy is shaped by his lived reality. The differences between his world and that of contemporary society are too great to enumerate.

Certainly, despite frequent failure to abide by it, the Abrahamic ideal of loving one's enemy has had a profound impact on dominant modes of morality in contemporary Western societies. Vengeful Greek gods destroying the whole for the sins of one have been replaced by a benevolent God who, the sake of a few good men, would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah.

Our world is much bigger than Hesiod's. Our cities are far larger, our societies much bigger, and different societies are in perpetual contact with a far broader range of different cultures. War, politics, international trade, and migration were of course part of the archaic world. Ships capable of transporting both people and goods were in use.[398] Hesiod acknowledges this in his recounting of his father's migration (*W&D* 635-40), and the advice on transporting cargo by sea, (618-32) though he is clearly distrustful of the latter and does not seem to consider it necessary.

[398] Thomas (2009: 39).

In contemporary Western society, the power of central government and the state is inextricably woven into the lives of everyone within a geographical area in ways that are alien to Hesiod's world, where states 'were only just beginning to form'.[399] And such a state is 'normally one of many organizations within a given area, defined by its superiority over other organizations in wielding force.'[400] This is certainly a model of power questioned by Hesiod in the *Works and Days*, who argues that it is not appropriate for mortals.

What city there is, Hesiod advises Perses to stay away from, exhorting him not to waste time listening to quarrels in the *agora* (*W&D* 27-29). In essence, Hesiod advises his brother to focus on his own job, and ignore the political wrangling of society. But with states still in their infancy, one is far more sheltered from the broader impacts of national and international events and relations. Though many today still like to abide by this idea, and seek to avoid active political engagement, their avoidance provides no shelter from the impact of politics as it might have done for Hesiod and Perses.

In Hesiod's world, hatred can be usefully manifested as avoiding one's enemies, and there is no suggestion that doing so is ever bad. But the enormity of the shift between political and economic models mean that doing so today does not provide the benefit it would have done for Hesiod or Perses. Whilst on an interpersonal level, avoiding one's enemies is still something generally considered advisable in contemporary Western society, the legal, ethical, political, and economic structures woven into society frequently prevent this from being practical or even possible.

Our hatred cannot be managed by Hesiod's model; the necessity of engagement with people we hate prevents even the possibility of manifesting hate in a productive way. Either it will explode destructively, in a way that harms us, or it must be contained. For Hesiod, the question of how to supress hatred is irrelevant: it can always be expressed in a functional way. For contemporary Western society, on the other hand, it is a most pressing concern.

[399] Ulf (2009: 83).
[400] Morris (2009: 71).

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